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CHAPTER 1
PEOPLE POWER OR PALACE COUP: THE FALL OF MARCOS
Anne Mackenzie
The overthrow of President Ferdinand E. Marcos in February
1986 by a largely bloodless popular uprising and military revolt
came as somewhat of a surprise to Philippine watchers and Filipinos
alike. The Marcos regime had demonstrated an uncanny ability to
ride out major political storms, and there existed a widespread
expectation that the dictatorship would weather yet another crisis
in disregard of popular sentiment. The events of the 1986
presidential election and its aftermath proved the observers wrong.
This paper is an attempt to ascertain the true nature of Marcos's
ouster. Was it a triumph of people's power, a spontaneous non
violent uprising which showed the people's refusal to continue
obeying Marcos's government? Or was it a coup d'etat, the
president being betrayed by his long-time defence minister, Juan
Ponce Enrile? Or was it a combination of both people's power and a
palace coup, and if it was, which was the more significant of the
two? Furthermore, what role did the United States (US) play in the
events of February? Did Washington have a hand in orchestrating
the overthrow of Marcos? A final question related to Marcos's fall
concerns the extent to which the events of February could be
categorized as revolutionary: was the 'snap revolution', as it has
been called in the Philippines, indeed a revolution?
The first section of this paper outlines the Marcos regime in
the 1980s. It analyses the long term problems facing the
government such as the deteriorating economy, the decreasing
solidarity of the ruling elite, the growing opposition - democratic
and armed, domestic and international - the worsening human
rights situation, and the uncertain state of Marcos's health. The
second section traces Philippine political history from Benigno
Aquino's assassination on the tarmac of the Manila International
Airport on 21 August 1983 to Marcos's arrival in Hawaii on board a
United States Air Force (USAF) transport plane on 26 February
1986. Particular attention is paid to the last month of Marcos's rule.
The third section investigates the level of US involvement in
Marcos's demise. Subsequent sections deal with the military-coup
interpretation of February's events and the people's-power
interpretation of those events, with special reference to the church's
role. The final section analyses the revolutionary aspects of the fall
of Marcos.
There remains one qualification to be made at the outset. It is
essential to note that the events of February 1986, particularly the
four days of 'people power' (22-25 February), occurred almost
entirely within the bounds of Manila. While the provinces voted in
the presidential election, and many of the underlying causes of the
weakening of the Marcos regime were to be found in the
countryside, the confrontation between the people and the
government centred on Manila. Indeed, the February uprising
involved only the organizations of the traditional, legal opposition;
the organizations of the Left, which are strongest in the countryside,
boycotted the election, and this effectively isolated them from the
popular Manila movement. Those members of the Left who ignored
the boycott and participated in Cory Aquino's campaign and then
rallied in the streets of Manila had to do so under a yellow (Cory)
flag, and not a red one.
The Marcos regime in the 1980s
To understand the forces at work in February 1986, it is
essential to appreciate the state of the Marcos regime in the 1980s.
Marcos had ruled the Philippines for twenty-one years at the time
of his overthrow. Elected as president on a Nacionalista party ticket
in 1965, Marcos defied the logic of Philippine elite democracy to be
re-elected in a fraud-marred contest, in 1969. Constitutionally
barred from a third term, Marcos chose to impose martial law in
September 1972. On the pretence of combatting subversion and
general lawlessness, and sweeping away the corruption and
inefficiency of the 'old society', Marcos ordered the arrest and
detention of most major opposition figures, both moderate and
radical. He went on to establish an authoritarian state, with all
legislative and executive powers ultimately resting with the
president. Cosmetic reforms were introduced with the interim
Batasang Pambansa (National Assembly) being elected in 1978, and
martial law being nominally lifted in January 1981, but the regime
retained its esentially personalist authoritarian character.
Martial law was necessary, Marcos claimed, to promote
economic development. Marcos adopted a more interventionist
programme of economic development following the then-
predominant trend in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) toward state involvement in, and regulation of, capital
accumulation and industrialization He was apparently vindicated for
the years 1973 to 1979 when GNP grew at an average annual rate
of 6.9 per cent, in contrast to the average of 5 per cent in the years
1960 to 1972 (Lindsey 1985:30). Much of this growth stemmed
from the further opening-up of the economy to foreign enterprise.
Marcos established Export Processing Zones (EPZs), wholeheartedly
embracing the World Bank's development strategy (Bello el al,
1982). He borrowed heavily to finance the expansion of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), corporate equity investment, his
wife Imelda's 'city beautification' sprees, and self-enrichment.
These spending priorities highlight the essential weakness of
the Marcos economy: the contradiction between two imperatives,
that of the regime's short-term political survival and that of the
country's long term developmental needs. This contradiction was
exacerbated by the unfavourable international economic conditions
of the 1980s, and by 1985 the Philippines had accumulated a
massive foreign debt of between $US26 and $US29 billion and a
growing debt service burden, poor terms of trade, and negative
domestic growth (Manning 1984:396; Far Eastern Economic Review
(PEER) 23 January 1986). Marcos sought to entrench his power by
positioning his 'mates' or 'cronies' as they became known, in control
of strategic sectors of the economy. Cronyism was an inefficient and
vastly expensive way to underpin the regime's political control, and
it alienated much of the business community. Among Marcos's
coterie of cronies were 'coconut king' Eduardo Cojuangco, 'sugar czar'
Roberto Benedicto, and Herminio Disini, procurer of Marcos's $US80
million kickback from the Westinghouse company for the Bataan
nuclear power plant (Sydney Morning Herald 8 March 1986). 'Ill-
gotten' wealth also found its way to loyal servants, such as defence
minister Juan Ponce Enrile, who reputedly amassed a fortune which
ranks him amongst the wealthiest Filipinos (Sydney Morning Herald
3 March 1986).
The most blatant self-enrichment belonged to the Marcoses
themselves. It has been alleged that 'Marcos and his wife Imelda
were driven by a lust for wealth and power that seems almost
pathological. Their extravagance and greed have, more than any
other single factor, crippled the economy' (McCoy 1984:25).
Documents recovered from the deserted Malacanang palace after
their overthrow indicate that the Marcoses' personal wealth in cash
and property could total $A10 billion, with much of it having been
siphoned off from foreign aid and international loans (Sydney
Morning Herald 13 March 1986). Marcos used the Philippines
national treasury as his own bank, a bank for which no accurate
accounts were kept. International Monetary Fund (IMF) auditors
discovered that 'accounting errors' were responsible for the $US7
billion underestimation of the foreign debt for most of 1983
(Rosenberg 1984:29).
The 1980s saw the US, the IMF, local and international
business, and elements of the Filipino administration (the
'technocrats') led by prime minister Cesar Virata and central bank
governor Jose Fernandez, attempt to pressure Marcos to reform the
economy and liberalize trade. Marcos's intransigence so annoyed
the US that it voted to postpone indefinitely the third tranche of the
ft IMF loan due in October 1985 (Villegas 1985:140). In cabinet, the
US-trained technocrats usually succumbed to crony expediency.
Despite a Virata and Fernandez victory over inflation and interest
' rates in 1985, they were unable to reverse the continuing
disinvestment initiated by Benigno Aquino's assassination in August
1983. Neither could prevent the government securing P2.5 billion
cash from the central bank in the first month of campaigning for the
February 1986 election. These funds were used to cover election
expenses such as vote buying and crowd hire (PEER 23 January
1986).
The average worker and peasant did not benefit from Marcos's
economic policies. Admittedly, Marcos's land reform programme
did improve the conditions of a limited number of tenant farmers in
rice and corn areas, although its primary purpose was 'to protect the
regime from rural unrest rather than to redistribute substantially
wealth and political power to villagers' (Kerkvliet 1979:113-114).
For most Filipinos, martial law saw a decline in real wages and
living standards (Lindsey 1985). Malnutrition among children was
prevalent. The indirect tax burden increased. The urban poor faced
conditions of increased unemployment, inadequate housing and
virtually non-existent welfare and infrastructure services.
Naturally, discontent was high, but Marcos believed he could ignore
the poor, and quiet their protests with the AFP, while
simultaneously parrying technocrat, business, IMF and US demands
with the warning that he constituted the only bulwark against
communism.
The Marcos regime is often said to have rested on three
domestic pillars of support - the AFP, the cronies and the
technocrats - and one foreign pillar, the US. The cronies constituted
the 'Marcos faction proper', their loyalty assured by their
dependence on state protection and subsidization of their
enterprises. By the mid-1980s, crony capitalism became a liability
to the continued existence of the regime. No longer were the US, the
'professional' AFP, business and the technocrats prepared to tolerate
the endemic corruption, inefficiency and incompetence of the
cronies, seeing them as the chief cause of the economic crisis and
the failing counter-insurgency strategy. Marcos, however, displayed
no inclination to sacrifice the cronies. He continued to rescue failing
crony firms with government bank credit and attempted to further
extend the monopolies in 1985 (Villegas 1985:138-140). The
balance of forces within Marcos's inner circle was changing in the
1980s. Defence minister Enrile, considered until mid-1983 as the
second most powerful man in the nation and Marcos's most likely
successor, lost out to a newly-formed coalition between AFP chief of
staff, General Fabian Ver, Imelda Marcos and Eduardo Cojuangco
(Hill and Hill 1983:168f). This trio came to dominate in cabinet
from mid-1983, sparking concerns that should Marcos suddenly
disappear from the political stage, Imelda, Ver and Cojuangco would
assume control of the government and so maintain crony
ascendance. Such a scenario was an anathema to the US, the
professional military, business and the World Bank-inspired
bureaucrats (Wurfel 1985:121-124).
Prime Minister Virata led the technocratic lobby, the group of
high level administration officials whose managerial ability and
/links with international financial and development institutions
i ensured them key positions in the Marcos regime (Nemenzo
1985:48-49). The technocrats shared with the professional military
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an institutional rather than personal loyalty to Marcos, a disdain for
politicians and a belief in a strong executive which would facilitate
central planning. In order to implement their model of
development, they were not, in principle, opposed to joint
technocratic-military rule (Diokno 1985:4; Bello 1984:300),
although, in cabinet, the technocrats frequently found their plans
thwarted by the cronies. The lower level bureaucrats displayed
qualified loyalty to the regime at whose pleasure they were
employed. Yet their complacency was shattered by the outrage of
the Aquino assassination and the steady decline of their real
incomes.
The military consisted of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) - army, navy, airforce, Philippine Constabulary (PC) - the
Integrated National Police (INP) and the Integrated Civilian Home
Defense Forces (ICHDF). The National Intelligence and Security
Authority (NISA) was theoretically independent of the military.
The military was undoubtedly a major beneficiary of martial law,
gaining an expanded role in security, law and order, judicial,
administrative, developmental and political activities (Hernandez
1985a:184-190). This was accompanied by an increase in AFP size
from 55,000 personnel in 1972 to over 250,000 in 1984 (Hernandez
1984:21) and in budget from P604 million in 1972 to P8.8 billion in
1984 (Bulletin Today 9 March 1984). Clearly the military had a
vested material interest in the continuation of such bountiful
conditions. The Marcos era brought the military much further out
of the barracks, so that by 1983, all post-Marcos scenarios posited a
politically active military (May and Nemenzo 1985).
By 1985, two distinct factions had formed within the military.
General Fabian Ver headed the integrie faction, a military parallel
to the cronies. The integries were often appointed to senior
positions on grounds of their personal loyalty to Marcos. Many
were Ilocanos, the ethno-linguistic group of the president. Their
seniority caused much resentment amongst the regular officers,
most of whom had graduated from the Philippines Military
Academy (PMA) and earned promotion through their military
abilities. PC head, General Fidel Ramos, led this regular faction,
whose officers found avenues of promotion blocked yet were
increasingly posted to insurgency-ridden regions. It was amongst
the ranks of the regular officers that the reformist elements were to
be found. These elements established the Reform the AFP
Movement (RAM) which surfaced publicly in March 1985 (PEER 30
January 1986). Ver's implication in the assassination of Aquino and
widespread dissatisfaction over the acquittal of Ver and twenty-five
others accused of the murder only widened the schism within the
military.
The Marcos regime has been described as 'a bureaucratic
superstructure constructed on the basis of loyalty to its chief
political architect' (Magno 1983:3). It lacked any institutionalized
process of succession, an omission which came to undermine it in
the 1980s. While an authoritarian ruler remains apparently healthy
and competent, the question of succession is kept from the main
political agenda. However, Marcos's evident ill-health spurred
frantic factional competition and shifting alliances as leading
contenders manoeuvred for positions in the post-Marcos era.
Enrile's split with both Ver and Cojuangco can be seen in this light.
8Another example of succession manoeuvring was the move to
restore the vice-presidency in 1983. The US, the technocrats and
the reformist military saw the vice-presidency as an institution to
facilitate a smooth transition of power, if not the removal of
authoritarianism per se (Magno 1984:4-5), and as a way to avert a
Ver-Imelda grab for power. Clearly, even amongst Marcos's pillars
of support, there was substantial dissension by late 1985. It
remained for the opposition to provide a feasible alternative.
General Order No 2 of 1972, which ordered the arrest and
detention of persons named, effectively obliterated the traditional
elite opposition of the 1970s and severely curtailed the activities of
the political Left. All political parties were banned, until Marcos
resurrected the electoral process in 1978 as a way of legitimizing
his rule. The traditional opposition organized to compete with
Marcos's Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) party, but failed to attract
mass support until after Aquino's assassination. The Left continued
to grow and consolidate although still proscribed.
Within the legal opposition in 1985, there were two main
schools: the traditional elite democrats and the non-traditional
cause-oriented groups. The traditional strand encompassed the
Social Democratic Party led by Francisco Tatad and Reuben Canoy;
the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO), a loose
coalition of sections of the pre-martial law and essentially
personalist Liberal and Nacionalista parties and ten regional parties
coming together in 1981 and headed by Salvador Laurel; and PDP-
Laban, a merger party formed from Lakas Ng Bayan (Laban:
People's Power Party), a pro-Benigno Aquino party established to
contest the 1978 Batasan elections, and the Philippine Democratic
Party (PDP), founded in 1982 by Cagayan de Oro mayor, Aquilino
Pimentel and pursuing a 'Christian socialist' programme (Villacorta
1983; Rosenberg 1984; Nemenzo 1983 and 1985). Among the
more radical, nationalist, non-traditional, cause-oriented groups
were: Jose Diokno's Movement for Philippine Sovereignty and
Democracy (KAAKBAY); the Justice for Aquino, Justice for All
coalition (JAJA); the Coalition of Organizations for the Restoration of
Democracy (CORD) which co-ordinated the boycott of the May 1984
Batasan elections; and the National Alliance for Justice, Freedom
and Democracy (NAJFD), formed in 1983 with ex-Senator Lorenzo
Tanada as its chairman, and rumoured to be a non-violent
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) front organization.
Although efforts to unify the legal opposition were made, they
invariably foundered on personality issues and ideological
prejudices, particularly the fear of communist infiltration.
Within the Left, which is loosely synonymous with the 'armed
opposition', there are three general ideological streams: Marxist,
Christian and Islamic. Each of these is subdivided, but one or two
major organizations stand out from the plethora of splinter groups.
The Islamic Left is found in Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago
where the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) has been waging
a war for Muslim autonomy since the early 1970s. A peace
settlement was negotiated in 1976-1977, but government inaction
and continuing confrontations resulted in an upsurge in MNLF
activity in 1985 (Villegas 1986:132).
The Marxist Left is both the most powerful and best known
component of the Left, although over the years it has been affected
by internal factional division. The original communist party, Partido
Komunista sa Pilipinas (PKP) was formed in 1930, but its
unsuccessful leadership of the Huk Rebellion (1946-1954) virtually
destroyed it as a political force, especially after it joined the
parliamentary struggle. The new generation of Marxists in the early
to mid-1960s, led by Jose Maria Sison (alias Amado Guerrero),
seriously questioned the approach and relevance of old PKP
theories. Sison's incisive critique of the Huk debacle so strained
relations with the old guard that it precipitated the formation of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) in December 1968. The
Marxist-Leninist-Maoist CPP formed the New People's Army (NPA)
in March 1969 to prosecute the people's war against 'US
imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism', adapting
Maoist strategy to Philippine conditions (Rosenberg 1984).
By 1986, the NPA was operating in at least sixty-two of the
nation's seventy-three provinces and could command between
10
11,000 and 16,500 full-time armed guerrillas (Sydney Morning
Herald 5 August 1986), with perhaps as many again in the part-
time barrio militias. NPA numbers have probably been constrained
by a shortage of weapons. Nevertheless, defence minister Enrile
acknowledged the NPA's inroads, calculating an annual growth rate
of 23 per cent since 1981 (Villegas 1986:131). Most CPP predictions
of the 'forthcoming Philippine revolution' still talked in terms of a
concerted push for Manila in the 1990s (Philippine News and
Features 8 October 1984; PEER 2 January 1986). The bitter lesson
of the Huks' overestimation of their strength and effectiveness in
the 1950s has been well learned.
The National Democratic Front (NDF) is another CPP
organization, formed in 1973 as part of a united front strategy for
revolutionary forces. The NDF consisted of approximately twelve
organizations but was dominated by the CPP. It provided behind-
the-scenes political guidance to various legal, urban and rural
sectoral organizations, prominent among which were the Kilusang
Mayo Uno (KMU), one of the most active, nationalist, trade union
groups in the Philippines; the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan
(BAYAN), an anti-Marcos mass-based coalition of cause-oriented
groups formed in March 1985; and allegedly the National Alliance
for Justice, Freedom and Democracy (NAJFD). The NDF played an
integral role in the post- 1983 popular upheaval because of its
mobilizing capacity, but the CPP's decision to boycott the 1986
presidential elections meant there were no red banners fluttering
during 'people power'.
The Christian Left was divided over the questions of
collaboration with the CPP and involvement in the armed struggle.
CNL (Christians for National Liberation), a constituent sectoral group
of the NDF, was the most radical pro-communist group on the
Christian Left. Established by Father Edicio de la Torre in 1972 and
advocating armed struggle, CNL has been a constant source of
irritation and concern to the institutional church, which fears its loss
of authority (PEER 21 February 1986). Among the other radical
Christian groups is the Philippine Democratic Socialist Party (PDSP),
formed in 1973 but insignificant until 1978, when it was
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'discovered' by a number of concerned bishops and religious
superiors who saw it as offering a revolutionary but non-communist
alternative which would stem the flow of priests and nuns to the
NDF (Nemenzo 1985:54). The PDSP has since split over the Marxist
collaboration question (ibid. 53; Rosenberg 1984).
The fear of being branded 'communist' paralysed the Roman
Catholic hierarchy for much of the 1970s. During this time, the
church leader, Cardinal Sin, picked a compromise course between
the regime and the people, engaging in a programme of 'critical
collaboration'. This approach became untenable with Aquino's
assassination; a more active profile was required by the
institutional church to halt defections to the Christian Left
(Shoesmith 1983:1). This is not to imply that the church was
completely silent in the years before 1983. The regime was at
times trenchantly criticized, but the criticism was not consistent,
unlike the abuses (Youngblood 1981:257). Task Force Detainees
(TFD), a human rights organization established by the relatively
radical Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines
(AMRSP), was the most vocal church critic of Marcos. The Basic
Christian Communities were of immense significance in some areas
for uniting the people in the struggle for a better life, a struggle
which often involved co-operation with the NPA. These
developments highlighted the conservative-radical and centre-
periphery tensions within the church, tensions which were relieved
by an increasingly progressive approach by the Catholic Bishops
Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) (Shoesmith 1985:74).
While the US was uncritical of the declaration of martial law in
September 1972 there remained an underlying uneasiness that
'Marcos was not a very reliable instrument of US policy' (Shalom
1981:177). The US's international strategic and ideological interests
coloured all aspects of the US-Philippines relationship, subsuming
even President Carter's interest in human rights (Bello 1984:294).
The Reagan administration embraced Marcos as a great anti-
communist, democratic ally, extending to Marcos that long-awaited
invitation to the White House. By 1983, certain US officials were
coming to realize that Reagan's 'benign stance only encouraged
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Marcos's worst instincts' (Munro 1984:174). In June 1983, the State
Department's 'senior unnamed sources' were declaring the twilight
of the Marcos years. Aquino's assassination firmed the State
Department's resolve to encourage the emergence of a democratic
'third force' to replace Marcos; hence, the pressure to ensure that
the May 1984 Batasan elections were 'meaningful' (ibid.; Soriano
1984b:22). A similar logic applies to the 1986 election. The US
wanted to appear more critical in its support of Marcos, so as to
extract itself from the increasingly popular cry, 'Down with the US-
Marcos Dictatorship!' (Poole and Vanzi 1984:30). But as February
1986 approached, it was clear that US attempts to modify Marcos's
behaviour with 'quiet diplomacy' had failed miserably.
The Marcos regime faced increasing opposition from the US
Congress. Not only were aid bills significantly amended, but
congressional representative Stephen Solarz initiated official
investigations into the Marcos family's alleged New York property
holdings (PEER 2 January 1986). Even the US's long term strategic
interests were being re-evaluated: alternative military base
structures were studied, although invariably rejected on grounds of
cost, inadequate alternative locations and inability to replicate the
cheap, skilled Filipino labour force (Munro 1984:186). The wisdom
of reflex anti-communism was also re-examined, with a number of
commentators noting that the US's strategic, economic and
ideological interests would be better served by a return to liberal
democracy than by helping Marcos in his pig-headed perseverance
in Vietnam-style anti-insurgency operations (Solarz 1985; Pringle
1980). Furthermore, there was growing concern within the US over
Marcos's human rights record.
The writ of habeas corpus was suspended with the
proclamation of martial law. Thirty thousand Filipinos were
arrested in its first weeks, with Marcos admitting to Amnesty
International in 1975 that 6,000 people were still detained (Shalom
1981:170). The suspension of the fundamental rights of the citizen
theoretically ended with the lifting of martial law in 1981, although
'numerous features of the law indicate that the Philippines is still a
dictatorship' (ICJ 1984:117). Marcos still governed by decree under
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the power granted him by constitutional Amendment No. 6 (1976) ;
normal democratic practices, such as criticizing the government,
continued to be offences attracting severe penalties; arbitrary and
indefinite detention were maintained under the Preventative
Detention Action; the definition of 'subversion' remained
sufficiently broad and ambiguous to allow many civil matters to be
tried before military courts; activities of the media and labour
remained carefully controlled while judicial subservience was
perpetuated (ibid. 11-18; Hernandez 1985b:245-252).
The assassination of Benigno Aquino at Manila International
Airport in 1983 was the most blatant of many human rights
violations by the Marcos regime. Extra-judicial killings, known as
'salvaging', escalated in the 1980s to such an extent that TFD
estimated that in the first nine months of 1983, there were 191
individual killings, 126 killed in group massacres and seventy-four
disappearances attributed to government security forces in
Mindanao alone (ICJ 1984:12). Instances of widespread arrest and
detention, torture, village burning and 'hamletting' - 'the herding of
rural residents into special camps by military or civilian authorities'
(ibid. 35) - have been collated by TFD, Amnesty International, the
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), and other local groups
such as Jose Diokno's Free Legal Advice Group (FLAG). In the 1970s,
the Marcos regime, although authoritarian, had avoided the violent
excesses of more ruthless Third World dictators. Any glimmers of
enlightenment appeared to be waning in the 1980s. There is
evidence that the rate of salvaging was increasing and that of
arrests declining: it became easier to shoot people than to gaol
them. A contributory factor in the explanation of this trend could
be found in the disease lupus erythematosus.
The state of Marcos's health was a constant source of
speculation throughout the 1980s. Although always denied by
Malacanang, it had been alleged that Marcos was suffering from
lupus erythematosus, a disease of the immune system which
generally attacks the kidneys and brain. It is incurable, but it is
treatable with a survival rate of five to ten years (Asiaweek 2
February 1986). The liberated Malacanang provided tangible
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evidence of Marcos's serious ill-health, and if lupus was the disease
in question, as seems likely, it provides a key to Marcos's growing
isolation in Malacaiiang in the mid-1980s. It would have been
difficult for him to move far from his dialysis machine. Also, one of
lupus's more serious side effects is paranoia. This could explain
Marcos's increasingly unclear and often politically insensitive
manoeuvring, and Ver's ascendancy within the inner circle.
Marcos's illness further contributed to the fragility of his regime, so
that by 1985, his demise appeared inevitable.
The return of the Aquinos
Benigno ('Ninoy') Aquino would have been, in all likelihood,
president of the Philippines in 1973, had not Marcos intervened
with the declaration of martial law in September 1972. A
traditional oligarch and head of the opposition Liberal Party, Aquino
was arrested under General Order No. 2. There followed seven and a
half year's imprisonment and a suspended death sentence on a
'conviction' for murder and subversion. He was released to go to the
US for triple-bypass surgery in 1980. The US, however, was a
political wilderness for Aquino, particularly with the election of the
Reagan administration. While Marcos's legitimacy slowly crumbled,
Aquino saw his role as opposition leader being usurped by Diokno
and Pimentel, so that by mid-1983 this still ambitious politician
from Tarlac in Central Luzon realized he must make his move (Hill
and Hill 1983:174-176). Aquino calculated that Marcos would
either simply refuse him entry; or detain him, resuming the process
of execution in accordance with the military tribunal's judgement;
or 'allow Aquino to enter the country freely, ... (waiting) for the
appropriate opportunity to have him assassinated in a 'clean'
fashion' (Bello 1984:297), avoiding the implication of government
involvement. Aquino hoped that he would be left with enough time
between his homecoming and the assassination attempt to establish
adequate defences. Unfortunately for him, he was not.
Aquino's execution on the tarmac of Manila International
Airport on Sunday, 21 August 1983 was 'the spark which set off the
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social tinderbox that was urban Manila' (ibid. 299). Whoever was,
in fact and in law, responsible, it was upon the Marcos regime that
the blame was laid. The assassination mobilized the Manila middle
classes. Businessmen, managers and white-collar workers joined
blue-collar workers and the urban poor in the streets. By mid
week, the Aquino family conservatively estimated that 30,000
people had passed through the family's living room, paying their
last respects to Ninoy (Asiaweek 2 September 1983). Aquino's
funeral on 31 August 1983 attracted millions of mourners (Diliman
Review 1983:12), prominent among whom were US Ambassador
Michael Armacost and Cardinal Jaime Sin. On 16 September 1983,
20,000 well-dressed men and women marched along Ayala Avenue
in Manila's central business district, Makati, demanding Marcos's
resignation. They were cheered by another 30,000 looking out from
the skyscrapers, showering them with yellow confetti (Nemenzo
1983:40-41). A further demonstration of this 'middle class revolt'
was the half- million strong 21 September Manila rally marking the
eleventh anniversary of the declaration of martial law (Rosenberg
1984:25). The violent dispersal of an ancillary demonstration at
Mendiola that evening (Consolacion 1984:5) highlighted the pattern
of relations with the military that was to be repeated over the next
two and a half years, as the opposition struggled to forge a non
violent, non-communist alternative to Marcos.
Aquino's murder focused the popular, but somewhat diffuse,
discontent welling up within many sections of society. It catapulted
the leaders of the traditional opposition, who had forfeited much of
their popular legitimacy by participating in Marcos's 'pretend'
politics, onto the centre of the political stage, as the leaders of the
Left were in no position to speak out for the people (either being in
gaol or in the hills). It shattered Marcos's tight control of dissent.
The greatest de facto liberalization came in the media. The
alternative 'xerox' press, which had been struggling for survival in
the early 1980s, suddenly became the authoritative source of
information for Manilenos. Newspapers and journals such as
Business Day, Malaya (the successor to We Forum, closed in 1982)
and Mr and Ms, offered independent analyses of events, breaking
censorship restrictions with impunity. In November 1983, the
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Roman Catholic Church and dissatisfied Makati business groups
established the newspaper Veritas. In response to this new-found
competition, dropping sales and advertising boycotts, the crony
press was forced to adopt a more even-handed coverage of the
news (Doronila 1985:202-203). The NDF's Liberation and the CPP's
Ang Bayan continued to appear, despite the logistical problems of
being the publications of illegal organizations. In 1984, the
Philippine Daily Inquirer was launched, and The Manila Times,
closed by Marcos in 1972, reappeared (Bain 1986:30-32). The
Catholic Radio Veritas remained the sole independent radio or
television station of any consequence.
Aquino's assassination sparked a devastating capital flight and
demolished the little remaining local and foreign business
confidence in a Marcos-led Philippine economy. The assassination
also reinvigorated organized labour: strikes and pickets took place
in defiance of government bans on such activities in 'export'
industries, which included enterprises from shoe factories to banks
(Hernandez 1985b:251). The most militant unions were found in
the export-oriented, martial law-preferred industries of sugar,
textiles and garments, and tourism (Diliman Review 1985:19). In
the first six months of 1984, 129 strikes were declared (ibid.), with
many of them being organized on a company or industry basis.
However, increasingly the strikes, pickets and rallies were broken
up by military force. A pattern of union and labour harassment was
established, the most dramatic examples being the Artex
confrontation in July 1984 which left five picketers dead and
ninety-eight injured (The Australian 11 July 1984), and the
Escalante massacre of September 1985, in which the AFP's dispersal
of a two day welgang bayan (people's strike) resulted in twenty-
one confirmed deaths, twenty-three unconfirmed deaths, more than
thirty injured, with between 160 and 200 people reported missing,
presumed dead or arrested (Simbayan 1985; PEER 10 October
1985). Repression only spurred further protest, and Marcos's
cover-ups became more transparent. A ratchet effect was
operating: as Marcos exhausted his legal options to quell protest, he
adopted military solutions and sought to obscure these by further
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legal 'investigations', the hypocrisy of which only resulted in more
protest.
The May 1984 Batasang Pambansa elections were a major test
of the strength of the opposition. Marcos granted enough token
electoral reforms to satisfy the US and split the opposition. UNIDO
and PDP-Laban participated, while KAAKBAY, NAJFD, the
underground opposition, and a number of more radical traditional
oppositionists, such as Benigno's brother Agapito 'Butz' Aquino and
Jovito Salonga, formed CORD, a coalition which co-ordinated the
boycott (Nemenzo and May 1985; Munro 1984:176). The boycott
movement gathered substantial support for its pre-election non
violent demonstrations and marches (Soriano 1984a:5-7),
particularly in the rural areas where electoral fraud and
intimidation were endemic. However, in Manila, election fever
engulfed the middle classes. A key development of this election
was the establishment of the National Citizens Movement for Free
Elections (Namfrel) a citizens' organization headed by businessman
Jose Concepcion which sought to monitor voting and the counting of
ballots. Although Namfrel mainly operated in Metro Manila in
1984, it proved a propaganda coup for the opposition, as it exposed
Marcos's legitimation elections for the sham they were and provided
a model for nation-wide citizen participation in the next election.
The US saw the 1984 elections as a way of placating the
articulate middle class, which Washington feared would be further
radicalized if Marcos's rule continued unchecked. The US realized
that a substantial number of opposition candidates had to win in
order to demonstrate that democracy was alive in the Philippines.
The high turnout and strong opposition vote surprised many, and
was interpreted as a major rebuff to the NDF and CORD boycotters.
However, a more accurate assessment could be that the Filipino
people 'will take any opportunity they have to show their
opposition' and CORD failed because it underestimated 'the degree of
anti-Marcos sentiment' (Rosenberg 1984:27). The basic faith in the
power of voting, even among the oppressed, remained despite
Marcos's excesses, although each additional fraud-marred election
challenged its hold.
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The opposition's capture of around sixty of the 183 Batasan
seats, including eighteen of the nineteen in Metro Manila, in no way
diminished Marcos's power. He could still rule by decree and the
KBL held the majority in the Batasan. The clearest example of
Marcos's predominance was the trial of Ver and twenty-five other
military personnel accused of complicity in the murders of Benigno
Aquino and his 'official assassin' Rolando Galman. This rigged trial
exonerated the accused in December 1985, totally overturning the
finding of the impartial Agrava Commission established in 1983 to
investigate the murder. By the middle of 1985, a general mood of
despondency and cynicism was growing among moderate opposition
ranks: Marcos appeared to have 'toughed out' the Aquino debacle,
and the only hopes for a change in leadership sprang from Marcos's
failing kidneys. The NDF continued organizing quietly, working
through BAYAN and causing the resignation of that organization's
moderate element, thus highlighting the growing split between the
moderate and radical opposition groups (Villegas 1986:130-131;
Asiaweek 30 August 1985). Ironically, it was Marcos who
singularly reinvigorated the opposition by calling, in November
1985, a snap presidential election.
Serious rumours of a snap presidential election started in early
August 1985. It was suggested that an election was a concession to
the US Congress in return for more military aid (Asiaweek 16
August 1985). Although this claim was never substantiated, US
pressure was a significant factor in the calling of the snap poll. The
Reagan administration's growing displeasure with the course of
events in Manila was illustrated by Republican Senator Paul Laxalt's
visit to Malacanang in October 1985. Laxalt expressed Washington's
concern over the growing NPA challenge and hinted that Ver's
reinstatement as chief of staff could prompt Congress to halt aid.
Laxalt counselled free and fair elections, the end of crony capitalism
and reform of the armed forces. His mission was also designed to
end Marcos's assertions of unqualified US support, thus heartening
the opposition and RAM (F E E R 31 October 1985; Villegas
1986:134).
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Other considerations prompting a snap poll included the
deteriorating law and order situation, the unabated decline in the
economy, Marcos's uncertain health, and opposition disorganization
and disunity. All the indicators pointed to the economic and
insurgency situations worsening in 1986, so Marcos faced a 'now or
never' dilemma. He gambled that the opposition could not unite,
and that he could 'win' convincingly enough to satisfy the US of his
legitimacy and legally secure himself another six years in office. He
announced the poll on David Brinkley's ABC (US) show, This Week,
on 3 November. By calling an early election, Marcos brought
himself 'just enough credibility to prevent the US from disowning
him' (PEER 21 November 1985). However, substantial questions
remained as to the constitutionality of the poll and Marcos's post
dated resignation to take effect upon the inauguration of the new
president. On 19 December, the Supreme Court declared the
election constitutional, and the way was cleared for polling on 7
February 1986.
Marcos's gamble on opposition disunity failed only one hour
before the close of nominations on 11 December. Until Cardinal Sin
managed to hammer out an eleventh hour compromise, which saw
Corazon Aquino (Benigno Aquino's widow) agree to run under the
UNIDO flag in return for Salvador Laurel sacrificing his presidential
ambitions, it seemed that this election was doomed to follow the
course of its predecessors, as an unconvincing Marcos whitewash.
As far as the US was concerned, for maximum legitimizing effect,
whichever way the polls went, a united opposition was essential.
Marcos's recognition of the power of the Aquino/Laurel ticket was
demonstrated by his surprise nomination of long-time critic Arturo
Tolentino as running mate. The inclusion of Tolentino, the only KBL
candidate to win a Metro Manila seat in the 1984 Batasan elections,
was intended to broaden Marcos's appeal to the electorate.
Namfrel's re-accreditation as an observer organization was
forced upon Marcos by US and public pressure. Having used the
preceding twenty months to reorganize and expand, Namfrel aimed
to have poll-watchers in 80 per cent of the nation's 90,000 electoral
precincts, and to use two private firms' nationwide telex networks
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to send results to Manila to be tabulated by computer as part of
Namfrel's Operation Quick Count (PEER 30 January 1986). This
made heavy fraud at the counting end considerably more difficult.
Massive fraud at the voting end, especially vote-buying, is a much
more expensive operation. Comelec, the government's Commission
on Elections, also opted for a quick count, but declined Namfrel's
offer to co-operate. The official count was to be conducted by the
Batasan. Although Namfrel was seen as being sympathetic to the
Aquino camp, it was primarily interested in ensuring fraud-free
polling and counting. Going on past form this would place Namfrel
in opposition to Marcos. Comelec was essentially a tool of the
Marcos regime. The greatest blow against Comelec's credibility
came during early counting on 9 February when thirty computer
technicians walked out of Comelec headquarters, alleging
manipulation of the vote count, and supporting their claims by
computer discs and print-outs (Sydney Morning Herald 11 February
1986). The computer operators were led by Linda Kapunan, wife of
a leading RAM officer, Colonel 'Red' Kapunan (Asiaweek 23
February 1986).
The campaign which preceded the tallying controversies was
itself a quite remarkable case of mud-slinging. At the outset,
Marcos declared that he was the issue, an issue out of which Cory
had little difficulty making mileage. Marcos then began by
disparaging Aquino's sex and competence, and ended up accusing
her of being a stooge of the communists. Cory weathered these
assaults, using the church as her communication link with the
people. By the end of the campaign, Marcos could not lose any more
credibility. Even the myth of Marcos as the Philippines' most
decorated soldier had been exploded (National Times 24-30
January 1986). Cory Aquino's appeal as a vote for change was
uncontested. The contrast between Marcos and Aquino was most
clearly seen in their rallies. Aquino and Laurel visited sixty-one of
the country's seventy-three provinces before the election, whereas
Marcos, constrained by his failing health, visited only nine (PEER 6
February 1986). The opposition's rallies were large, noisy,
spontaneous and broad-based, whereas Marcos's tended to be well-
orchestrated but stiff and subdued, staged largely for the benefit of
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the foreign media (FEER 30 January 1986). Cory's appeal was so
strong in many areas that it overrode the NDF's and BAYAN's official
decisions to boycott the elections. In Mindanao, BAYAN workers
joined the Cory campaign, recalling the 1984 boycott failure, and
seeing the Aquino ticket as offering respite and hope (ibid.).
The campaign, the election and its aftermath were particularly
violent and fraudulent, even by Marcosian standards (Sydney
Morning Herald 6 and 8 February 1986; FEER 6 and 20 February
1986). Marcos had to pull out all stops this time: non-existent
barrios returned 100 per cent Marcos; in Metro Manila 10 per cent
of predominantly opposition voters were disenfranchised as their
names disappeared from the electoral rolls; Namfrel observers
were forced out of many precincts by 'gun-toting goons'; votes were
bought; ballot boxes were stolen and/or stuffed, although people
chained themselves to the boxes to protect them. At least twenty-
four election-related deaths were reported on polling day, and a
number of 'Cory' and KBL organizers were murdered in the run-up
to and in the wake of voting. The fraud was so blatant that even
the mainstream Western media and Senator Richard Lugar, heading
the US congressional observation team, could not help but notice
and comment on it.
Reagan's instinctive response to the evidence of fraud was to
protect his old friend, advising Aquino to join Marcos and alleging
poll fraud on both sides (Sydney Morning Herald 12 and 13
February 1986). This outraged Aquino, Lugar, the New York Times
and the State Department strategists. Reagan subsequently
modified his stance, dispatching 'fact-finder' Philip Habib to Manila
on 16 February in a stalling tactic. When the Batasan proclaimed
Marcos victor on 15 February, Lugar rejected the result as tainted
by the fraud. The CBCP, in a statement issued on 14 February, and
agreed to by eighty of the 118 bishops, firmly denied the legitimacy
of Marcos's pending victory:
'In our considered judgement, the polls were unparalleled
in the fraudulence of their conduct ... according to moral
principles, a government that assumes or retains power
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through fraudulent means has no moral basis ... [and in
such circumstances] active resistance of evil by peaceful
means [is justified]' (Asiaweek 23 February 1986; National
Times 21-27 February 1986).
In response to Marcos's 'official' victory by 10,807,197 votes
(54 per cent) to 9,291,716 (Asiaweek 2 March 1986), Aquino
refused to concede defeat, claiming the election had been stolen.
She outlined a seven-point programme of civil disobedience to a
crowd of close to one million supporters assembled in Manila's Rizal
Park (Luneta) on Sunday 16 February (Sydney Morning Herald 17
February 1986). At the same time, a RAM statement denounced the
election, called for a non-violent struggle for justice, and advised
soldiers not to use force against peaceful demonstrators (PEER 27
February 1986). Habib's presence in Manila prompted speculation
of plans for a US -backed RAM coup d'etat to oust Marcos, although
Habib did not meet directly with RAM leaders.
In his search for a 'credible' solution, Marcos, on 16 February,
announced Ver's resignation as chief of staff (but not as head of
NISA) and Ramos's appointment as acting chief of staff, but on 21
February Marcos indefinitely deferred Ver's resignation, allowing
time for his crony general to reorganize the upper echelons of the
AFP (Asiaweek 2 and 9 March 1986). It seems likely that Ver's
reinstatement sprang directly from the discovery of a RAM coup
plot, with fifteen soldiers at Fort Bonifacio being arrested on Friday
21 February (Manila Times 23 February 1986). Ver's continuation
as chief of staff was the final straw for a much-maligned Ramos. It
was at this point that Ramos had to answer Cory's question, 'When
will he decide what he is for?' (PEER 27 February 1986).
With Cory's civil disobedience campaign working up to a
general strike to coincide with Marcos's inauguration, on the
morning of Saturday 22 February Enrile received information of his
impending arrest. This had resulted from Enrile's involvement in
the abortive RAM coup plot (National Times 5 October 1986). At
this stage, Enrile contacted Ramos who agreed to join the rebellion
against Marcos. Thus, RAM's thwarted coup became a mutiny that
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Saturday afternoon as Enrile, Ramos, the RAM colonels and
approximately 300 soldiers took over the Ministry of National
Defence at Camp Aguinaldo and Camp Crame on opposite sides of
the EDSA highway in Quezon City, Metro Manila. At a 6 p.m. press
conference, Enrile and Ramos announced their withdrawal of
support from the Marcos regime and proclaimed Aquino the rightful
winner of the presidential election. Aquino was in Cebu on
Saturday night, and after having talked to Enrile took refuge in a
Carmelite convent, returning to Manila on Sunday. Around 10 p.m.,
Cardinal Sin broadcast over the church radio station, Radio Veritas,
an appeal to the people to come to the rebels' aid. The prompt
arrival of the masses at the military installations on Epifanio de los
Santos Avenue (EDSA) marked the passing of the stage of critical
danger for the rebels; Marcos had missed his opportunity to crush
the mutiny without major loss of civilian life.
Early Sunday morning, 23 February, Marcos's military
sabotaged Radio Veritas. However, this vital communication link
was back on air by mid-morning. Talks between Enrile and Marcos
stalled on Enrile's basic demand that Marcos resign. The ever-
persuasive Marcos allegedly extended an amnesty to Enrile, Ramos
and their men if they surrendered. At this point, the unpersuaded
Enrile transferred from Camp Aguinaldo to the more easily
defensible Camp Crame; Marcos brought in reinforcements to
Malacaiiang; and General Tadiar's marine tank corps commenced its
push against Camp Crame, only to be blocked less than 2 kilometres
away from Camp Crame at the junction of EDSA and Ortigas Avenue
by approximately 20,000 unarmed civilians. At around 5 p.m., after
three hours of negotiations, Tadiar withdrew his tanks: the people's
prayers had been heard, for the moment.
At their Sunday evening press conference, Enrile and Ramos
were joined by Laurel and Tanada. Ramos listed the commanders
who had defected to his 'new armed forces of the people', and Enrile
urged Aquino to form an alternative government before Marcos's
inauguration on 25 February. Later that evening, Aquino appealed
to the nation over Radio Veritas to support Enrile and Ramos, and
pleaded for non-violence. The White House released a strong
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condemnation of the Marcos regime, citing Enrile and Ramos's
charges of election fraud and urging a non-violent resolution to the
crisis, although stopping short of calling on Marcos to resign. The
stand-off in EDSA between Tadiar's tanks and the people continued
throughout the night.
Monday 24 February proved to be the decisive day of the
revolt. As part of the military showdown scheduled for dawn,
Marcos ordered Colonel Antonio Sotelo and his fifteenth strike wing
to strafe and bomb Camp Crame. Unbeknown to Marcos, Sotelo and
his men had been involved in the RAM coup plot. Their defection
prompted similar action throughout the AFP, so that by Monday
evening around 80 per cent of the armed forces had joined the
rebels. An attack by Sotelo's strike wing on Villamor air base in
Metro Manila incapacitated what little air cover remained loyal to
Marcos. At 6.30 a.m., Radio Veritas announced that Marcos and his
family had fled. Although Marcos later appeared live on television
to deny this, the report is credited with having broken the
determination of Tadiar's marines. During Marcos's morning
television appearance in which he overrode Ver's pleas to be
allowed to annihilate the rebels, transmission was cut off. After a
three and a half hour battle-cum-discussion, rebel soldiers and
civilian demonstrators had overrun the government television
station, OMA/MBS 4. Monday morning also saw Enrile announce the
formation of an Aquino-Laurel parallel government. On Monday
evening, around 7 p.m., the White House issued a statement calling
on Marcos to resign. It read in pan: 'Attempts to prolong the life of
the present regime by violence are futile. A solution to this crisis
can only be achieved through a peaceful transition to a new
government.'
The import of the US statement had not penetrated the
increasing isolation of Malacanang by Marcos's 8 p.m. television
news conference, seen on crony channels 2, 9 and 13. The president
announced a nation-wide 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. curfew, which was
immediately defied by the thousands of civilians on the streets. He
rejected any suggestion of resignation or flight, and admitted that
his family was 'cowering in terror because of the threat of bombing
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by helicopter'. Meanwhile, a gathering of opposition and defecting
KBL Batasan members proclaimed Aquino and Laurel the rightful
president and vice-president of the Philippines.
Tuesday 25 February was inauguration day, a day on which a
violent end to the crisis appeared ever more likely. Thirteen people
lost their lives in incidents around Manila that Tuesday, as the
tension of the preceding weeks culminated in the inauguration of
two presidents. An hour before Aquino's 10 a.m. ceremony at the
Club Filipino, Marcos made his final offer to Enrile, promising to
cancel the election and remain as honorary president until 1987
while Enrile assumed full control of the actual government. Enrile
declined and joined Cory at the Club Filipino, where she appointed
Laurel, prime minister, Enrile, defence minister, and Ramos, chief of
staff. At mid-day, Marcos took his oath of office at Malacanang. No
foreign dignitaries were present and only seven of Marcos's twenty-
three cabinet ministers arrived, Tolentino and Virata being
conspicuous by their absence. The telecast of Marcos's inauguration
was cut short by the destruction of Malacanang's microwave
connection with Channel 9. Marcos had lost his last link with the
media and the people.
In the early hours of Tuesday morning, Marcos had been in
contact with US Senator Paul Laxalt in an attempt to gauge
Washington's attitude on a compromise deal with Cory. Laxalt,
unconstrained by diplomatic niceties, reiterated the White House's
opinion when he said, 'I think you should cut, and cut cleanly. I
think the time has come'. Carrying this knowledge with him
throughout Tuesday's inauguration ritual, Marcos made the decision
to quit the Philippines in the late afternoon. Around 9 p.m. on
Tuesday 25 February 1986, Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos,
accompanied by an entourage of approximately ninety people, were
airlifted by USAF helicopters from Malacanang to Clark Air Base,
where they spent the night before being flown on by the USAF to
Guam and Hawaii.
In the two hours between Marcos's exit and the arrival of
Ramos's troops at Malacanang at around 11 p.m., priests and nuns
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intervened to prevent violent conflict between groups of Marcos
loyalists and Cory's masses who were seeking to liberate the
presidential palace. As news of Marcos's confirmed departure
spread, the city celebrated. Wednesday 26 February was Aquino's
first full day as president of the Philippines: she announced her
cabinet, restored civil liberties, ordered the release of all political
prisoners, including the leading communists, called for a cease-fire
with the insurgents, and instigated investigations into the ill-gotten
wealth and human rights violations of the Marcos regime. The
Aquino era had begun.
As can be seen from this narration of events, there were many
significant actors in the downfall of Marcos. It remains to be seen
which were the most influential: Cory Aquino and the moderate
opposition forces; the Roman Catholic Church, led by Cardinal Sin;
the people who took to the streets in their thousands; the pressure
of the growing communist insurgency; the reformist elements of
the military; ex-Marcos supporters like Enrile and Ramos; the US;
and Marcos himself. Essentially, were the events of February 1986
a victory for non-violent people's power or a palace coup, a
statement of Philippine autonomy or a 'neo-colonial' orchestration?
The following sections will seek to provide an answer.
The US connection
The tumultuous street scenes of February 1986 have come to
symbolize Marcos's overthrow. As captured on camera, it was a
victory for people's power, for although armed soldiers abounded, it
was the throngs of unarmed civilians jamming the streets that
seemed to prevent shooting and ensure success. Yet appearances
can be deceptive, and other factors may have been at work which
were equally, if not more, important than the people in the streets.
The first of these elements to be investigated and evaluated is the
US connection.
The events of 1986 occurred within the historical parameters of
the US-Philippine relationship. American influence in Philippine
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politics, economy and society did not terminate with independence
in 1946. This ongoing 'special relationship' has been termed neo-
colonial in the sense that 'strategic and economic domination coexist
with legal independence' (Shalom 1981 :xiii). The Philippines do not
lack all autonomy of action; rather, this neo-colonial relationship is
'an alliance between the leading class or classes of two independent
nations which facilitates their ability to maintain a dominant
position over the rest of the population of the weaker of the two
nations' (ibid. xiv). While the Filipino lower classes are denied what
the Left would describe as 'true self-determination and national
independence', the Filipino elite shares a mutually beneficial
reciprocal relationship with the US: the US is as locked in by its
strategic, economic and ideological interests as the Filipino elite is
reliant on US military and economic aid. Marcos, displaying the
'power of the weak ally', has been as indifferent to US requests for
regime reform as the US has been insensitive to the currents of
Philippine nationalism.
The US's interests in the Philippines fall into three broad
categories: strategic, economic and ideological (Pringle 1980:18-21).
The strategic interest is the most tangible with eight separate US
military installations situated in the Philippine archipelago, the most
important being Subic Bay Naval Complex and Clark Air Base
(Feeney 1984:64-66). The US justifies its military presence in terms
of its global nuclear and conventional force deterrence structure, the
protection of vital air and sea lanes, a hedge against the unknown,
and as part of the US's obligations to defend the Philippines under
the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (ibid. 69; Pringle 1980:68-70).
The issue of the bases arouses much anger amongst Filipino
nationalists, but was approached cautiously by the traditional
opposition, who recognized that while the bases provided a possible
focus for anti-regime sentiment, any move to expel them would
alienate the US (Feeney 1984:76). Furthermore, the bases arc a
major source of employment for Filipinos and of revenue for local
business and the government, as well as being an important
bargaining chip in aid negotiations.
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The US's economic interests in the Philippines include SUS2.5
billion in private investment (Sydney Morning Herald 1 February
1986). Generous conditions were accorded to foreign enterprise by
Marcos and the US has been concerned to see that the Philippines
develop along 'open and friendly', free-market, World Bank-IMF
lines (Tugon 1985:27-28; Wolpin 1972:3). The third strand of US
interests in the Philippines is ideological: the desire to create, as far
as possible, a world in its own image, coupled with a desire to
combat communism. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Philippines' elite
democracy did go some way towards achieving the US's idealistic,
post-war goal of a democratic Third World. However, by 1972, the
rising nationalist and left-wing tide meant that 'the formal
democratic system was slipping from the control of the interests it
had originally been designed to serve' (Bello 1984:287), that is, the
US and the neo-colonial elite. Martial law was the Marcos response.
The continuation of authoritarian rule was then justified by the
threat of communist subversion and the lack of any credible and
acceptable alternative to Marcos.
The 'demonstration effect' of US allies falling to 'unfriendly'
forces intensely frightens US administrations. This can be seen
through their fixation with analogies (Cuba, Vietnam, Iran,
Nicaragua, etc.) and their habit of seeing all US losses as gains for
the Soviet Union (Johnson 1985). In the Philippines the US faced a
dilemma. Before the unification of the Aquino/Laurel forces,
Washington was presented with a regime whose legitimacy was
crumbling and whose excesses were mounting, but whose only
organized mass-based opposition was the (unacceptable) Left. It
could either apply the Kirkpatrick doctrine (Kirkpatrick 1979)
described in The New Republic (17 April 1986) as - 'we should
choose to stick with our SOB rather than risk the deluge' - and
support Marcos wholeheartedly; or 'do a Diem', working for
Marcos's overthrow in a coup d'etat ; or create or find a third force,
a middle option, a strategy which failed in Iran but appeared to
work in El Salvador and which had been suggested for the
Philippines by a former ambassador (Sullivan 1983:154-155).
Furthermore, Marcos's intransigent refusal to institute any reforms
which would erode his domestic political support structure of the
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cronies was a direct rebuff to the Reagan administration's quiet
diplomacy', and complicated American ambitions for a 'strong,
stable, democratically-oriented, pro-US Philippines' (Jugon 1985:27)
with a healthy economy. It was in the context of this quietly
persistent, but often ignored, pressure that Marcos surprised the US
by acceding to American desires for a demonstration of his regime's
legitimacy.
Marcos's decision to call a snap election was as much in
response to US pressure for some proof of regime legitimacy as it
was in response to deteriorating domestic political and economic
conditions. Laxalt's October visit alerted Marcos to the extent of
Washington's discomfort with the course of events in Manila.
Marcos needed a legitimization exercise to placate the US public and
Congress, and act as a safety valve for moderate domestic
discontent, as had the May 1984 election (Constantino 1984:6).
While many observers remained sceptical that Marcos would
actually go through with the election, once Aquino and Laurel joined
forces, and the US publicly endorsed the election, Marcos could no
longer wriggle out of it. He had played himself into a corner and
could only extricate himself with an election. Appearances were all-
important to the Reagan administration, which wanted the
legitimization of the Marcos regime in the eyes of the US public
brought by a successful 'demonstration' election, that is an election
'organized and staged by a foreign power to pacify a restive home
audience, assuring it that ongoing interventionary processes are
legitimate and appreciated by their foreign objects' (Herman and
Brodhead 1984:5).
The Philippine elections of 1978, 1984 and 1986 can be seen
from this perspective. To justify continued military and economic
aid to the Marcos regime, the US administration sought to quell
congressional and public unease with Manila's human rights and
development record by pressuring Marcos to hold elections in which
the traditional opposition participated and won a few seats in a
contest without obvious election-day fraud. An integral element of
a demonstration election is the international media's acceptance of
'the government's manipulation of symbols [of elections and
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communism], its agenda of relevant information and questions and
its formulation of the election as a drama between the forces of
good [those participating] and evil [those boycotting]' (ibid. 6). This
means that the media tend to ignore the massive fraud and
intimidation in the countryside and the absence of the fundamental
conditions of a free election: freedom of speech and the media,
freedom of association, party organization and the ability to field
candidates, and the absence of systematic state-sponsored terrorism
and a climate of fear (ibid. 11-15; Hermann 1984:34).
The success of May 1984 as a demonstration election sprang
from the US's central commitment to the Marcos regime. By
February 1986, however, the commitment was no longer
unequivocal. Washington recognized Marcos's waning internal
support and wanted a decisive electoral outcome, although an
outright Aquino victory must have seemed unlikely, considering the
opposition's lack of organization and money. The ambivalence of
the US was reflected in the much more critical role taken by that
'institutionalized demonstration election prop' - the observer
(Herman and Brodhead 1984:7). Observers usually find
demonstration elections fair, a function of their composition, bias
and limited opportunity to observe: 'what they can reasonably
testify is that nobody was beaten and ballot boxes were not stuffed
in their presence. This is entirely compatible with massive coercion
and ballot box stuffing' (ibid. 8). In the Philippines in February
1986, the observers saw too much. The fraud was far too obvious to
be glossed over, with even the US congressional observation team
making it clear that the cheating was unacceptable.
In contrast to other demonstration elections, the international
media were remarkably critical of the Marcos regime. They
examined the criteria of election integrity, particularly Aquino's
exclusion from the domestic electronic media (save Radio Veritas),
and the militarization of the countryside. They concentrated on the
issue of government interference in the polls, not rebel disruption,
merely noting in passing the NDF/BAYAN boycott. The television
cameras rolled as KBL thugs snatched ballot boxes and harassed
Namfrel volunteers. This freedom of the media to observe, as much
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as their apparent indifference to the 'communist threat', highlighted
the contrast between the Philippines 1986 and El Salvador 1982.
As Bain observes, February 1986 was 'a textbook case of how pack
journalism can serve a civic purpose' (Bain 1986:28). With over 850
foreign journalists registered to cover the election on 7 February,
'President Marcos could lie and cheat, but in the end he could not
hide' (ibid. 29). This failure of the demonstration election left
Washington with a terrible dilemma.
The fraud was so massive and well documented that
Washington could not simply discount it as an isolated incident, and
proceed to endorse Marcos. The long-held fear that 'the Philippines
would be the site of America's next foreign policy disaster' (Poole
and Vanzi 1984:337) was beginning to materialize. Marcos sought
to confront the US once more with 'the Hobson's choice of
authoritarian dictatorship or communist totalitarianism' (The New
Republic 3 March 1986), between himself or civil war. This time,
however, the US had an alternative: the strength of Cory's vote
indicated the depth of popular dissent. The third force strategy,
frequently suggested by the US State Department as an appropriate
Philippine policy, began to appear feasible. Yet Washington did not
immediately adopt this policy. In the first few days after the
election, there was an embarrassing contradiction between the
positions of the White House and State Department. Reagan called
on Marcos and Aquino to 'work together to form a viable
government', pointing to Evidence of a strong two-party system ...
in the islands', and suggesting that there was no hard evidence of
fraud, only the general appearance of it 'occurring on both sides'
(Sydney Morning Herald 12 and 13 February 1986; PEER 20
February 1986). The State Department expressed surprise at these
statements (Reagan evidently having gone beyond his carefully-
drafted written statement), and dispatched US Ambassador
Bosworth to reassure Aquino that the US was not reconciled to a
Marcos victory (Sydney Morning Herald 14 February 1986). Philip
Habib's fact-finding mission to Manila was largely a stalling tactic, to
give Washington time to assess the situation and formulate a
coherent response.
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For the US, the central issues raised by this disputed election
were the future of the US bases, the NPA insurgency and the
demonstration effect. Reagan is reported to have said, 'I don't know
of anything more important than the Philippines' bases' (FEER 20
February 1986), and this is indicative of US policymakers' priorities.
The growth of the NPA and the counter-productiveness of much of
Marcos's anti-insurgency strategy (Magno and Gregor 1986:501 and
509) raised images of Vietnam, not Malaya, and if the US could not
defend its former colony from communism, Washington envisaged
the clatter of tumbling dominoes throughout the world.
Furthermore, the US's immediate credibility as a force for
democracy would have been undermined everywhere if the
administration, having been so active in drawing Marcos into the
democratic process, acquiesced 'in the humiliation of the Filipino
democrats' (The New Republic 3 March 1986). That the outcome of
the crisis was so favourable to US interests should not be taken as
conclusive proof of the US's involvement in bringing it about. The
danger of such ex post facto rationalization in this case is that it
assumes a purely structuralist notion of power, while clearly a large
number of human elements, quite autonomous from the neo-
colonial structure, were operating in February 1986.
Assuming the US was faced with three alternatives - support
Marcos, support Aquino, or support a reformist military coup-cum-
civilian-junta - its decision would have been based on the relative
advantages of each to US interests, if in fact the US had time to
consider its options and direct events. A number of observers have
commented on the absence of adequate time for US direction and
the essentially reactive, ad hoc nature of American action.
Considering the neo-colonial status of the Philippines, there has
always been a strong presumption of US intervention, with some
concluding as early as March 1986 that 'the Enrile-Ramos bloc
would not have staged the aborted coup d'etat without the green
light from Washington, specifically the CIA' (EPIC 1986:8). Later
research suggests that the CIA was aware of the RAM coup plot but
played a double game, advising Marcos not to persecute RAM and
RAM not to move unconstitutionally against Marcos unless in the
'line of enlightened self-defence' (National Times 5 October 1986).
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Although the coup plan may have lacked US endorsement, there
was a suggestion that the mutiny led by Enrile and Ramos was
instigated on US orders, considering Habib's timely departure just
hours before its outbreak (National Times 6 March 1986) and
Washington's prompt approval of Enrile and Ramos's move (Sydney
Morning Herald 24 February 1986). However, a more realistic
analysis is that upon Ver's discovery of the plot, RAM and Enrile
were forced to act quickly in order to save their own skins. Ramos,
for reasons of his own, chose to join the mutiny.
Admittedly, it does seem unlikely that Enrile, particularly,
would have moved without some assurance of US support, if only a
tacit promise to exert maximum pressure on Marcos to avoid a
violent resolution to the conflict. A reformist coup, however, even if
it had handed power to Aquino, would have destroyed the AFP's
non-interventionist professionalism and commitment to civilian
supremacy, two values which the US sought to protect (PEER 27
February 1986). Although Washington no longer wanted Marcos in
Malacafiang and had objections to a RAM coup, it did not
immediately endorse Aquino. Both Habib and Lugar were
noticeably loud in their calls for fresh elections. Aquino's civil
disobedience campaign evidently worried the Reagan
administration. The US especially feared that Marcos would meet
the democratic opposition with violence, thus forcing an escalation
in the conflict and providing a greater opportunity for the CPP. It
did not appreciate the dynamics of Aquino's non-violent action, nor
could it completely dissociate itself from its self-imposed dichotomy
of alternatives - Marcos or the communists. Thus, the US was very
much the prisoner of its own preconceptions.
It is difficult to pinpoint the exact role of the US in the fall of
Marcos, save that it was not the US-orchestrated operation that
some American officials privately claimed (Sydney Morning Herald
27 February 1986). Much of the evidence is circumstantial, and
gains meaning only in the context of the Philippines' 'special
relationship' with the US, and Manila's dependence on American aid.
Clearly, Marcos called the snap presidential poll in response to
mounting American pressure for some sign of legitimation and
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progress on US demands for reform. Yet other factors were
operating upon Marcos, and Washington was apparently somewhat
surprised by Marcos's timing. Once the election was called, one
would have expected a demonstration election along similar lines to
1984, but growing administration ambivalence towards Marcos
resulted in a much less tightly-staged election. The US, while seeing
a Marcos 'victory' as inevitable, desired to keep its options open,
ready to welcome a decisive Aquino victory or even possibly a
reformist coup d'etat, particularly in the face of any move by the
Marcos-Imelda-Ver faction to reimpose martial law and decimate
the opposition, including RAM.
The closeness of the election outcome disrupted all US plans.
Although the US could have been active in prompting Enrile and
Ramos to act, numerous domestic forces and personal ambitions
were in play and the quickness of developments, as well as
Washington's dithering over the election fraud issue, tend to
undermine the case for US involvement in those four days.
Admittedly, pressure on Marcos to avoid violence was significant,
but this too could have sprung from other sources. In short,
although the results of Marcos's overthrow were favourable to the
US, there is no substantial evidence to suggest that the US played
anything more than a secondary role in the course of events.
RAM, Enrile, Ramos: a bloodless coup ousts Marcos?
A second force at work during February 1986 was the military.
It is perhaps evidence of our tendency to emphasize the importance
and utility of violent action that the overthrow of Marcos is most
frequently described as a 'bloodless coup with popular backing',
rather than a 'popular uprising with military participation'. While
the mutiny on 22 February was significant in bringing the post
election crisis to a head, the military's involvement in the uprising
does not, ipso facto, prove it a coup d'etat. To understand the role
played by the military in Marcos's overthrow, it is essential to
appreciate the militarization of Philippine society since 1972, the
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factions and personalities competing within the AFP and the
theoretical dimensions of military intervention in politics.
The process of militarization was evident after the
proclamation of martial law. Not only did manpower levels and
budget allocations increase, but the military engaged in a much
wider range of activities. Since its creation in 1936, the AFP had
performed both the traditional military function of the defence of
the state from external aggression and the police roles of
maintaining internal security and law and order. Martial law saw
the AFP greatly extend its duties in the areas of the administration
of justice and the management of development programmes and
agrarian reform (Hernandez 1985a). In effect, the AFP during
martial law 'act[ed] as the main agent of change in almost all facets
of Filipino life' (Andaya 1973:33). The lifting of martial law in 1981
did not in essence reduce the level of militarization. As the 1980s
proceeded, the AFP's involvement in political and social life
increased. With the escalation of the counter-insurgency war, the
military presence in the provinces became more tangible, while
human rights abuses multiplied (ICJ 1984:19-22: EMPJ cl984:3-4).
Many villagers in fact preferred an NPA presence simply because
the NPA's acts of violence were far less random and unpredictable
than the AFP's (ICJ 1984:22). In Manila, the factionalization of the
AFP's hierarchy prompted increasing speculation about either a
reformist or crony coup d'etat as part of a post-Marcos settlement.
Military involvement in politics can be seen as a continuum in
which three basic stages stand out (Welch 1976:3-4). 'Military
influence' is the 'normal' western democratic model of military
involvement. In this stage civilian supremacy is strictly observed
and military duties are sharply delineated. The AFP's pre-martial
law involvement in politics approximated to influence (Hernandez
1985a: 190). The next stage is 'military participation', in which
military autonomy is greater and the civilian elite is ever sensitive
to a perceived military veto. This level of military involvement
typified the post-1972 Marcos regime. The declaration of martial
law was only made after close consultation with Marcos's 'twelve
disciples', all leading military men, including the then chief of staff,
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Romeo Espino, defence minister, Juan Ponce Enrile, PC chief, Fidel
Ramos and presidential security command chief, Fabian Ver. In the
1980s, the Marcos regime became more dependent on the military
to secure its power and to silence the popular opposition. Marcos
debased the codes of civilian supremacy and military
professionalism by limiting civilian control of the military to that of
himself and by appointing cronies to the AFP's uppermost positions.
Given these developments it was now easier to envisage the
possibility of the Philippines moving towards the third stage of
military involvement in politics, that is, 'military control' of politics,
either with or without civilian partners. Even among the
professional officers, the ethic of subordination was being
undermined, as they came to question the attainability of their goals
(particularly, victory over the NPA) in light of the dominant civilian
forces in the regime (the cronies).
The military's propensity to intervene in politics springs from
both the sociological and organizational nature of the military, and
the political and institutional nature of society. In approaching the
military structure, Hernandez adopts Janowitz's sociological scheme
for calculating the military's potential for political intervention
(Janowitz 1964). She analyses the AFP in terms of its organizational
format, its skill structure and career lines, its social recruitment and
education, its professional and political ideology and its social
cohesion, from which she concludes that the AFP's potential for
intervention was fairly high (Hernandez 1985a:181). Undoubtedly,
the military's potential for political intervention was enhanced by
the AFP's infantry orientation, facilitating deployment of forces in
Manila and elsewhere, its existing involvement in political issues
due to its security and police duties, its 'managerial' (technocratic)
style of leadership, and the nationalist, developmental, self-reliant
and puritanical themes of its ideology. Despite these developments
the strength of commitment to the concept of civilian supremacy,
although possibly waning, has been an extremely important factor
inhibiting military activism in the Philippines. Much of this
commitment stems from the application of US military training
traditions and the concomitant values of professionalism. The AFP's
'anti-politics' attitude has tended to minimize its willingness to 'soil
37
its hands' by direct intervention in the political process.
Furthermore, the AFP's low social cohesion, originating from the
heterogeneous class background of its officer corps (ibid. 168), the
distinction between Philippine Military Academy (PMA) graduates
and non-PMA-recruited officers, regional and ethno-linguistic
cleavages, and the inter-generational tension between younger,
upwardly mobile officers and the overstaying generals, has
restricted the military's disposition to intervene.
Any military involvement in politics takes place within the
nation's political and social framework. As Welch (1976:5-34)
notes, the maintenance of civilian control by governments draws as
much on elements external to the military organization as from
internal considerations. While factors such as constitutional
constraints, ascriptive elements such as class and ethnicity, party
controls, historical and geographic influences permitting the
maintenance of a relatively small standing army, and the
delineation of clear and limited spheres of military responsibility
are not equally important in the Philippines, they highlight the
linkages between the AFP's involvement in politics and society
generally. Finer (1976:78) has suggested that the parameters of
intervention are set by society's response to questions concerning
the degree of public approval of procedures for transferring power,
the strength of the commitment to legitimacy as a prerequisite for
government and the extent of the mobilization of the public into
private associations. In the light of this analysis, the imposition of
martial law 'was fundamentally a class response to the emergence
of a mortal threat to the system of neo-colonial domination' (Bello
1984:287). Martial law was welcomed by the politically-mobilized
middle classes, who saw it as a means to offset the threat posed to
their livelihood and security by the increasingly militant and radical
masses. Yet if military intervention is tied to the civilian political
culture, the change in the mood of the middle classes, as
demonstrated by their support for Aquino, augurs well for a true
civilian restoration, even though the sociological and organizational
nature of the military has not greatly changed.
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Having outlined the military and societal factors contributing to
the AFP's potential to intervene in Philippine politics, the questions
of Finer's (1976) dimensions of motive, mood and opportunity must
be examined. The motives disposing RAM, Enrile and Ramos to
intervene in February 1986 could be seen as a mixture of national,
corporate and individual self-interest. Each had a grievance with
the Marcos regime and an awareness of their combined ability to
remedy these complaints. The opportunity to intervene presented
itself with the acute post-election crisis, in which Marcos was
extremely dependent on the military to restore order, but from
which the military could not have mustered enough legitimacy to
rule in its own right.
The Reform the AFP Movement (RAM) surfaced publicly in
March 1985 at a military academy reunion (FEER 30 January 1986).
Also known as the 'We Belong' movement, RAM had its origins in
PMA reunions in the early 1980s when 'professional' field officers
met and exchanged notes on their respective battles against the
NPA, and came to the conclusion that their counter-insurgency
would remain ineffective until the AFP ceased to be seen as an
instrument of oppression. Claiming the active membership of
approximately 1500 middle and lower ranking officers in the
13,500-strong officer corps, RAM was dedicated to restoring the
AFP's tarnished image, eliminating human rights abuses, raising
morale and training standards, and fighting the NPA efficiently
(FEER 6 February 1986). From March 1985 RAM began holding
press conferences at which it denounced favouritism and corruption
in the AFP without ever naming names. Such an apparently open,
non-conspiratorial stance did not overly worry Ver, but RAM's 1986
series of lectures and prayer seminars, code-named Kamalayan '86
(Consciousness '86), which were aimed at establishing an
understanding of and respect for democratic processes among active
servicemen, did concern Ver, so much so that on January 17 he
demanded that they cease their activities, which RAM promptly
refused to do (ibid.).
Within RAM, two distinct levels could be seen. There were the
younger officers - the lieutenants and captains - who joined RAM as
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a way to vent their protest at the deprofessionalization of the AFP
under Ver. And then there were the colonels - Gregorio 'Gringo'
Honasan, Eduardo 'Red' Kapunan, Victor Batac, Tirso Garor - and the
captains - Felix 'Boy' Turingan and Rex Robles - who allegedly
organized RAM 'as a cover, to contact brother officers who might be
sympathetic to the coup' (National Times 5 October 1986). 'The
coup' was the RAM-Enrile plot to oust Marcos and install Enrile as
the head of a largely civilian junta. This plan was first devised in
mid-1985 by Honasan and Kapunan: it involved taking Malacanang,
arresting Marcos and Imelda, assassinating Ver, and proclaiming to
the nation a 'National Reconciliation Council' with Enrile as chairman.
Marcos's calling of the presidential election disrupted the colonels'
plan for a New Year's Eve coup, and the events after the election
prompted them to re-schedule it for 2 a.m. on Sunday 23 February
(ibid.). Enrile and the colonels' use of RAM apparently angered a
number of junior officers who did not appreciate being tools of
Enrile's ambition. This split between the levels of RAM could almost
be seen as the basis of two RAMs, one aiming to reform the AFP
along Ramos's lines and another along Enrile's.
In an April 1986 speech, the Philippine political scientist,
Francisco Nemenzo, suggested that RAM had three contingency
plans in the event of a stolen election. Since RAM officers controlled
most of the combat divisions, 'Plan A' envisaged a RAM-led mutiny
in the hinterland, thereby drawing out Ver's forces and allowing a
second uprising to take Malacanang. 'Plan B' was for a Manila-based
mutiny, spreading to the rest of the country, while 'Plan C, never
seriously considered, was for the gradual and co-ordinated
resignation of RAM officers. While this does not tally exactly with
the National Times (5 and 12 October 1986) account, in both cases,
Ver's uncovering of the coup plot (Plan A?) on or before the 21
February arrest of fifteen RAM soldiers, spurred the senior RAM
officers to their open rebellion. It was the very human
consideration of self-preservation, rather than any sociological or
societal factor, that forced these soldiers to abandon their
apparently non-interventionist stance. They did not, however,
overtly reject civilian supremacy, for the rebels, including Enrile
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and Ramos, claimed that they were making a stand for Corazon
Aquino and the democratic process.
Out of the context of the extreme situation in which Enrile
found himself - imminent arrest by Ver's forces - this claim sounds
hollow. Self-preservation was clearly the spur to Enrile's action on
22 February. Joining with Marcos in 1964, Enrile never hid his
presidential ambitions. The public expression of this desire has
been seen by many as the basis of his progressive fall-out with
Marcos since the late 1970s (Asiaweek 9 March 1986; Sydney
Morning Herald 24 February 1986). Ver's appointment as AFP chief
of staff in 1981 marked a turning point in Enrile's relationship with
Malacanang, in that it eventually strengthened Imelda's hand vis-a
vis his in the succession stakes. July 1983 saw Enrile's power to
give orders to the military revoked by Marcos (Asiaweek 9 March
1986), although for some time many of his orders had gone
unheeded, for example, his prohibition of strategic hamletting (ICJ
1984:35). From this time on, Enrile became increasingly vocal in his
concerns about military excesses and the growing NPA insurgency.
Although Enrile has claimed to have been involved with RAM from
its early days his role appears to have been so clandestine that only
the colonels knew of it (Asiaweek 9 March 1986). Throughout the
election, Enrile campaigned, intimidated and bribed extensively for
Marcos, and although some observers noted that the ballot boxes
from Enrile's Cagayan region were very slow in arriving in Manila,
suggesting that Enrile was holding them back in order to see which
way the popular mood was flowing, Enrile's change of heart came as
a big surprise to the assembled journalists at the Saturday evening
news conference and to the people (National Times 28 February
1986). Yet while Enrile's long-term motives were open to serious
question, the situation in February demanded that Aquino and the
people simply trust Enrile.
The more surprising defection was that of Lieutenant General
Fidel Ramos. Ramos had long been considered the head of the
professional faction within the AFP, although his commitment to
civilian supremacy and the values of West Point apparently
disqualified him from interventionist policies, much to the
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disappointment of the reformers (ibid.), and even Mrs Aquino (PEER
27 February 1986). However, like Enrile, Ramos had found himself
increasingly out of Marcos's favour and his power being
undermined by Ver. The final humiliation for Ramos came with
Ver's 'resignation' on 9 February, effective from 1 March, and
Ramos's 'appointment' as acting chief of staff, two presidential
orders Ramos later claimed had never been issued (Sydney Morning
Herald 24 February 1986). In any case, those orders were
overturned by Ver's secret 'reinstatement' and his subsequent
replacement of a number of senior Ramos supporters in the AFP
hierarchy around 19 February (Asiaweek 9 March 1986). It was at
this point that Ramos began to doubt he had a future, and his long
pent-up frustration at Marcos's refusal to instigate any reforms in
the AFP, particularly in the areas of corruption and human rights,
was vented in his decision to join Enrile and RAM on Saturday 22
February. Ramos's defection was vital for the prospects of the
mutiny: the high regard in which he was held, even by pro-Marcos
forces, and the solid power-base he enjoyed within the AFP and at
the US embassy could well have guaranteed the survival of the
mutiny beyond its first few hours. It was largely Ramos's presence
in Camp Crame which legitimized this act of military intervention in
politics, and prompted the AFP's wholesale desertion of Marcos.
This is no coup, we're just trying to force the issue of who is
really President of this country. We're not seizing power, we're just
trying to make the President step down', said one RAM officer in
Camp Aguinaldo (National Times 28 February 1986). The
preconditions for a coup were met in February 1986: instability in
the civilian political sphere was exacerbated by deteriorating
economic conditions; serious conflicts did exist between the Marcos
regime's plans and policies, and those of sections of the AFP
(especially in regard to counter-insurgency); and evidence of
military plotting (the RAM colonels-Enrile coup conspiracy) had
been uncovered. These, coupled with the Marcos government's
growing illegitimacy and the elite's declining solidarity throughout
the 1980s, increased the likelihood of some form of military
intervention in politics. However, the fact that the AFP participated
in the political process does not amount to proof of its permanent
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escalation of involvement to a level of control or, as Finer puts it
(1976:78), displacement or 'supplantment'.
Had Enrile's coup attempt succeeded, it would have constituted
an act of displacement: the removal or replacement of a cabinet or
ruler by violence or its threat. Despite Enrile's disclaimers, it would
have been a case of military control with partners. There is now
evidence from Enrile's own admission that he supported the
establishment of a junta or people's committee to rule the
Philippines before supporting Aquino as the duly elected president
(Sydney Morning Herald 10 May 1985). Enrile's ambition was quite
obvious. Claims that he has subsequently made, that if he had
wanted the presidency he simply could have taken it in February
1986 (Sydney Morning Herald 23 July 1986) are clearly
unsupportable, since the rebels were dependent on Cory's popular
power base to legitimize and protect their action. Had Enrile seized
control of the government and denied Aquino her position as
president, it is quite possible that Ramos and much of the AFP
would not have joined the mutiny, and that in this disorganization
of the opposition Marcos and Ver could have effected a crackdown
and reasserted their authority.
The alliance between the mutineers and Aquino was, as Enrile
put it in a television interview, 'an alliance born out of the common
denominator ... the power of the people'. The RAM mutiny was only
part of the general rejection of Marcos's mandate, forming the
somewhat unexpected climax to Aquino's civil disobedience
campaign. While the military's 'trying to make the president step
down' is an element of a coup d'etat, Aquino's moral claim to the
presidency in the context of the stolen election gave the military's
action a civil political focus. The AFP intervened in politics in the
sense that its members, along with the Manila masses, determined
the character of the new Philippine government, but the military's
action dictated neither the nature of Aquino's system of government
nor the composition of her cabinet.
A final consideration is whether the actions of the RAM
mutineers constituted a coup d'etat. A coup d'etat is a sudden
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forcible overthrow of a government by a small group (David
1985:2). It can follow the lines of a golpe de estado, the 'seizure and
elimination' (but not necessarily the assassination) of the person of
the head of state' (Finer 1976:140), or a cuartelazo, a barracks
revolt, or a combination of the two. Elements of a coup include the
quickness of the operation, the presence of an element of extra-legal
force, the replacement of the government by the coup leaders or by
persons designated by them, and the participation of only a small
number of conspirators (David 1985:3). Essential to a coup's success
are secrecy, surprise and the neutralization of the bulk of the
military; bloodlessness is the measure of a 'good' coup (Finer
1976:226). While RAM's revolt was a relatively bloodless surprise,
initially following the pattern of a cuartelazo, it became entrapped
in a siege at Camps Aguinaldo and Crame, a siege which was only
broken by the force of hundreds of thousands of civilians in the
streets and the collapse of Marcos's remaining support pillars (even
some of the cronies began to defect or flee). Thus, the elements of a
coup d'etat were barely present in the RAM-Enrile-Ramos mutiny,
and the process that at first glance appeared to be a coup was in
fact transmuted by popular participation into a political revolution.
People's power: a church-sponsored non-violent
revolution?
Having discounted the significance of the US's direct
participation in the events of February 1986, and having noted that
the military's involvement constituted neither a coup d'etat nor a
permanent escalation of intervention to a level of control, the
phenomenon of people's power remains to be examined. The
thousands of unarmed civilians who jammed EDSA in order to
prevent Marcos's tanks reaching the rebels at Crame were only one
aspect of the non-violent action which signalled the collapse of
Marcos's remaining power and sounded the death knell for his
regime. The prominence of Roman Catholic priests and nuns in this
process raises the question of the role of the church in Marcos's
ouster, an event which has been termed by some, a non-violent
revolution.
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The essence of people's power is its mass-based non-violent
nature. All such action is founded on 'the belief that the exercise of
power depends on the consent of the ruled who, by withdrawing
that consent, can control and even destroy the power of their
opponent' (Sharp 1980:4). People's power, February 1986, was the
manifestation of the Filipino people's withdrawal of that consent. It
lent credence to Hannah Arendt's (1970:44) somewhat
unconventional definition of power: that 'Power corresponds with
the human ability not just to act but to act in concert. Power is
never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and
remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together.' The
ability of the people of Manila to act in concert, to join Aquino's civil
disobedience campaign and to intercede between Enrile, Ramos and
RAM, and Marcos's forces, clearly demonstrated Marcos's
diminishing power as his original ruling group, and the pillars of his
support, crumbled.
The philosophical background of Filipino non-violent action is
complex. On a cultural level, an old Malay concept appears to be
significant. To be one nation, you must be like one body. The pain
of the smallest finger should be the pain of the entire body. This
notion militated against a violent opposition to Marcos but
encouraged a non-violent mass mobilization to overturn the
injustices of the regime. Other deep-rooted ethical justifications for
non-violent action were the long tradition of strict non-violence in
theological teachings (Carino 1985:59), the Gandhian desire to
convert one's enemies (which coincides with the Christian concept of
forgiveness), and the utilitarian perspective that violence would
merely render unattainable the desired political and social goods.
For the traditional opposition, the prized utilitarian good was the
return to liberal democracy. The utilitarian justification for non
violent action shaded into the pragmatic argument, which maintains
that 'non-violence is (or can be made to be) more effective than
military means' (Mack and Boserup 1974:12). In the Philippines, it
was because the legal opposition had no alternative that non-violent
action was adopted. The legal opposition had no significant
organizational support structure, no guns and no training. Violence
45
would only have invited bloody repression. Furthermore, a
commitment to non-violence was a means by which the Marxists
and the non-Marxist opposition could be distinguished, especially
since the leaders of the non-violent action were largely legal
oppositionists who wanted to avoid communist rule or civil war as
much as a continued Marcos regime.
With such a substantial philosophical inclination towards non
violent action, it is not surprising that people's power is a regular
theme in Filipino politics. Strikes and other non-violent techniques
have long been used to press for improvements to both political and
economic conditions. The term 'people's power', was used in
relation to the Zoto campaigns of squatters in Tondo (Metro-Manila)
in the early 1970s. It also forms the closest English translation of
Lakas ng Bayan (Laban). There has been an attempt to distinguish
between 'people power' and 'people's power': the former being a
term for describing the non-repeatable historical experience of
February 1986; the latter as a way to describe a populist ideology
which, while positing power with the people, could be used by the
Aquino government as a way to deny class contention and to sustain
'ruling class control' over the masses (Pinches 1986). Whatever the
validity of this distinction, the two phrases will be used
interchangeably here.
The theoretical basis of people's power and non-violent action
is the belief that power is non-hierarchical and emanates from the
people, the grassroots. Thus, the sources of a regime's power
ultimately rest with the subjects' obedience and co-operation.
While the material and human resources available to the ruler are
significant in determining the strength, intensity and scope of the
regime's power, once the citizens, including the agents of law
enforcement, begin to question the relative desirability of the
consequences of obedience and disobedience, and develop a greater
self-confidence with which to assert themselves, 'the ruler's will is
thwarted in proportion to the number of disobedient subjects and
the degree of his dependence on them' (Sharp 1980:4).
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Sharp argues that there are benefits peculiar to non-violent
action. Non-violent action, particularly if it is met with violent
repression, establishes a dynamic, known as political jiu-jitsu, which
can destabilize the opponent regime. Repression rebounds upon the
oppressor. The oppressor is exposed in the worst possible light.
This often results in outrage and the realization of the repression's
lack of justification amongst uncommitted third parties, the
opponent's supporters, and those already sympathetic to the
grievance group (ibid. 657-658). Violent opposition is much easier
to justify in its suppression, whereas non-violent action, by creating
an asymmetrical conflict situation, imposes limits on the degree to
which the opposition can be persecuted. Non-violent action also
focuses attention on the grievance rather than the news-worthy
violent clash between demonstrators and the government forces
(Cohen 1971:24). As political jiu-jitsu becomes more pronounced,
the disquiet of the third parties and the regime supporters is often
transformed into action in support of the opposition (Sharp
1980:113). The 1944 demise of Guatemalan dictator Jorge Ubico
clearly illustrates the pattern of successful political jiu-jitsu : 'he
was helpless against civil acts of repudiation to which he responded
with violence, until these slowly pushed him into the dead-end
street where all dictators ultimately arrive: kill everybody who is
not with you or get out' (Rosenthal 1962:200).
Marcos, in February 1986, faced Ubico's dilemma. Throughout
the 1980s, his power-base had been decaying. Particularly after
Aquino's assassination, large sections of the community began to
question their obedience and withhold compliance, even in the face
of increasing repression. The post- 1983 reinvigoration of the non
violent, legal opposition escalated the process of political jiu-jitsu at
work in the Philippines. The US and the church came to adopt
actively critical third party roles. The technocrats, non-crony
businessmen and the reformist elements within the military started
questioning the efficacy of the repression in the light of their
growing agreement with the traditional opposition's complaints
against Malacanang. And amongst the non-violent resisters,
repression only galvanized their resolve to continue the struggle
against Marcos.
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Prior to February 1986, non-violent techniques such as strikes,
welgang bayans, rallies and marches had been used against the
regime. However, Aquino's seven-point programme of civil
disobedience, announced on 16 February, was the first attempt to
promote a non-violent campaign across the whole country. She
called for a nation-wide general strike on 26 February, the day after
Marcos's inauguration, a boycott of the seven crony-government-
owned banks, of the government-crony media and of the products
of Cojuangco's San Miguel Corporation, the delayed payment of
water and electricity bills, a nightly noise barrage and experiments
in other forms of non-violent protest (Asiaweek 2 March 1986;
Sydney Morning Herald 17 February 1986). These tactics were
adopted enthusiastically by Manila's middle classes, workers and
poor. The inundation of Manila with yellow, Cory's colour, was a
further sign of Marcos's diminishing hold on the people's 'hearts and
minds'. Aquino's stand had moral endorsement from the church as
seen by the 14 February CBCP statement. The church's sentiments
were echoed by the RAM press release of 16 February.
The RAM-Enrile-Ramos rebellion was a further instance of civil
disobedience: together, they defied Marcos's commands as a protest
against the regime. The mutiny was a repudiation of Marcos's
mandate, and although it amounted in effect to a reversal of the
direction of the guns, it could be construed as part of the non
violent schema (Sharp 1980:332-333). It was not, however, the
rebel soldiers who finally destroyed Marcos's hold on power: it was
the masses in the streets of Manila who signalled to the church, the
US, the technocrats and the AFP the total disintegration of Marcos's
mandate. In the early hours of the rebellion on 22 February,
Marcos may not have appreciated the seriousness of the crisis, and
so miscalculated by opting to attempt to persuade Enrile and Ramos
out of their fort rather than risking a rebel attack on Malacanang by
moving Ver's forces forward to take Aguinaldo and Crame. Once the
people took to the streets with the blessing of the church, Marcos
could not have dispersed them without thousands of casualties, and
such a resolution was unacceptable to the US. Marcos's dilemma
was complicated by the fact that many of the loyalist soldiers would
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have refused to open fire on the people (National Times 12 October
1986). Even if Marcos had crushed the incipient rebellion and
arrested all the opposition leaders in a reimposition of martial law,
the mood of the people had so radically altered that civil war would
have been the most likely consequence.
In retrospect, by Monday morning, Marcos's power-base had
been so undercut that he could not have successfully ordered a
crackdown. However, the people in the streets were unaware of
this. In the face of the ever-present, and by experience quite
justified, fear of a violent end to their protests, a means had to be
found to ensure non-violent discipline. It was the church which
fulfilled this role, Cardinal Sin over Radio Veritas, and more
importantly, the priests and nuns in the streets. Whether non
violence could have been maintained for long beyond Tuesday is
now a hypothetical question, but to understand how it was
essentially maintained throughout the uprising, one has to
appreciate the church's place in Philippine society.
The Philippine Catholic Church is a deeply divided institution,
not at all the monolith suggested when referred to as 'the church'.
The schism between the conservative and progressive/radical
factions is bridged by the moderates in a pattern of conflict which is
reflected throughout the Roman Catholic Church in the Third World.
At one end of the spectrum are the arch-conservatives who believe
that the priest's duty is to minister to the needs of the eternal soul
of his flock, with scant regard to their present material situation. It
is these clerics who most obviously provide the living evidence of
Marx's claim that religion is 'the opium of the people', upholding the
status quo by making the 'apolitical' commitment not to question
present social injustice, while promising a rosy afterlife.
The progressive faction gained impetus from Vatican II and the
papal encyclicals of Popes Leo XIII, Pius XI and John XXIII. The
plight of the poor and the remedying of social injustice became the
centre-piece of the priest's duty towards his congregation. Social
injustice was increasingly viewed as structural sin. As the Filipino
Jesuit theologian, Fr Antonio Lambino, put it, 'one cannot be for
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neighbour unless one is against the unjust structures, systems and
institutions that prevent him from realizing his dignity and freedom
as a son of God' (Youngblood 1981:252). In practical terms, this
social justice interpretation of the gospel prompted more church
criticism of the human rights' excesses of the Marcos regime, and a
focus on building Basic Christian Communities at a local level 'to
emphasise human dignity, equality and democratic participation'
and at the national level a focus on 'restructuring the economic
system to ensure a more equitable distribution of the nation's
wealth' (ibid. 253).
The most radical sector in the church is that which avows the
'theology of liberation'. Employing a Marxist analysis of society,
these 'liberation theologists' advocate armed struggle against the
dictator and the 'clerico-fascists' of the institutional church.
Naturally, liberation theology does not enjoy the Vatican's approval,
although this Latin American-developed theology has come to be
recognized by many influential church leaders as a valid and useful
way of analysing many Third World situations (Sydney Morning
Herald 29 October 1985). In the Philippines, Christians for National
Liberation (CNL) and the NPA's rebel priests are the major
exponents of liberation theology, although its slightly less violent
version is widely accepted amongst many parish priests,
missionaries and lay workers. Indeed, one's position in the church
hierarchy often determines the degree of one's radicalism, as seen
in the variations of opinion between the CBCP, the AMRSP, and the
regional secretariats (Shoesmith 1985:76).
It was this great difference of opinion that the moderates
sought to span. They realized that if they were unsuccessful, the
church would be irrevocably split, as it had been in Nicaragua. The
excesses of the Marcos regime's security forces radicalized the
moderates, encouraging them to review the scriptures, particularly
Christ's challenge to the pharisaical status quo. Cardinal Sin, leader
of the moderate bishops, and once described by a leading Filipino
Jesuit as 'a shrewd tactician who lacked an overall programme'
(ibid. 79), became an increasingly outspoken critic of the
government in the 1980s. By January 1986, Sin and the CBCP were
50
reminding the people that they need not vote according to the bribe
they had accepted. In a pastoral letter delivered on 18 January, Sin
went so far as to warn 'the party in power' that 'if a candidate wins
by cheating, he can only be forgiven by God if he renounces the
office he has obtained by fraud' (FEER 30 January 1986). This level
of criticism was quite unprecedented. Although the church did not
directly endorse Aquino during the election campaign, it granted
her access to its communications network. Furthermore, Namfrel
was largely organized by priests and nuns.
The 14 February CBCP statement calling for non-violent
resistance to the fraudulent victor marked the point at which the
moderates climbed off the fence to join the progressives. This was
the crucial difference between 1983 and 1986. Although the
moderates condemned the Aquino assassination and alleged official
complicity, it was not until 1986 that they actually called for
Marcos's departure. In addition, in 1986 they had the moral
support of the Pope, who cabled an 'I am with you' message. The
church's stand was an acknowledgement that Cory was the first
credible alternative to Marcos and the CPP/NPA, and since self-
interest can be as much an element in destroying as in reinforcing
obedience (Sharp 1980:22), the vision of Nicaragua ensured that the
institutional church would do its utmost to swing the revolutionary
tide away from Marxism and towards Cory (FEER 27 February
1986).
The maintenance of non-violence has been largely attributed to
the church. With around 85 per cent of Filipinos embracing
Catholicism, the church was in a pre-eminently powerful position to
counsel non-violence, in that socialization from birth meant that
most Filipinos would listen quite willingly to the church's directives
and so would try to fulfil the commandment to turn the other cheek
if so directed by the church. In addition, the church remained the
one nation-wide legal institution free of Marcos's control and with
the human and monetary resources to confront the regime. While
there are some who would argue that the people would have come
to the rescue of Enrile and Ramos on Saturday evening even without
Cardinal Sin's broadcast over Radio Veritas, it is undeniable that
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Radio Veritas played an essential role in keeping the people
informed, and that the priests and nuns who took up frontline
positions before Tadiar's tanks in EDSA and between the groups of
Marcos loyalists and 'Cory's crowds' by Malacanang, leading the
protesters in prayer and singing of the Ave Maria, were an integral
part of the maintenance of non-violence. The presence of the nuns
and priests rekindled the people's faith, which helped them
overcome the fear of possible death on the streets. The experience
in EDSA united the citizens of Manila in a way that had never been
achieved before (Sydney Morning Herald 26 and 27 February
1986). The spiritual nature of people's power has been noted by
many of the participants. The spontaneity, the spiritualism and the
cross-class nature of those four days in Manila led many to call this
non-violent uprising a people's power revolution.
Central to the idea of revolution are social change, mass action
(or at least acquiescence) and, usually, violence. More often than
not, the 'success' of the revolution is judged merely in terms of the
long range reconstruction of society rather than the event itself.
Although revolutions are 'cataclysmic events that shape eras of
human history' (Walton 1984:1), the emphasis on their long term
ramifications in many analyses (Dunn 1972:12; Skocpol 1979:4)
makes it difficult to evaluate, so soon after the event, the success of
people's power as a real revolution. Although the Aquino
government appears more competent and certainly more committed
than the Marcos regime in dealing with the pressing social, economic
and political problems of the Philippines, it cannot be said that the
Philippines has undergone a crisis which has resulted in 'the
coincidence of societal structural change with class upheaval; and
the coincidence of the political with social transformation' (ibid. 4).
In the long-term structural sense, the struggle of February
1986 cannot presently be called revolutionary, although it is quite
justifiable to term people's power a 'political revolution'. Tilly
(1978:190) makes a useful distinction between revolutionary
situations and revolutionary outcomes. The former are
characterized by multiple sovereignty, that is, 'when a government
previously under the control of a single sovereign polity becomes
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the object of effective, competing, mutually exclusive claims on the
part of two or more distinct polities'. Clearly, such a situation
existed in the Philippines in early 1986, with Marcos beseiged by
the claims of two competing 'polities', Aquino and the CPP.
Revolutionary outcomes are characterized 'by the displacement of
one set of power holders (and policies) by another' (Walton
1984:12). In the political sphere, if not the economic or social
spheres, people's power certainly achieved such a displacement of
power holders; hence, the 'political revolution'.
Symptoms of impending revolution had been long observable in
the crumbling authority of the Marcos regime in the 1980s. The
elite was split. Even some of the less avaricious crony politicians had
started to question the moral basis of Marcos's hold on power. The
intellectuals had long since deserted the regime, the universities
forming a hotbed of anti- Marcos sentiment. It could be argued that
class differences in the 1980s were increasing, with at least some of
the rich getting richer and all of the poor getting poorer. However,
the split within the elite and Marcos's antagonization of the middle
classes halted this class polarization and united these disparate
groups in opposition to their common foe, Marcos, bringing them
into the streets in February 1986 to protest his rule. The
Philippines in the 1980s also experienced rapid social and economic
change which rendered Marcos's political arrangements obsolete.
The devastation of the economy denied Marcos access to his
essential and massive funds for patronage. In the ruins of Marcos's
political order were the seeds of a revolutionary situation.
The final element necessary to realize this revolutionary
potential was leadership from new and determined political elites.
To capitalize on the (usually) pre-existing state of chaos, effective
political leadership is essential (Dunn 1972:22-23). By defining
revolution in terms of an elite's forcible seizure of power through
mass action and its subsequent attempts to reform society, the
essentially elitist and authoritarian aspects of revolution stand out.
(It is in light of this definition that coups can be revolutionary.) The
spontaneity of the Philippine uprising tended to militate against one
elite rising above the chaos of the competition. Even within
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Aquino's cabinet many trends are evident. For the CPP/NPA, the
real revolution, of course, has not yet occurred. They did not play
an active role in people's power because their leadership was not, at
that time, 'effective' (Ang Bayan March 1986). The decision to
boycott the election marginalized the Left, and its leaders were in
hiding and unable to speak out. However, the CPP/NPA still have
the willpower and the resources to continue their struggle.
One of the most interesting theoretical questions raised by the
Philippine experience is the necessity of violence in a revolutionary
situation. Johnson (1982:7) maintains that 'an irrreducible element
of any revolution is the resort to, and acceptance of, violence'. He
defines violence broadly as behaviour-distorting anti-social activity
which 'is not necessarily brutality, or insensitivity, or the antithesis
of empathy' (ibid. 8). This would seem to include non-violent
coercion: 'change [which] is achieved against the opponent's will
and without his agreement, the sources of his power having been so
undercut by non-violent means that he no longer has control' (Sharp
1980:69). Clearly, Johnson's use of 'violence' does not accord with
its popular definition: 'direct assault upon the body of another in
order to inflict pain, injury or death' (Wrong 1979:24). Violence is
the ultimate form of force or coercion, but not the only form. Non
violent coercion/force occurs when the protestors 'use their own
bodies as physical objects to prevent or restrict actions by others
rather than acting directly on the bodies of others' (ibid. 24). Thus,
a revolution is coercive, but need not be violent.
By placing their bodies between the rebel troops and the
loyalist tanks, in conjunction with their other acts of civil
disobedience, the people confronted Marcos with a choice: to shoot
them all and restore order, or to resign and hand the presidency to
Aquino. Through their non-violent action, which only aggravated
Marcos's other economic and political problems, his regime's
remaining capacity for repression collapsed. The Marcos regime
suffered 'the sudden dramatic breakdown of power which ushers in
revolutions' (Arendt 1970:49); it was toppled in a coercive
revolutionary manner, but without substantial immediate loss of
life.
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Conclusion
The preceding sections illustrate that many forces were at work
in the downfall of Marcos. However, if forced to choose between the
labels of 'people's power' or 'palace coup' to describe the events of
February 1986, people's power would seem to be the most
appropriate. While the military's contribution was extremely
important, the RAM mutiny only gained legitimacy in the context of
the stolen election. The US played a less important role than the
military, with US criticism somewhat unexpectedly forcing Marcos
to an early poll, and US pressure to avoid a bloody outcome of the
post-poll crisis restricing Marcos's freedom to manoeuvre. Yet, it
was the change in the people's mood, especially Manila's middle
class, that was the critical reversal suffered by the Marcos regime.
Once the middle class was no longer prepared to obey Marcos, a
dynamic was established which left the president in a precarious
situation: violent repression of this Manilacentric movement would
have so outraged and radicalized the legal opposition that many
would have joined or at least aided the underground armed
opposition. A civil war could have resulted and the CPP would have
been the most obvious beneficiary. The February 1986 presidential
election was seen by many Filipinos as the last-ditch effort to oust
Marcos electorally. Similarly, people's power under Aquino's moral
leadership was almost as much directed at the radical Left as
against Marcos: it was mobilization by the moderate opposition to
secure the succession and forestall further gains by the CPP.
Marcos's demise was logically foreseeable, in that his power-
base had been substantially eroded during the 1980s. The economy
was in an extremely unhealthy state. The extravagance and
economic irrationality of the Marcoses and their cronies had
alienated the technocrats and business leaders, while cronyism
within the AFP caused substantial factionalization. The lack of a
presidential succession mechanism, especially in the light of
Marcos's poor health, further fractured the ruling elite, as
personalities came into conflict - particularly those of Imelda, Ver,
55
Cojuangco and Enrile. The assassination of Benigno Aquino proved
the turning point for Marcos's regime. It spurred renewed popular
interest in the legal opposition, a de facto liberalization of the
media, and a much more critical stance by the church, the US
Congress and elements within the State Department. And with the
NPA escalating its activities, Marcos never again appeared fully in
control. Indeed, the regime's loss of its sophistication in dealing
with dissent appears to validate Arendt's (1970:56) distinction
between violence and power: 'Power and violence are opposites ...
Violence appears where power is in jeopardy but left to its own
course it ends in power's disappearance.' Nothing could have been
truer in the streets of Manila in February 1986.
The involvement of the US was secondary. Although the neo-
colonial relationship perhaps set the parameters of the Filipino
political sphere, the ambivalence of Washington towards continued
Marcos rule, and Washington's apparent inability to formulate a
coherent policy in response to such a closely contested election
militate against an interpretation crediting the US with a major role.
While the CIA apparently knew of the RAM-Enrile coup plot, active
US involvement in the mutiny seems unlikely, considering the speed
of events and the personal imperatives of Enrile, Ramos and the
RAM colonels. The US's pressure for a non-violent resolution to the
crisis appears to have been motivated as much by fear of
communist infiltration of the moderate opposition as by any
humanitarian consideration. Violence would have destroyed
Washington's 'third force' strategy and left it once more with
Hobson's choice.
It was the NPA's growing strength which spurred the reformist
elements of the military to action. The AFP's level of involvement
in politics had steadily increased with martial law, and as the ethos
of civilian supremacy was whittled away, the AFP's potential for
political intervention increased. While the AFP may have been on
the verge of a further step towards military control had Enrile's
coup plan succeeded, the open revolt was extremely dependent on
the support of Ramos and the people. Ramos's defection was
essential to ensure the support of the remainder of the AFP and to
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assure the people of the military's honourable intentions. The
people were indispensable because their presence in the streets not
only blocked the tanks' advance but also undermined many of the
soldiers' loyalty to Marcos. Thus, the events of February
demonstrated that military intervention in politics may only be
possible if implicitly sanctioned by the people, but particularly the
middle class. While the AFP may have been technically capable of
intervention, had Enrile attempted to usurp Aquino's popular
mandate, the people, in all likelihood, would have rejected RAM's
move and another split in the military between Enrile and Ramos
factions would have ensued.
The people's power interpretation of Marcos's fall is the most
convincing. It isolates the single most significant factor in Marcos's
downfall: Marcos's rejection by the middle class and the church, as
well as by the poor workers and peasants. People's power, as a
successful case of non-violent action, incorporates the US's
withdrawal of support for Marcos, the RAM mutiny, and the
growing presence of the CPP/NPA as the third alternative, an
alternative unacceptable to the US, RAM, the moderate opposition
and the church. While the leaders of RAM may have been
motivated by considerations other than Aquino's claim to the
presidency, the choice facing the average soldier was the same as
that facing the citizen: people's power or Marcos. A non-violent
mutiny is as much an act of civil disobedience as a general strike.
The dynamic of political jiu-jitsu, established by the opposition's
non-violent action, had gained such momentum by 22 February that
the military rebellion was merely the final blow to Marcos's power-
base. The church's decision to support Aquino was important both
in the preservation of non-violence and in signalling that Marcos
could no longer hold the support of even the relatively
conservative church hierarchy. Admittedly, the moderate
opposition had no plausible alternative to non-violent action, but
this commitment to non-violence seemed to coincide with a deep
conviction among Filipino citizens that legal means should be tried
once more to oust Marcos.
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Finally, the influence of Mrs Corazon Aquino should not be
underestimated. It was she who unified the people by providing
them with a popular alternative to Marcos, and it was she who
insisted on non-violence. Aquino's political acumen allowed her to
forge an alliance with Enrile, while resisting his attempts to
establish a junta. Indeed, she is the 'mother' of the February 1986
Filipino political revolution. Although it is too early to evaluate it as
a social revolution, people's power has created a 'myth', which both
legitimizes the Aquino administration in true democratic spirit, and
engenders in Filipinos a greater sense of belonging to and power
over the system. It is perhaps this reassertion of the democratic
political consciousness among Filipinos, especially the middle class,
which constitutes one of the most significant 'revolutionary' changes
brought by 1986.
CHAPTER 2
THE QUEST FOR POLITICAL LEGITIMACY IN THE
PHILIPPINES: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PLEBISCITE OF 1987
Mark Turner
On Tuesday 25th February 1986 two presidents of the
Philippines were sworn into office in different parts of Manila - the
incumbent, Ferdinand Marcos at Malacanang Palace and the
challenger, Corazon Aquino, at the Club Filipino. This was one
president too many. By the evening of the same day the problem
had been solved by the abrupt flight of one contender, Marcos, to
Hawaiian exile. Aquino thus assumed the presidency much to the
delight of hundreds of thousands of supporters who thronged the
streets of Manila. But what gave her the right to hold this office?
Was it because she was the victor in the presidential election?
Perhaps her claim to power was based on her popular support on
the streets of Manila, the hundreds of thousands of people who had
thronged the EDSA highway. Maybe there had been a successful
revolution and she was the leading representative of the new order.
Had she been installed as president by the military or had the
events of 23-25 February 1986 been, as many believed, a case of
'divine intervention'?
All of these questions focus on the central issue of legitimacy,
'that political condition in which power-holders are able to justify
their holding of power in terms other than those of the mere fact of
power-holding' (Lewis 1982:125). Since Weber (1948:1978)
subjected legitimacy to his intellectual scrutiny in the 19th century
the concept has remained at the forefront of political science
enquiry (Connolly 1984) and has been of particular interest to
those studying the new states of the Third World (e.g. Heeger
1974:134; Horowitz 1979; Casanova 1979). But it is not only
scholars who have been concerned by legitimacy. Governments
have invested considerable resources in attempting to 'generate a
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belief in the obedience-worthiness of their rule which will in
normal circumstances secure the acceptance of their decisions
without resource to overt coercion' (White 1986:482).
This concern with legitimacy has been a pronounced feature of
Philippine political culture since the late 19th century. Thus, it was
not surprising that a major issue on Aquino's political agenda was
establishing legitimacy for herself and for the mode of government
to be promoted by her regime. This paper examines Aquino's quest
for legitimacy during the first year of her rule. The methods
selected by Aquino for attaining legitimacy will be analyzed while
the reasons for government concern with legitimacy will be
demonstrated. Also, there will be an account of the steps taken by
the government to achieve legitimacy and of the elements of
instability in the political environment which attempted to impede
progress towards that goal of legitimacy.
Selecting the path to legitimacy
In February 1986 President Aquino had a number of choices
open to her and a number of variations on those choices. She could
merely step directly into Marcos's shoes by accepting his 1973
constitution. This was of course unacceptable if it involved the
continuance in office of the Batasang Pambansa (National
Assembly) as this body was dominated by Marcos's political party,
the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL). Promoting the power of
opponents was not on Aquino's agenda. She could perhaps have
called Batasan elections but this would have acknowledged the
legality of the 1973 constitution and the legitimacy of Marcos's
political system. And Aquino had come to power largely because
that system had been identified by many groups and organizations
as illegitimate. To many, the 1973 constitution was both the
symbolic and legal foundation of a massively corrupt, morally
bankrupt, inequitable and illegitimate regime. To persevere with
such an instrument was unthinkable. A return to the 1935
constitution with its elected Congress and Senate was a possibility
mooted by some. The stigma of Marcos did not attach to this piece
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of legislation and as it existed there would be no delay or cost of
preparation. However, to utilize the old constitution was considered
a retrograde step as it was under scrutiny when Marcos declared
martial law in 1972. A constitutional convention had been
deliberating for nearly two years on changes to the 1935
constitution. Not only was this document seen to be in need of
alteration but it was also a creation of the American colonial era
and so offended certain nationalist sentiment. A third option was
for Aquino to declare a revolutionary government and, at least for
the moment, forget about the legalities of constitutions. She could
thus easily accommodate her mode of government to the
extraordinary conditions of the times. The supporters of this
political expedient argued that the Philippines was in crisis and as
such required radical treatment which could only be administered
by a revolutionary government unencumbered with considerations
of constitutionality. Such a platform does not go down well in the
Philippines where the elite and leading classes have a historical
preference for the security promised by the legalities of a formal
constitution. Aquino also knew that important sections of the
international community (notably the US, multinational banks, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank) with a
direct interest in the welfare of the Philippines would be uneasy
about the status and intentions of something called a 'revolutionary
government'. The president wished to secure foreign assistance in
renegotiating debt and in promoting socioeconomic development.
To foster unease in potential and actual international partners
would not help her to fulfil her wishes. As Vidich (1979:297) has
observed, 'political legitimacy in the Third World has now become a
process which includes a substantial investment of extra-national
elements'.
This left Aquino with one final option. She would have to
produce a new constitution and while it was being prepared govern
under some sort of transitional arrangements. Her electoral
platform had been built on opposition to the system which Marcos
had constructed and to those who had found power and fortune
under that system. Thus, there was widespread anticipation that
dramatic changes in the system and policy-orientation of
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government would be forthcoming. A new constitution was seen as
a way of exorcising the influence of Marcos from the political
system and of redirecting that system to worthier ends. Eventually,
on 25 March 1986 a short proclamation was issued by Aquino
declaring 'a provisional constitution for an orderly transition to a
government under a new constitution' (Far Eastern Economic
Review (FEER) 3 April 1986). The new constitution was to be
written in a mere ninety days by a commission of thirty to fifty
members and both the new 'permanent' constitution and 'a duly
elected parliament' were to be in operation within one year. The
term 'revolutionary government' was studiously avoided in
describing the arrangements for the transitional period. A
'temporary Freedom Constitution' was to provide the 'battered'
nation with shelter. It was essentially the 1973 constitution shorn
of some of its provisions. The Batasang Pambansa was scrapped
thus removing any lingering hopes among the KBL that they might
share power. Although some of Marcos's unfettered presidential
powers and the office of prime minister were abolished Aquino still
retained enormous personal powers. The 'Freedom' part of the
interim constitution's title was to assure people that all 'new won
rights and privileges' would be safeguarded. It is interesting that it
took Aquino and her advisers one month to make the simple
proclamation about writing a new constitution and transitional
government arrangements. It is not, however, surprising given the
prominence which Filipino politics has consistently awarded to
legitimacy, constitutionality and legality. The delay in making the
proclamation can be accorded to these elements of political culture.
Filipino concern with legitimacy originates in the reform
movement of the last two decades of the 19th century. Educated
and relatively wealthy Filipinos proposed modest programmes of
reform to their peers according to the imported principles of
Western liberal democracy. These principles found expresssion
during the revolution with 'several attempts at constitution-
making, by Filipinos' (Aruego 1954:24) before the framing of the
Malolos Constitution in 1898-99. According to Agoncillo and
Guerrero (1973:236) this document was 'anchored in democratic
traditions that ultimately had their roots on American soil' although
62
it drew heavily on Spanish and Spanish-American constitutions and
to a lesser extent the constitutions of France and Belgium (Aruego
1969:43). The important point is that it established
constitutionality as a leading element of political legitimacy in the
Philippines. The necessity of framing constitutions and acting, or at
least appearing to act, in a constitutional manner entered Philippine
political culture. Constitutionalism incorporating principles of
Western liberal democracy was more firmly entrenched in the
American colonial period. Although 'political education' did not
proceed quite along the lines envisaged by the Americans (May
1980:41-73) it has been argued that by the time the 1935
constitution was written 'more than three decades of colonial
education and cultural Americanization had produced a ruling elite
that regarded the American concepts of government and American
political institutions as the highest development of democracy'
(Constantino 1975:346). Also, less fervent nationalists have
observed that many American political practices, including those of
a corrupt and morally suspect nature had already found a 'rich soil'
in the Philippines (Agoncillo and Guerrero 1973:431). An extreme
reverence to constitutions was one of these practices. The
importance of this is neatly summed up by Apter (1977:146) in his
assertions that 'in the United States, the Constitution is absolutely
the last word, the embodiment of legitimacy. To violate the
Constitution in practice or in spirit is to surpass the limits of
political mandate'.
The election of delegates to the constitutional convention in
1934 emphasized another major element of political legitimacy in
the Philippines, a preoccupation with legality. Filipinos directly
concerned in the political process pay great attention to the legality
of institutions, activities, legislation and constitutions. Although
this may be a practice imported from the United States it is the
numerical dominance of lawyers in the Philippine political elite
which offers the most convincing explanation of the tradition of
legalism in political culture. In 1934, 81 per cent of the delegates
to the constitutional convention were lawyers (Juco 1969:18), a fact
which may explain why the convention got off to a slow start, the
delegates spending many weeks discussing rules and then sub
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dividing into more than forty committees. But lawyers had
appropriated Philippine politics from the early days of American
rule. In the Malolos Congress of 1899, of the eighty-eight members
for whom data are available, forty-three (49 per cent) were
lawyers (Zaide 1954:253). In the First Philippine Legislature
(1907-09) of the American period, forty-seven (59 per cent)
members were lawyers while another nine (11 per cent) had legal
training (May 1984:187). Sixty-three per cent of the eighty-one
members in the Third Legislature (1912-16) were lawyers while a
further eight (10 per cent) had legal training (ibid.). Similar
findings were made in postwar studies of Congress and Senate.
Simbulan (1965) analysed Philippine legislators in the period 1946-
63 and identified 69 per cent of congressmen and 73 per cent of
senators as lawyers. In another study of 1963 legislators (Abueva
1969a), 58 per cent of senators and 65 per cent of congressmen
cited law practice as an additional source of income. Over 40 per
cent of each group held law degrees while even among local level
elected officials, lawyers were often the leading occupational group.
Fifty-six per cent of governors, 48 per cent of vice-governors and
43 per cent of city mayors were lawyers. Although the legal
profession did not have the extraordinary numerical dominance of
previous regime's political elites, lawyers still constituted 37 per
cent of Marcos's early political elite and were the leading
occupation (Agpalo 1975:7).
Abueva (1969a:271) notes that the 'abogado' (lawyer) has held
high prestige in Filipino society since Spanish times and legal
training was seen from the early twentieth century as a way to
'advancement' for the able and ambitious Filipino. The legal-client
relationship appears to be 'analogous to the roles of representative,
intermediary and broker often expected of a politician' while legal
knowledge is advantageous for the politician because of 'the
baffling intricacies of Philippine law and the art and expertise of
living with it that has evolved' (ibid.). As a final note on the
proclivity of the Filipino politician to the legal profession, it should
be noted that until Aquino assumed office in 1986 only one
president of the Philippines (Magsaysay) had not been a lawyer.
Thus, the enduring concern with legality commenced at the top of
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the political ladder and was enforced from there, especially and
perhaps paradoxically because successive presidents were able to
exercise greater powers than those officially vested in them by the
constitution.
The symbiotic relationship between legality, constitutions and
political legitimacy in the Philippines should now be apparent.
Constitutions are revered in Philippine political culture. The
fundamental objective of a constitution is 'to provide a basic law for
a governmental regime' (Pritchett 1968:295). Philippine politics
has been a domain of lawyers who have been greatly concerned
with legality. The constitution is the basis of legality and so must
act as a fundamental element in determining political legitimacy.
Without a constitution a regime is viewed as illegitimate as it lacks
a legal basis. This may explain Marcos's extraordinary concern with
constitutionality after the declaration of martial law in 1972.
Admittedly, he was anxious to secure legitimacy in the eyes of the
international community but, more importantly, he was conforming
to a longstanding Philippine tradition. Del Carmen (1979) has
demonstrated Marcos's attention to constitutionality in declaring
martial law. He made great use of a Supreme Court decision
(Lansang v. Garcia) upholding his own suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus following multiple killings during a political rally in
Manila's Plaza Miranda in August 1971. This case was in fact a
legal test run to determine the constitutionality of martial law
before its declaration.
Marcos then set about ratifying a constitution. A constitutional
convention was already in session when martial law was declared
and had almost completed the revision of the 1935 constitution.
Within two months of the declaration of martial law a new
constitution was presented by this convention. In an effort to
acquire a rapid endorsement of his enormous 'temporary' powers
Marcos organized an informal referendum. The constitution was,
according to official sources, overwhelmingly ratified by show-of-
hands in the approximately 35,000 citizen's assemblies throughout
the Philippines. Many would argue that this method of ratification
was a farcical exercise for which results were fabricated. Canoy
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(1980:155) notes that in 'bizarre cases' leaders asked some trivial
question such as 'Are you ready for lunch?' to secure the
enthusiastic hand-raising for the photograph of the great formal
approval for the constitution! Other referenda/plebiscites followed
with regularity. It is not necessary to examine the operation or
outcome of these presidential initiatives. What is important is that
Marcos felt it necessary to regularly engage in some form of
legitimating ritual in an attempt to satisfy the twin traditions of
constitutionality and legality and to assure foreign powers that
'democracy' was alive and well in the Philippines.
Political rituals employed for the purpose of legitimation were
not new in the Philippines. Suhrke (1971) in her commentary on
pre-martial law politics lists such tactics as congressional
investigations which result in little or no action, legislation which is
far-reaching and much publicized but only partially implemented
and personal concern demonstrated by the president on a given
matter. These rituals can give the appearance that 'something is
being done', performance legitimation, when in fact very little or
anything is occurring to alter the status quo. Stress on a shared
ideological heritage, which finds its highest expression in the
constitution, performs a cohesive function lessening the conflicts
which the vast and obvious inequalities of Philippine society have
the potential to foment. But it was as Agpalo (1975:8) has
emphasized, 'Because they were elected in the course of popular
elections, the pre-martial law political elite achieved legitimacy'. It
is interesting to note that despite recurrent fraud and violence 'the
contending parties in pre-martial law elections .... tended to
circumvent electoral rules and regulations rather than tamper with
the law or the rules themselves' (Carbonell and Nicolas 1985:57).
Legality and the constitution were not for alteration except by duly
constituted authorities. As politicians were elected according to the
provisions and principles of Philippine constitutionalism, they were
legitimate representatives even though they were guilty of a
multitude of political sins such as graft and corruption, poor
legislative performance and self-interest.
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But a regime can extend the gap between ideology and reality
only so far before political legitimacy is called into question. Many
questions were being asked prior to martial law, though perhaps by
restricted circles, and attempts were being made to answer them in
the 1971 constitutional convention elected to change the 1935
constitution. The dominant legalist perspective encouraged the
prevailing view that 'the old constitution somehow had resulted in
the ills of Filipino democracy' (Abueva 1979:37). The reverse side
of the coin was the assumption that the ills could 'somehow' be
legislated away in a new constitution. While consolidated elite
power was under attack from dissatisfied social classes,
organizations and individuals, those agitating for change did not
need to step outside of the Philippine tradition of constitutional
thought in order to find their platforms. They merely needed to
alter the emphasis in what already existed. More nationalist
sentiments were demanded to remove foreign influence which
attached to the 1935 constitution. The legislation suffered from
being framed under colonial supervision and subject to the
approval of the president of the colonial power. The existing stress
on the. civil rights of individuals should be complemented with
provisions designed to promote and guarantee the social and
economic interests of 'lowly sectors of society'. There should be
more 'democracy' and more 'equality'. All the ideas and principles,
however vague or ambiguous, were already present in the
constitutional heritage which political elites had so assiduously
handed down over the years.
The advent of martial law did not, as we have already noted,
diminish concern with constitutionality and legality. Quite the
reverse, the regime was doubly concerned with these items because
'the political formula of Filipino liberal democracy .... prescribes that
martial law is not a normal institution' (Agpalo 1975:13). The
lawyer-politician president was only too aware of the traditions
and was determined to give the impression that constitutionalism
and the legitimate rule of law were alive and well. All manner of
devices were employed to this end - referenda, plebiscites,
elections, court rulings, barangay democracy and endless
propaganda. But credibility gradually diminished to the point
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where it is more appropriate to talk of regime tenability
(McDonough 1981:171) rather than legitimacy, if by the latter we
mean 'the popular acceptance of political institutions as both lawful
and moral' (Abueva 1969b:532). That Marcos was engaging in
passive political participation, mobilizing people according to his
wishes and orchestrating outcomes of supposedly democratic
procedures to his requirements became increasingly apparent to all.
That the judiciary had been rendered subservient to Marcos's
political needs could hardly remain hidden. Even the president's
legendary legal knowledge and skill and the critical court cases
decided in favour of the regime could not conceal that judicial
independence was a myth. That the military had encroached onto
civilian political territory and jettisoned certain established
constitutional rights en route had not gone unnoticed; neither had
their reluctance to retreat. The national crisis which was held up to
justify these attacks on constitutional sacred cows could not be
perpetuated too long without the population making their own
assessment of what that crisis actually was. As they attempted to
match Marcos's efforts to preserve some semblance of
constitutionality with corruption, cronyism, falling living standards,
increased unemployment and other societal ills so the legitimacy
which Marcos had been at such pains to erect began to collapse.
The popular acceptance of his political institutions as lawful and
moral had evaporated long before 1986. Legitimation through good
performance was hardly a way out as economy and society
staggered from crisis to crisis. The coercive capacity of the state
and mass acquiescence became more critical to the survival of
Marcos as opposition from below grew and sections of the elite
withdrew support.
Ironically, it was Marcos's attempt to impress the world with
his political legitimacy at home which led to his downfall. He
contested a presidential election against a 'housewife' (Aquino) in
order to demonstrate the popular acceptance of his rule and to
'once and for all end scepticism over his government's legitimacy'
(PEER 20 February 1986). The 'housewife' proved to be formidable
opposition whom Marcos could only attempt to beat by employing
massive electoral manipulation duly recorded and reported by
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hordes from the international and local media. What is, in
retrospect, astonishing about the election is that people, especially
those supporting Aquino, turned out in their millions to vote. After
more than a decade of systematic electoral manipulation
orchestrated by Marcos why would there be such a high level of
voter turn-out to participate in an event, the conduct of which
many knew would be highly suspect? One important contributory
factor was that people still adhered to the constitutional and legal
tradition of validating legitimacy through electoral means. The
retention of this belief says much for the survival capacity and
hence strength of certain long-established elements of Philippine
political culture.
This excursion into the traditions of constitutionalism and
legalism in establishing political legitimacy in the Philippines
should not be misconstrued as an attempt to exclude other factors
from the explanation of such legitimacy. The point is that
successive generations of Filipino politicians and different types of
regime have demonstrated a consistent concern with constitutions
and laws. As all observers of Philippine politics know, such concern
has not precluded a multitude of political malpractices and a form
of democracy which, when operating, has borne little resemblance
to that described by theorists of pluralist democracy and to liberal
interpretations of the constitution itself. As Carbonell-Catilo
(1986:123) notes, 'the Philippine experience shows clearly that
political arrangements which are constitutionally mandated and
legally based go a long way towards effectuating manipulation in
ways desired by the ruling elite'. President Aquino is not tainted
with the sins of manipulation and so occupies the moral high
ground but her early actions in government showed that she too
upheld the faith of constitutionalism and legality. She is the latest
in a line of presidential exponents of these traditions, although her
interpretation of them may differ from her democratically-elected
predecessors. It certainly forms a stark contrast to the
machinations of the man she succeeded. Finally, the strong
traditions of constitutionalism and legality are not found to
anywhere near the same degree in other comparable Southeast
Asian societies. What Weber (1948:79) terms the 'legitimation of
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domination by legality' has not gained such a foothold in nations
such as Thailand, Indonesia or Malaysia. The prominence awarded
to such legitimation, and indeed to the perceived necessity for that
legitimation, is a feature of Philippine politics which distinguishes it
from the politics of its ASEAN neighbours.
The Constitutional Commission
To dismantle Marcos's 'constitutional authoritarianism' and to
secure her regime's political legitimacy and stability, President
Aquino had chosen the well-worn legal and constitutional way. In
order to accomplish this objective the president required a
committee or convention to actually draft the new constitution.
Such a body would be expected to be representative of the
'sovereign will' of the people, especially so in Aquino's case given
the way in which she came to power. But how would the
constitution-drafting body be selected? Would it be necessary to
undertake some form of electoral exercise to choose delegates or
would it be acceptable for the president and her advisors to simply
appoint members?
Philippine constitutional history was not forthcoming with a
solution to Aquino's dilemma. The Malolos Constitution of 1899
was written by one man, Felipe Calderon. Although it went before
Congress for approval, this body was not truly representative of the
people. Up to sixty members of the 136-man Congress were
appointed rather than elected while all were from the higher
socioeconomic orders of Philippine society. The constitution of
1935 was framed by 202 delegates elected from districts
throughout the Philippines. As there was no universal franchise
the 'popular' vote was restricted to 1,704,005 registered voters of
whom only 873,021 (51 per cent) went to the polls compared to
1,344,557 (79 per cent) who voted in the 1934 general elections
(Aruego 1954:51). The popular vote was nowhere to be seen
during the Japanese occupation. The Japanese High Command
merely ordered the Executive Commission of the Philippines to
prepare a constitution. An appointed convention 'elected' twenty
70
members of the Philippine elite to the Preparatory Commission for
Philippine Independence which was authorized to frame the
constitution (Zaide 1970:70). In 1971, 2,481 candidates contested
320 seats in a popular election in order to win the privilege of
drafting the new constitution. The battle was keenly fought and
aroused considerable public interest. The successful candidates
were drawn from the middle and upper socioeconomic levels and
were perhaps not representative of all interests in Philippine
society, especially those of the lower orders. They were, however,
more representative of the 'sovereign will' of the people than any
of their predecessors in the constitution-drafting business.
Unencumbered by a strong tradition of electing constitutional
conventions Aquino was able to choose the option of appointing a
commission to draft the constitution. Despite Aquino's commitment
to democracy there were good practical reasons for taking this
course of action. First, the government would have to make heavy
financial expenditures to hold an election. Official resources were
severely limited after the expensive Marcos campaign in the
presidential election and the new policy was to save on government
expenditure wherever possible. Secondly, even if funds were made
available, it could take well over a year to conduct the
constitutional elections and ensuing deliberations. President
Aquino wanted a speedy constitutional resolution to the matters of
legitimacy and stability while she had no wish to delay elections for
local and national officials. Thirdly, Aquino was anxious to promote
political stability, a condition that could be jeopardized by the
immediate holding of an election. Given the political climate of the
time an election could have been a highly volatile affair. Fourthly,
by appointing a relatively small and able body, operational
efficiency could, theoretically, be maximized and the job completed
in the shortest possible time. A body such as the 320-person
convention of 1971 was more likely to be unwieldy and slow as
well as being far more expensive. Finally, Aquino could claim not
to be compromising her democratic principles as the constitution
drafted by her appointed team would require ratification in a
plebiscite. Thus, the adoption of the constitution would depend on
the 'sovereign will' of the people.
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It took Aquino two months from the proclamation of her
intention to draft a new constitution to announce the names of the
delegates to the Constitutional Commission (Con-Com) of 1986. A
number of potential candidates such as former senator Raul
Manglapus, even Marcos's vice-presidential running mate and
constitutional expert, Arturo Tolentino, and various regionally-
based persons did not wish to be considered for appointment as
Aquino had ruled in Proclamation No. 9 that no Con-Com delegate
would be allowed to run for public office for at least one year after
the ratification of the constitution. Nevertheless, there were plenty
of able candidates. Aquino first announced the names of forty-four
delegates on 25 May 1986 to tens of thousands of her supporters
who had gathered outside Manila's Camp Aguinaldo army
headquarters to celebrate the three month anniversary of the
February revolution in the 'Reunion of EDSA Heroes'. A further five
'opposition' delegates, former Marcos supporters, were named the
following day while the last seat was left for a representative of the
indigenous church, the Iglesia ni Kristo. The Iglesia ni Kristo failed
to find a suitable candidate and declined to participate. One of the
nominated opposition delegates also declined the Con-Com
appointment as he wished to stand in post-plebiscite elections.
Thus, Con-Com became a 48-seat commission and not a 50-seat
commission as originally envisaged.
The appointed delegates comprised forty-two men (87.5 per
cent) and 6 women (12.5 per cent). Male dominance was secure
although not as pronounced as in 1971 when there were thirteen
women delegates making only 4 per cent of the membership of the
convention. The appointees to the 1986 Con-Com were generally
held to represent a wide range of sectors and political persuasions.
The newspaper Business Day (26 May 1986) captured this well in
its observation that:
The 44 delegates chosen include eight professors and
educators, four former senators, six former Constitutional
Convention delegates, three former jurists, three lawyers,
three from the clergy, two labor leaders, one film director,
one student leader, one anthropologist, one ambassador,
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one former military official, two newsmen, one civic leader
and one economist.
Although this list would appear to suggest that the traditional
dominance of lawyers had been broken, this would be a mistake.
In addition to the six former jurists and lawyers noted above, a
number of other delegates had undertaken a legal education and/or
had practised law. The legal profession was still numerically the
largest profession on the Con-Com although they did not have the
superior numbers seen in previous Congresses or in the 1935 and
1971 constitutional conventions. Furthermore, in the 1986 Con-
Com belonging to the same profession by no means entailed sharing
the same ideology.
Indeed, ideological differences were more evident in the 1986
Con-Com than in any previous constitution-drafting gathering. By
using appointive rather than electoral methods of delegate selection
Aquino was able to ensure that opinion from a wide range of the
political spectrum would be represented. Whether an election
would have produced similar results remains unknown. No known
communists were included, despite early rumours that the 'reds'
would be invited to participate. The political Left was represented
by such figures as Jaime Tadeo, leader of the militant peasant
movement Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), Minda Luz
Quesada, leader of the Health Workers Association, Jose Luis Gascon,
student leader from the University of the Philippines, and Ponciano
Bennagen, anthropologist with the University of the Philippines.
The conservatives included Joaquin Bernas, President of the Jesuit
Ateneo de Manila University, Bernardo Villegas, a senior vice-
president of the private sector-funded Center for Research and
Communication, and former senators Francisco 'Soc' Rodrigo and
Ambrosio Padilla. The opposition appointees, three former KBL
assemblymen and one former Marcos cabinet-member, naturally
gravitated to the political Right. Also populating Con-Com were the
numerically-dominant moderates whose views on many issues
would be likely to coincide with those of Aquino. The same
judgement might be made of some elements in the conservative
camp. Among both conservative and moderate delegates were
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many who had been active in their support of Aquino during and
after her electoral campaign. Thus, it was predictable from the
start that the constitution which would emerge from Con-Com's
deliberations would be likely to find favour with the president.
Aquino could, as she promised at Con-Com's inaugural ceremonies,
maintain her distance from the proceedings and make no attempt
to influence the outcome yet still safely assume that the majority of
constitutional provisions drafted by Con-Com would be to her
liking.
The Con-Com first convened on 2 June 1986 at the Batasang
Pambansa building in Quezon City. Elected president was seventy-
two years old Cecilia Munoz-Palma, a former Supreme Court Justice,
member of the Batasan in opposition to Marcos and active in the
Cory Aquino for President Movement. Other officeholders were
also elected including the chairpersons of seventeen standing
committees in which much of Con-Com's work would be
accomplished. Twenty million pesos were allocated to cover Con-
Com's costs and in keeping with the democratic people-power spirit
of the times sessions of Con-Com were to be open to the public. An
intention to televise proceedings was also declared. Con-Com would
endeavour to comply with Proclamation No. 9 and complete a draft
constitution in ninety days for submission to the president who
would in turn ask the people for their verdict in a national
plebiscite. In an opening day interview, Palma expressed the views
of many delegates when she asserted that framing the new
constitution was an 'urgent' and 'vital' task which would bring
'immediate' political and economic stability (Business Day 3 June
1986). The implicit argument was that the constitution would
provide legitimacy which would necessarily create stability.
National problems could be solved because the proper legal steps
had been taken.
Indeed, some legal steps had already been taken in a different
direction by the political opposition from the Marcos-loyalist camp.
Three petitions questioning the government's legitimacy had been
presented to the Supreme Court. The court gave a unanimous
decision on 22 May 1986 that the legitimacy of the regime was
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judged by the people when they accepted the Aquino government
which the court held was in such effective control of the country
that it was not merely the de facto government but also de jure.
The court also cited the recognition of the Aquino government
among the 'community of nations' as further proof of its legitimacy.
A direct challenge to Con-Com came from the Left side of the
opposition with the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN)
describing the inclusion of former Marcos men in Con-Com as
'outrageous' and demanding that their seats should be given to
representatives from more deserving sectors such as farmers and
labour. The outrage of the Left was more formally expressed by
the National Alliance for Justice, Freedom and Democracy (NAJFD)
in its petition to Con-Com seeking the disqualification of former
Marcos cabinet minister Bias Ople and his three opposition
colleagues. Con-Com rejected the petition arguing that its
acceptance would set a 'dangerous precedent' that could 'derail the
work of the body' (Business Day 4 June 1986).
After easily fending off these early challenges the Con-Com
entered a period of calm as it settled down to its appointed task.
The calm was, however, disturbing to many delegates who
bemoaned public indifference and Con-Com's inability to generate
public interest. In an effort to save members from 'speaking before
empty galleries' there was a proposal to move the proceedings to
the Philippine International Convention Center in Manila to see
whether this step might metamorphose Con-Com into a body
drawing intense public interest. The move did not eventuate but
interest and action did increase as more controversial issues were
discussed, as more organizations and individuals lobbied and as
public opinion was more actively sought out both in Manila and the
provinces by the Con-Com members.
The opposition members were incensed by the proposal that
President Aquino and Vice-President Laurel should continue in
office for a six-year term until 1992. However, they were easily
outnumbered by the other delegates who shared a common
platform on this issue despite their ideological differences. Jose
Suarez, the nationalist chairman of the Committee on Amendments
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and Transitory Provisions, considered Aquino and Laurel as the
'real winners' of the February presidential election. Speaking from
the conservative ranks the retired general, Crispino de Castro,
bluntly stated that 'the people elected them for six years' while
former senator, Ambrosio Padilla, believed that the Aquino
government's legitimacy should be recognized because it had
already been 'enshrined by people's power' (Business Day 23
January 1986). The opposition were joined by other conservatives
and even one nationalist in their quest to remove the sequestration
powers of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).
The Chairman of the PCGG, Jovito Salonga, even threatened to resign
if Con-Com cut back the PCGG's powers of sequestration. But the
status quo was maintained after several heated debates and the
PCGG was permitted to carry on sequestering. Land reform
provided five days of stormy exchanges between Con-Com
members. The peasant leader Jaime Tadeo wanted to include in the
land reform programme plantations of all types of crops, mineral
areas, timber land and fishponds where there were workers. His
radical proposals were watered down by numerous amendments in
the Committee on Social Justice. In order to avoid major conflict
Con-Com passed the agrarian reform buck on to Congress. Con-Com
voted a resounding 36-0 in favour of agrarian reform but excluded
itself from inking in the details on the grounds of lack of technical
knowledge.
While the above matters were controversial and demonstrated
wide differences of opinion in Con-Com they paled next to the most
divisive issues, the future of the US-military bases on Philippine
soil and the permissable level of foreign involvement in the
economy. The nationalist cause had been growing in strength at the
time of the 1971 constitutional convention and had obviously not
faded away since then. The nationalists in Con-Com, numbering
between eight and seventeen depending on which journalist or
political figure was doing the counting, were vehement in their
desire to abrogate the bases treaty with the US. At first they
appeared to be succeeding when the Committee on Preamble and
National Territory in a 7-2 vote forbade foreign military bases,
troops or facilities and nuclear weapons from Philippine national
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territory after the expiry of the current agreement in 1991. Strong
lobbying from BAYAN, the umbrella organization for over one
thousand cause-oriented groups, the radical Partido ng Bayan (PnB)
and the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) labour federation plus student
demonstrations failed to prevent the eventual conservative
triumph. The body of Con-Com voted 29-15 to strike out the clause
forbidding foreign military bases leaving open the option to extend
the military bases agreement. Encouraged by this success, a group
tagged as 'ultraconservatives' and led by Christian Monsod
attempted to move for a reconsideration of the nuclear free
provision. Their move failed as most Con-Com members mirrored
the view increasingly found amongst the urban upper and middle
classes that things nuclear were extremely unpleasant and to be
avoided.
The question of foreign involvement in the Philippine economy
had been discussed throughout the independence period. A
nationalist view arguing for a reduced foreign presence in the
economy had been gaining ground in the late 1960s and was
equally strongly felt in 1986. The political forces of the Left had
lobbied Con-Com from its inception on the evils of foreign capital in
the Philippine economy. Amongst some businessmen there was
also concern that liberalization of the economy could result in
greater foreign control and the extinction of the Filipino
entrepreneur. Such was the feeling about 'national economy and
patrimony' that representatives of management, capital, labour,
farmers, consumers and cause-oriented groups got together to form
the Coalition for a Constitutional Provision on Industrialization,
Economic Protectionism and Filipinization of the Economy. As its
name suggests the organization demanded rapid industrialization
and protectionism to ensure that local firms and local agriculture
would dominate the domestic market.
These were the sort of ideas espoused by the nationalists in
Con-Com. They considered that the proposed provisions on the
Filipinization of the economy would still allow foreign domination.
Thus, after a 25-17 defeat in one session eleven nationalist
delegates staged what the newspapers called a 'boycott' or 'walkout'
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but what the commissioners involved termed 'a time to reflect'.
The commissioners did return and so did dissensions. There were
allegations of American interference while a leading nationalist
economist publicized the links of certain commissioners with
multinational corporations. The Philippine Chamber of Commerce
and Industry tried to map out a compromise but still 'heated verbal
clashes led to a near pandemonium at the session hall' (Business
Day 25 August 1986). Six nationalist members walked out claiming
that 'the majority using the tyranny of numbers approved with
'undue haste' anti-Filipino and pro-multinational corporations
economic provisions' (Business Day 27 August 1986). After hearing
threats of resignation from these nationalist commissioners, the
remaining delegates then decided to relax procedural rules.
Further amendments were permitted and five commissioners
returned to do battle with the tyranny of numbers. The film
director, Lino Brocka, did not return to Con-Com. Eventually after
twenty days of 'tumultuous debate' Con-Com approved on second
reading the article on national economy and patrimony by a vote of
26-9 with three abstentions. Two of six proposed nationalist
amendments were approved. As in seemingly all votes the
moderates and conservatives who occupied roughly the same
political ground as President Aquino imposed their stamp on the
constitution.
Con-Com failed to abide by the ninety-day timetable for
drafting set by President Aquino. The workload was simply too
much for such a deadline and Con-Com identified 30 September
(120 days) as its target date for completion. Even this extension
would not suffice despite extra sessions and longer working hours
and 15 October was set as a final deadline. Con-Com commenced
deliberations on the whole draft of the new constitution on 9
October, the same day as 'five Bacolod residents' filed a petition
with the Supreme Court seeking to stop the constitutional plebiscite.
Their legal challenge, based on the proposition that with the
accession of Aquino the 1935 constitution became operative again,
did not impress the justices of the Supreme Court and Con-Com
continued with its work.
78
The draft constitution was given its third and final reading on
12 October. One commissioner was absent through illness from the
final vote which went 44-2 in favour of the constitution. Jaime
Tadeo and Jose Suarez were the nationalist/Leftist dissenters.
Suarez saw many 'infirmities' in the constitution which could bring
'incalculable harm and chaos' to the nation while Tadeo believed
the constitution 'did not contain the just ideals and aspirations of
our people' (Business Day 13 October 1986). Both agreed that the
constitution was designed to serve foreign interests. Four other
nationalist commissioners, although voting in favour, publicly
expressed their reservations about the provisions on national
economy and patrimony and on the future of the foreign military
bases. Three opposition delegates led by former Marcos cabinet
member, Blas Ople, announced their reservations on the
constitution because of 'the single reckless act of adjudicating the
terms of office of President Aquino' (ibid.) and Vice-President
Laurel. However, Con-Com president Cecilia Munoz-Palma probably
reflected most members' beliefs in her statement that the draft
constitution was 'the embodiment of the aspirations of our people'
(ibid.). Christian Monsod saw it as a 'panacea for political stability'
and President Aquino, while accepting the constitution on IS
October, proclaimed that 'democracy is safe with this constitution'.
That clearly indicated Aquino's positive support for Con-Com's final
product. Perhaps encouraged by the mood of euphoria a ten-
person nationalist bloc issued a signed statement saying that 'the
new constitution will bring positive gains to the deepening of
democracy making it more participatory and popular' (Business Day
16 October 1986).
President Aquino was now well on the way towards
establishing political legitimacy via the respected methods of
constitutionality and legality. Although the constitution-drafting
timetable had fallen behind schedule the work had still been
completed rapidly. In less than eight months from her accession to
power President Aquino had produced a draft constitution to
present to the people for their approval. Also, the public
proceedings were seen to have been conducted in a proper manner
with minimal external interference and allegations of corruption.
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Most importantly, the president appeared to have kept her distance
from the consitutional deliberations and thus emphasized the
independence of the constitution-drafting body that she had
appointed. That Con-Com's final product was to President Aquino's
liking was to be expected considering she had appointed a majority
of delegates who shared broadly similar views to hers and in
accordance with Philippine political tradition she urgently required
a constitution to establish legitimacy.
The plebiscite campaign
The drafters had now finished their work and the fate of the
constitution would be determined by the Philippine public.
According to the 'transitory provisions' the constitution would 'take
effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite' (Con-Com 1986:64). The plebiscite would take
place on 2 February 1987 thus giving the voters three and a half
months to digest the contents of the constitution and make up their
minds on which way to cast their ballot. And there was plenty to
digest - approximately 24,000 words spread over sixty-two pages
divided into eighteen main articles each of which was broken down
into sections. This large constitution attempted to provide a
comprehensive coverage and ranged from delineating national
boundaries to setting out an economic development strategy,
limiting presidential power, decreeing land reform, establishing
autonomous regions and prohibiting divorce. The multiplicity of
topics covered coupled with ambiguity in language could provide a
future interpretative 'feast for lawyers' or as former prime
minister, Cesar Virata, remarked 'too many laws passed by the new
congress being challenged on constitutional grounds' (PEER 29
January 1987). All the electorate was required to do, however, was
to answer either 'yes' or 'no' to the one simple question of whether
they accepted the constitution - lock, stock and barrel!
The 'yes' campaign commenced with President Aquino's strong
endorsement of the constitution at the formal ceremony in which it
was handed to her by Con-Com on 15 October. Simultaneously a
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new 'political movement' called Lakas ng Bansa (LABAN) was
formed by cabinet ministers, close relatives and other leading
political figures in the Aquino camp to 'support' the candidates of
the president in the 1987 elections. This 'movement', later to seek
party status, naturally adopted a vigorous pro-constitution stance.
In January it became the official co-ordinator of pro-constitution
rallies while its close association with the popular president
attracted many local politicians. Campaigning for 'yes' under the
LABAN banner could be transformed into political capital for the
elections later in 1987. Accompanying the LABAN in the pursuit of
charter ratification was the Coalition for the Constitution's Approval
(CCA) formed early in November and comprising the strongly pro-
Aquino Philippine Democratic Party-Lakas ng Bayan combination
(PDP-Laban) and Bansang Nagkaisa sa Diwa at Layunin (Bandila) in
league with the Salonga wing of the Liberal Party, the National
Union of Christian Democrats (NUCD) and the Partido Demokratiko
Sosyalista ng Pilipinas (PDSP). The Roman Catholic Church officially
endorsed the new constitution when the Catholic Bishops
Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) issued a pastoral letter on 26
November. The letter urged Roman Catholics to vote for the
ratification of the charter and noted that its contents were
'consistent with the teachings of the gospel' (PEER 15 January
1987). The National Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP)
followed suit. Some, mainly those from the 'no' side, were unhappy
about the level and nature of religious involvement, probably
because the church carried such influence and because the pulpit
was being used in a political campaign. The Federation of Free
Farmers, for example, suggested that 'the Catholic bishops stick to
enlightening people on moral aspects of the constitution and leave
people alone to make political judgements on whether to ratify or
reject it' (Business Day 20 November 1986). The Catholic hierarchy
was unimpressed by such outbursts and continued with their pro-
charter stance.
A host of organizations of varying degrees of formality, size
and purpose joined the chorus advocating a 'yes' vote. Quite what
impact or influence such organizations had is difficult to say but
they were both numerous and rarely backward in coming forward
to publicize the merits of the constitution. Some were convened
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specifically for the plebiscite such as the Citizens for Constitutional
Democracy (CCD) and the Abantikita Movement. Many were backed
by the church, such as the Families for Justice and Peace, the
Christian Social Movement (CSM) and the Sanggunian ng Kristianong
Komunidad, or were actual medical and educational institutions of
the church. Others represented occupational groups and labour
unions or women's and youth groups. Regionally-based
organizations joined the fray while one expatriate body - Filipinos
Overseas for the Ratification of the Constitution (FORCES) - urged
Filipinos in North America and Europe to contact their family and
friends at home to encourage them to vote 'yes'.
Aquino's major partner in government, the United Nationalist
Democratic Organization (UNIDO), was not so enthusiastic in its
support for the draft constitution. Soon after it had been released
to the public, Salvador Laurel, president of UNIDO and vice-
president of the Philippines expressed his concern that 'questions
are being raised about the legitimacy of our [Laurel's and Aquino's]
offices and casting doubt on our having been elected in the first
place' (Business Day 30 October 1986). He recommended that the
matter be cleared up by making his and Aquino's terms of office
subject to a separate question in the plebiscite. In the event of a
'no' vote Laurel suggested that people should indicate a preference
for either the 1935 or 1973 constitutions and whether an election
for president and vice-president should be held in May. President
Aquino quickly rejected these proposals although they were not
dropped by UNIDO. The 'yes with reservations' attitude was
maintained and the party even pointed out a few further
arguments against the constitution. But on balance, UNIDO thought
that 'the pros outweigh the cons' and that in order to 'accelerate
political stabilization' the ratification of the constitution was 'a
conditio sine qua non' (Malaya 28 January 1987).
Officialdom was also harnessed, as far as possible, to work for
the 'yes' vote. On 28 October, in order to give the green light to the
involvement in the plebiscite campaigns of local level officials and
employees in government bureaucracies, justice minister Neptali
Gonzales ruled that participation in such activity was not a partisan
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political activity. As these people were unlikely, in the interests of
job security, to mount voluble attacks on their employers,
Gonzales's ruling served mainly to aid the 'yes' campaign. The local
government minister, Aquilino Pimentel, was more forthright and
less legalistic in his approach. He let it be known that 'harsh
measures and sanctions' would be visited upon those officers-in-
charge at the local level who did not actively campaign for
ratification. Meanwhile, Con-Com had been transformed from a
drafting body into an organization devoted to the promotion of the
'yes' vote. In accordance with Executive Order 48 the members of
Con-Com were to take the lead in the educational campaign for
ratification. Thus, on 21 October, thirty-one members of Con-Com
met to organize themselves and design their educational strategy.
The trump card in the 'yes' campaign was of course President
Aquino. She had given her unequivocal support to the draft
constitution and now set about actively promoting it. In addition to
the normal diet of media appearances and press releases, Aquino
travelled the length and breadth of the nation addressing
extremely well-attended public meetings. Her successful
performances and obvious crowd-pulling power earned the ire of
the opposition, one of whose members claimed, with some
justification, that the poll was an 'opponent-less,' presidential
campaign masquerading as a plebiscite' (PEER 29 January 1987).
The popular campaign slogan 'Yes to Cory, Yes to Country, Yes to
Democracy and Yes to the Constitution' put Aquino first and seemed
to mention the constitution almost as an afterthought. The tactic of
announcing budgetary increases for regions at meetings in those
regions was deemed by the president to be a token of gratitude to
the people from the government rather than a vote-buying exercise
(Business Day 12 January 1987) while in explaining her campaign
style Aquino stated that 'I believe I should disclose what
government is doing for the people's welfare' (Business Day 20
January 1987). Whether intentionally or not, Aquino had
transformed the plebiscite campaign from a debate about the issues
raised in the draft constitution to the matter of her regime's
popularity. The ballot was coming to look less like an objective
assessment by voters of the constitution's merits and more like a
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vote of confidence in Aquino and her government. A positive vote
of confidence would of course satisfy the Aquino regime's claim to
legitimacy and, the regime would argue, promote political stability.
The opposition to the constitution's ratification comprised some
strange ideological bedfellows whose campaigns were marked by
disorganization and indecision. Marcos's old political creation, the
Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL), led the Right's rejection campaign.
Even before the draft constitution had been handed to the
president the KBL described it as 'patently defective, fatally flawed
and lacking a solid and central framework' (Business Day 14
October 1986). The KBL spokesmen maintained a steady stream of
anti-constitution invective throughout the campaign, attempting to
portray themselves as the guardians of democracy and defenders of
the poor. Leading Marcos supporter and former Batasang
Pambansa speaker, Nicanor Yniguez, led the charge alleging that the
charter was formulated 'by cronies appointed by a regime
characterized by hate, vengeance and vindictiveness, and does not
reflect the true feelings and aspirations of the people' (Business Day
27 November 1986). He cited 'sixteen inherently defective,
contradictory and therefore objectionable provisions' which should
lead to the constitution's rejection. The issue of Aquino's term of
office was the one which caused greatest annoyance to the KBL as it
did the rest of the opposition Right. The KBL painted themselves as
staunch nationalists waging war on a government which promoted
foreign interests through a constitution which was 'anti-Filipino,
anti-Philippines and anti-poor' (Malaya 28 January 1987).
Although the KBL was reported to be co-ordinating the political
Right's opposition to the charter, co-ordination of effort was not a
marked feature of this 'no' campaign. Even by the second week of
January the various opposition parties of the Right were still unable
to form a grand coalition for 'no'. Some groups could not agree on
common strategies, the KBL was disconserted by defections of
prominent personnel to the Aquino camp (for example, former
assemblyman Alejandro Almedras of Davao and former Metro
Manila vice-governor Mathay) while the positions of a few potential
political allies were still unclear (for example, the Partido
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Nacionalista). Eventually, on 14 January, less than three weeks
from polling day the Coalition for Democratic Action (CODA) was
formed 'for the purpose of jointly and collectively undertaking a
systematic and concerted action to restore the rule of law, the
supremacy of democratic institutions over individual political
groups or persons and a legitimate popularly supported, and just
constitutional order' (Business Day 15 January 1987). This charter
rejection group claimed to include the KBL, Nacionalista Party
(Palmares wing), Liberal Party (Kalaw wing), the Democratic
Socialist Party, the Mindanao Alliance, the Pusyon Bisaya and
Timawa, another Visayan group of disgruntled former Marcos men
(Manila Bulletin 15 January 1987). Attending the foundation
meeting and signing the manifesto were Juan Ponce Enrile, former
Marcos and Aquino cabinet member, and Arturo Tolentino, Marcos' s
vice-presidential running-mate in 1986. Neither claimed a party
allegiance although both had been active on the 'no' campaign trail.
Whether the formation of CODA had any effect on the co
ordination of the opposition's 'no' campaign is difficult to say.
Leading spokesmen for the various groups maintained a steady
output of anti-constitution rhetoric. Enrile assumed the de facto
leadership of the 'no' campaign, travelling widely and speaking
forthrightly. Tolentino warned all that 'approval will legitimize all
dictatorial, illegal and inimical acts of President Corazon C. Aquino'
(Business Day 30 December 1986). He too maintained a high
profile and between speaking and debating even found time to
furnish the Manila Bulletin (15-17 January 1987) with a detailed
critical analysis of the constitution. He also indicated that he would
vote 'yes' if the provision on the president's tenure were removed
(Daily Express 22 January 1987).
The difficulties of the political Right in adopting a co-ordinated
and coherent strategy towards the plebiscite were minor compared
to those of the Left. As early as mid-June militant leaders were
reported to be 'planning strategies for waging a massive campaign
against the ratification of the new charter in the event that the
nationalist provisions are not incorporated' (Business Day 14 June
1986). The National Democratic Front (NDF), the front organization
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representing the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the New
People's Army (NPA) and several lesser left-wing groups found the
draft constitution unpalatable. However, it was reported that the
NDF's rejection of the charter was less to do with nationalist
provisions than 'because the CPP, being an outlawed organization,
was outside of the constitutional process' (The Manila Chronicle 24
January 1987). It was also alleged that the NDF 'no' was not of the
emphatic variety and that in practice the constituent groups and
their members were being given a free hand on which way they
voted in the plebiscite (ibid.). This 'conscience vote' would not
appear to have been endorsed by the CPP who described the
constitution as 'pro-imperialist and anti-people .... a piece of
bourgeois superstructure reflecting dominant-class interests' (FEER
29 January 1987). Despite this ideological castigation of the
constitution and only two weeks before the vote, Antonio Zumel, an
NDF representative, announced that the NDF position on the
plebiscite would be issued 'right before' the vote. On 30 January
the NDF peace negotiators gave a press conference in which they
stated that the NPA and other rebel groups would vote against the
charter (The Manila Times 31 January 1987).
The Partido ng Bayan (PnB), formed in May 1986 to
'spearhead' the electoral challenge of the Left, followed the
charter's public release with a statement that it would campaign
against the constitution (Business Day 20 October 1986). By early
November the PnB had supposedly softened its position and was
advising a 'critical yes' - a 'yes' vote for the constitution despite its
shortcomings. According to others of this persuasion on the Left,
the 'critical yes' had to be distinguished from the full-blooded
unconditional 'yes na yes'. In addition to being a campaign for a
'yes' vote the 'critical yes' approach was also 'an educational process
aimed at explaining both positive and negative features of the draft
charter' (Philippine Collegian 22 January 1987). The PnB decided
to develop the 'critical' element of its 'critical yes' stance by writing
to the president in January requesting the suspension of
objectionable charter provisions. As an alternative the PnB
suggested the deferral of the plebiscite until a negotiated
settlement had been reached with both Muslim and communist
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rebels. Its final option was to immediately convene a 'political
consultative conference' which together with Con-Com would form a
'constituent assembly' to draft an entirely new constitution
(Business Day 16 January 1987). The PnB received a negative
response from Malacanang Palace as did Moro National Liberation
Front (MNLF) leader Nur Misuari who demanded the suspension of
the provisions on autonomy.
BAYAN, the umbrella organization which claimed to represent
over one thousand cause-oriented groups, selected the 'conscience
vote' as its plebiscite strategy. Thus, in November, BAYAN
announced to the press that 'they would educate the people on the
virtues and shortcomings, mostly shortcomings, of the draft Charter
.... and let the individual vote as he thinks is right' (The Manila
Chronicle 28 January 1987). Not so the militant labour federation,
the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) which, even before the charter's
release, warned that it might advocate a 'no' vote because of anti-
labour provisions. At its national congress on 21 December it was
decided to launch a 'vigorous' campaign for rejection as the
constitution was 'pro-imperialist' and 'does not respond to the basic
interests of the people' (Business Day 23 December 1986). Its
peasant counterpart, the Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP),
followed a similar course. This was to be expected as its president
was Jaime Tadeo, one of the two Con-Com members who voted
against the draft constitution. Both KMU and KMP appeared to hold
to their 'no' position and were classified as such by the Philippine
Daily Inquirer (30 January 1987) immediately before the plebiscite.
Yet solidarity may not have been universal. As certain KMU
affiliates were reported to favour a 'yes' vote (PEER 5 February
1987) the commitment of the KMP to the 'no' cause was questioned
(The Manila Chronicle 2 January 1987), and despite issuing a
statement highly critical of the charter on the eve of the plebiscite
the statement contained no outright call to vote 'no' (Malaya 28
January 1987).
Several generalizations can be made from observations on the
plebiscite campaigns. First, none of the protagonists waged a well-
managed and efficient operation. It is more pertinent to speak of
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degrees of disorganization. The government-orchestrated 'yes'
campaign appeared to be the best-run but even this was classified
as having 'organizational machinery' that 'remains disorganized'
and campaign themes that were 'inchoate' (The Manila Chronicle
24 January 1987). Second, the campaigns often had little to do with
detailed analysis, or any analysis, of the charter. On the 'yes' side,
typified by the LABAN and the CCA and led by the president
herself, the poll was about an affirmation of her regime's legitimacy
in a legal exercise. People were basically being asked to confirm
that Corazon Aquino was the rightful president. The charter was
identified with her so that voting for the charter was also voting for
Cory. It was also promised that stability would result from the 'yes'
vote. While the opposition on the Right paid more attention to the
provisions of the constitution their major target in the 'no'
campaign appeared to be the unseating of Aquino and the calling of
a presidential election. They wanted to establish the illegitimacy of
the Aquino regime. Only the Left seemed to maintain focus on the
constitution itself but even then it was a restricted range of
provisions which they discussed. Indecision about where they
stood was a marked feature of the Left's performance. Previous
strategic mistakes of the Left in the presidential election and
revolution may have contributed to the indecision while lining up
with the Right to advocate 'no' may not have been to the liking of
many.
A third feature of the plebiscite campaign was the reluctance
of local elites - present, former or aspiring - to campaign too
vigorously for the 'no' vote. A successful 'no' vote would postpone
both national and local elections, a situation many, both in and out
of office, deemed undesirable. The constitution was the legal
requirement for the main political event - the elections. The
political culture demanded a constitution for elections which would
select legitimate officeholders. Campaigning for 'no' involved
personal expenditures yet promised no rewards if successful. Local
elites had no tradition of investing purely in principles. More
concrete returns were expected but without the legal-constitutional
prerequisite such returns were unavailable. A muted 'no' campaign
thus characterized many areas and despite the much-publicized
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rhetoric of 'no' leaders in Manila some of their provincial affiliates
and also metropolitan associates kept relatively low profiles or
even changed to the Aquino camp where the political future
seemed brighter.
A fourth issue concerns the general level of knowledge of the
constitution in the community. From circumstantial evidence and
my own experience I would suggest that knowledge of the
provisions of the constitution was low. Very few actually read the
document. This would include many aspirants to public office,
especially at the local level. How many actually saw the document
is a moot point. Certainly there were educational campaigns, but to
how many people did these actually extend? The media did cover
the constitution but how many people actually had access to
newspapers and read the appropriate items and how many turned
off their televisions when another plebiscite debate came on the
air? How many people knew two or three provisions but no more?
Because the plebiscite had been transformed into something
beyond a verdict on Con-Com's work, detailed knowledge of their
product was unnecessary. The vote was about Aquino's legitimacy
and the desire of local leaders to engage in electoral combat. The
'yes' camp attached the spectre of instability to the possibility of a
'no' win. There would be instability because the necessary
constitutional and legal provisions for a legitimate government
would be lacking. Democracy would be under threat without a
constitution. In such a political climate, a comprehensive
knowledge of the constitution and an informed assessment of its
provisions were hardly essentials for the poll.
The plebiscite campaigns did not take place in a vacuum.
Preparing for the constitutional poll was not the only major event
occurring in the Philippines between October 1986 and February
1987. Much was happening besides and was frequently of such
importance as to remove the plebiscite campaigns from the top of
the political agenda and relegate them to the inside pages with
fewer column inches. But these events did have a bearing on the
plebiscite outcome as they were invariably interpreted in terms of
the effect on regime stability - and stability was a principal issue in
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the February poll. The effect of current events on public opinion
was differentially felt throughout the Philippines and what may
have been viewed from Manila as highly destabilizing may not
have had such an impact in other places. This would be the case
especially in those areas where the campaigns were low-key and
local elites were preoccupied with pursuing strategies which could
produce electoral success for themselves.
In late October bombs started exploding in Manila indicating
that somebody was out to aggravate tension during the plebiscite
campaign. Further aggravation came rapidly with the brutal
murder of the KMU and PnB leader, Rolando Olalia, in Manila on 15
November. This sent Left leaders back underground and caused
the withdrawal of the NDF from peace negotiations with the
government. Although industrial action by the KMU disappointed
the organizers, an estimated 300,000 people did turn out to Olalia's
funeral indicating his popularity and the level of public outrage at
his murder. More killings followed. On 19 November David Puzon,
a politician close to Enrile, and two other men were gunned down in
Manila in what was seen to be a reprisal for Olalia's murder. Three
days later Ulama Tugung, chairman of western Mindanao's
autonomous government, was also gunned down in Manila, an
event which sent Shockwaves through the violent and volatile
region he represented. Kidnapping also became popular. On 24
October two South Korean engineers were abducted in northern
Luzon while in early November a similar fate befell a Thai national
working for the Asian Development Bank. Of greater political
impact was the 15 November kidnapping of the Japanese general
manager of the Mitsui company. It was interpreted in some
quarters as putting into jeopardy future Japanese aid and
investment.
Meanwhile November was a month of military coup rumours.
It was on the strength of these rumours that, on 23 November,
Aquino sacked her increasingly critical defence minister, Juan
Ponce Enrile. The government alleged that Enrile had tacitly
supported moves by military dissidents from the Reform the
Armed Forces of the Philippines Movement (RAM) to reconvene the
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old national assembly. While coups were forestalled, the military
hierarchy did demonstrate its intention of exercising influence over
government. On 15 November, General Fidel Ramos and other
senior generals sent the president a memorandum containing a list
of proposals on a range of both military and civilian issues. Cabinet
was, by this stage, known to contain 'voluble disagreements' on a
range of matters while tales of corruption, nepotism and
administrative inefficiency were circulating far and wide. Two
more cabinet ministers followed Enrile through the exit door in
November, one was reshuffled in December and another departed
in early January. The US embassy and the State Department were
reported to be concerned about the deterioration of events in the
Philippines. The country and the regime appeared to be
increasingly unstable and out of the president's control.
The last days of November brought relief to the beleaguered
government when Aquino, rather than dissident soldiers, pulled off
a coup. A ceasefire agreement was signed between the government
and the NDF negotiating panel who were acting on behalf of the
guerillas of the NPA. The agreement was to come into force on 10
December and last, in the first instance, for a period of sixty days.
More good news came on 4 January when a Mindanao autonomy
agreement was signed in Jeddah by Aquilino Pimentel for the
government and Nur Misuari for the MNLF. The MNLF had at last
dropped its demand for full independence.
But destabilization was soon back to the fore. In mid-January
another Muslim rebel group commenced a new and vigorous
programme of violence in Mindanao. Then on 22 January, more
than twenty people were killed and many injured when marines
opened fire on a KMP peasant march in Manila. The Mendiola
massacre, as it was dubbed by the media, was potentially
enormously damaging to the regime. The 'yes' campaign was
identified as a vote for Aquino and her government, the very
government some were now portraying as being directly
responsible for this massacre. Political commentators began
wondering whether the 'no' vote could perhaps win. They certainly
saw it gaining strength. The Mendiola massacre was still the
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leading issue when on 27 January up to 500 troops attacked
military and civilian targets in the Manila area. Rebels at the two
air bases were quickly overcome but those occupying a television
station held out for several days before a negotiated surrender was
arranged. During the coup, rumours of Marcos's imminent return
abounded and evidence was produced to show that the rumours did
have a solid basis in fact. As a final touch of pre-plebiscite
destabilization, opposition politician Homobono Adaza released a
tape-recording of an alleged telephone conversation featuring the
president, her secretary and a special counsel. The conversation
was intended to show that Malacanang and the American
government had attempted to influence the decisions of Con-Com.
The only question that now remained was whether the course of
destabilizing events would persuade the majority to vote 'no' and so
cast doubt on the legitimacy of Aquino and her government.
The Poll
The 1935 constitution provided for a Commission on Elections
(Comelec) to enforce and administer the laws pertaining to
elections. Although one author described its position as 'like that of
a muzzled bulldog' (Kiunisala 1969:76), prior to martial law it had
generally been seen as one of the components of the electoral
system which served as 'countervailing forces to electoral
manipulation' (Carbonell and Nicolas 1986:57). Following the
imposition of martial law in 1972 Comelec was awarded wider
powers and was transformed into a partisan body directly under
presidential control. Its claim to impartiality was already weak,
both at home and abroad, when the 1986 presidential elections
were called. The blatant manipulation on a massive scale which
Comelec then attempted to perpetrate in order to secure a Marcos
win removed any lingering doubts about Comelec's partisanship
and subservience to the will of President Marcos.
President Aquino did not dispense with the institution of
Comelec but opted for its 'revamp'. Ramon Felipe was appointed
chairman and five new commissioners were chosen. Other officials
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and personnel were scrutinized and removed where necessary so
that by the end of June Felipe was able to announce to the
president that the 'revamp' was complete. The next task was to
organize the registration of voters. This job was necessitated by the
unreliability of voter lists from the Marcos era. Illegal registrations
abounded. To illustrate the point one commissioner cited the case
of a single Danao City voter registered 360 times and observed that
in Sulu and Tawi-Tawi 'even turtles have been able to vote'
(Business Day 16 September 1987). In December, Comelec carried
out an orderly registration programme in which 25,030,471 voters
enlisted. This was 95 per cent of the registered voters for the 1986
presidential election. All regions showed decreases in the number
of registered voters, especially Ilocos, Cagayan Valley and Central
Mindanao, all centres of strength for the Marcos administration.
Over one million residents of 'ghost barangays' (non-existent
villages) and 'flying voters' (individuals with multiple registrations)
were removed from the electoral rolls. Ballot papers were printed
and an army of 270,000 public school teachers was recruited to
man the 86,505 electoral precincts. The formation of Comelec
special action teams was then announced. These teams were
invested with the power to arrest persons violating the election
laws. The chairman of Comelec declared that everything was ready
and that 'only a full-scale revolution .... will stop us from proceeding
with the plebiscite as originally scheduled' (Business Day 28
January 1987).
Three bombs exploded in Manila and another in Cotabato on
the eve of the plebiscite but there was no revolution. Thus, the
plebiscite of 2 February 1987 did proceed as scheduled with both
'yes' and 'no' camps claiming that victory would be theirs. A
massive 88 per cent of the registered voters turned out throughout
the country to express their decision on the future of the
constitution. Even in NPA strongholds, Left-dominated enclaves
and in revolutionary Muslim areas the people flocked to the polls.
In contrast to the previous year's presidential elections there were
few reports of violent incidents or allegations of irregularity. The
Comelec chairman described the plebiscite as 'abnormally peaceful'
while other commentators judged it to be 'the calmest and cleanest
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electoral exercise since 1952* (F E E R 12 February 1987) or 'a
refreshingly boring election' (Business Day 4 February 1987). The
president was delighted and noted that it was 'heartening .... that
voting for the plebiscite has been clean, honest, orderly and
exceptionally heavy' (Business Day 3 February 1987). In these
circumstances a 'yes' win would furnish an emphatic legitimation of
both the president and the political system she so vigorously
endorsed.
Her delight must have changed to ecstasy when the counting
started. At 10 p.m. on the day of the plebiscite the National Citizens
Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel) reported that 'yes' formed
77 per cent of the first million votes. Its 'quick count' continued
apace and by 6.30 p.m. on the following day with over 10 million
votes (over 40 per cent of the total poll) counted the 'yes' vote had
secured 79 per cent. At this juncture (4 February) Comelec
commenced the official count. But as the Comelec chairman said
'it's all over but the counting' (The Manila Chronicle 5 February
1987). Namfrel was ceasing its 'quick count' with 70 per cent of
registered votes tabulated showing 78 per cent supporting 'yes'.
All knew who had won and by how much.
On 7 February with less than half a million votes to be counted
the Comelec Chairman, Ramon Felipe, officially proclaimed the 'yes'
victory. The 'official canvass' recorded 76 per cent 'yes' and 23 per
cent as 'no'. For 'yes' were 16,605,398 and for 'no' 4,949,501. In
six regions 'yes' had obtained over 80 per cent of the vote while in
all other regions but two, 'yes' had gained at least 73 per cent (see
Table 2.1).
The two odd men out were the Ilocos and Cagayan Valley. The
Ilocos was the home and stronghold of former president Marcos
while the Cagayan Valley was the power-base of the former
defence minister Enrile and had a heavy representation of Ilocanos,
the ethno-linguistic group of both Marcos and Enrile. In the Ilocos,
'no' was in the majority with 52 per cent of the vote - in Marcos's
province of Ilocos Norte, the 'no' vote was 85 per cent.
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Table 2.1
Official Comelec Returns at Close of Canvassing (4.35 p.
7 February 1987) for the Constitutional Plebiscite
Region
Yes
Number Per cent
No
Number Per cent
Metro Manila
1. Ilocos
2. Cagayan Valley
3. Central Luzon
4. Southern Tagalog
5. Bicol
6. Western Visayas
7. Central Visayas
8. Eastern Visayas
9. Western Mindanao
10. Northern Mindanao
11. Southern Mindanao
12. Central Mindanao
2,917,104 77.4
779,237 47.9
421,486 46.7
1,870,425 81.3
2,390,096 82.9
1,116,122 86.3
1,611,547 86.4
1,473,958 83.9
732,250 73.0
496,330 84.2
970,971 77.6
1,161,509 79.5
664,363 76.2
849,407 22.6
848,237 52.1
481,781 53.3
429,570 18.7
492,271 17.1
177,861 13.7
253,019 13.6
281,598 16.1
270,571 27.0
79,075 15.8
280,028 22.4
298,926 20.5
207,557 23.8
NATIONAL TOTAL 16,605,398 76.3 4,949,901 22.7
In the Cagayan Valley, 'no' also won with a 53.3 per cent vote.
Elsewhere, with the possible exception of Danao City in Cebu,
former Marcos strongmen could not hold back the 'ycs' tide. The
revolutionary Left shared a similar experience with centres of NPA
strength, such as the Bicol, recording resounding 'yes' victories.
Many of the NDF's claimed eleven million supporters must have
voted 'yes'. The armed forces did not display such enthusiasm for
the constitution. Returns from precincts which included armed
forces camps showed strong 'no' votes. Although it was claimed
that 61 per cent of Manila's military personnel opted for 'yes' it was
also disclosed that 'no' was the winner at Camp Aguinaldo and
Villamor Air Base and had been pipped at the po*t at Camp Crame
(Business Day 4 February 1987).
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The opposition to Aquino made some ritual denunciations of
the poll as being 'rigged' and 'manipulated'. Marcos chipped in
from Hawaii with his opinion that the plebiscite was 'rife with fraud
.... one of the final blows that would completely extinguish
democracy' (ibid.). Nobody appeared particularly interested in
these outbursts. Of greater importance were the conciliatory
statements of Enrile, the de facto leader of the opposition Right. He
announced the Right's acceptance of the plebiscite result. Other
opposition leaders conceded to 'the will of the people' without a
murmur, their thoughts already on the elections later that year.
The KBL even declared its intention of being a 'constructive
opposition'. Meanwhile the radical Left issued denunciations of the
constitution alleging that it was pro-imperialist, pro-elite and
contained only superficial reforms. The NDF noted that its
programme was supported by 'considerable sections of the
population'. As many of this same population must have voted 'yes'
the electorate could not be harshly criticized. But the criticisms of
the constitution were familiar fare and somewhat late in the day.
It was obviously time to reconsider strategy. Aquino had no such
worries and on 11 February in the ceremonial hall at Malacanang
Palace 'promulgated a new Constitution that ends her near
dictatorial rule and restores the country to full democracy'
(Business Day 12 February 1987).
Conclusion
With her overwhelming plebiscite victory, President Aquino,
had, in less than one year, succeeded in her quest for legitimacy.
Commentators and politicians had constantly referred to the
plebiscite as a legitimating exercise. But what was it and/or who
was it that had been legitimated? And what does such legitimation
entail?
Aquino had claimed legitimacy from the outset. This claim to
being the rightful president and chief power-holder in the land was
based on one or more of the following elements - electoral victory,
popular sentiment, military force, elite support and divine
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intervention. But these elements which had swept her to power
were obviously not perceived by Aquino and other elite groups as
sufficient justification for remaining in power. Had she really won
the presidential election? Did 'people power' extend beyond the
boundaries of Metro Manila? Did the military's role in placing her
in power invalidate her democratic credentials? These were the
sort of questions which Aquino would have been asking herself and
which the elite would certainly ask sooner or later. Thus, it was
necessary for Aquino to secure acceptance of her claim to
legitimacy. Given her commitment to some conception of liberal
democracy it was inevitable that 'the people' would be requested to
grant her claim to legitimacy. But it was also predictable that the
path to legitimacy would involve those twin pillars of Philippine
political culture, constitutionality and legality. These were
traditions handed down since the late nineteenth century and could
not be ignored by Aquino. Indeed, she fully endorsed them. Elites,
especially of the political variety, had been responsible for the
handing down of the traditions and for communicating their virtues
to the wider society. Whether the wider society has benefitted
from the traditions is open to question. Using both moral and
empirical grounds it could be argued with justification that the
attachment to constitutionality and legality was created by elites to
maintain their own power and the privileges of the social classes to
which they belonged. They had been used to further individual
rights rather than to promote the socioeconomic and political
welfare of the majority. Despite their lofty sentiments,
constitutions could be manipulated to defend the status quo.
The necessity of drafting a constitution and asking for its
popular approval provided Aquino with the opportunity of
legitimating both herself and the system of government and power-
holding described in the constitution. The latter was of secondary
importance in the plebiscite campaign. The major concern was to
secure majority acceptance of Aquino's claim to power. The claim
occupied only three lines of the constitution (Article XVIII, Section
5) but it commanded most attention. The massive winning margin
in the plebiscite granted Aquino the dual legitimation which she
desired. Although the constitution falls into Weber's rational-legal
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mode of legitimation the plebiscite was won on various grounds.
Aquino's charisma was of vital importance as was the symbolic
importance of constitutions. In accordance with Skocpol's
(1979:31-32) general observation, the support of large sections of
national and local elites was also necessary in securing the votes.
Many of these persons were more concerned with contesting the
elections which would come with the legitimation of the
constitution. Their devotion to constitutions was pragmatic. This
does not contradict the fact that constitutions are a powerful
symbol of political legitimacy in Philippine political culture. Rather
it emphasizes the fact that constitutions are deemed essential for
legitimate political life in the Philippines. Regimes are simply
illegitimate without them.
The threatening spectre of instability was effectively employed
to facilitate constitutional approval. Aquino's campaign stressed
that political instability would result if the constitution was not
approved. Her campaign spokesmen argued that a 'no' vote would
produce dire consequences. The nation would be afflicted with
interminable political conflict, declining living standards and many
other unpleasant illnesses. Stability was essential for national
progress, Aquino claimed, and such stability could be secured only
by voting for the constitution. Once again, political tradition was on
Aquino's side. A longstanding and widely held view was that
stability automatically follows from a legitimate government, and a
legitimate government is one which is constitutional and legal.
Evidence suggesting that governments might be stable but of
dubious legitimacy was not considered. Taking this line of thought
further the electorate was voting on Aquino's promise to provide
stability. Legitimacy was thus based on the acceptance of the
presidential promise to solve the problem of political instability.
The electorate reacted to the destabilizing events leading up to the
plebiscite with an overwhelming vote for 'yes'. People chose not to
believe that events were beyond Aquino's control but expressed
faith in the ability of Aquino and the constitution to promote
stability. The spectre of instability banished by the promises of
Aquino were potent symbols and highly effective electoral
weapons. Foreign governments, especially the US and ASEAN
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countries, also disliked the idea of instability and wished to see the
legal and constitutional legitimation of the regime which they had
already recognized. Thus, 'extra-national elements' anxious to
promote stability lent their support to the legitimation of Aquino
and the constitution. In certain cases their commitment was to the
stability which legitimacy might encourage rather than to
legitimacy per se.
This leads to the question of whether the current legitimacy of
Aquino and the institutions created by the constitution will endure
and bring stability. In the euphoria surrounding the 'yes' victory it
seemed to be forgotten that the framing and endorsement of a
constitution cannot singlehandedly ensure a vital constitutional
democracy. President Marcos had demonstrated that such a mode
of government could be overthrown in the Philippines while
numerous examples of such regime changes have been seen in the
post-war world. At least in the short term Aquino and her
government seem secure. The size of her plebiscite triumph was a
timely reminder to her enemies of her enormous popularity. To
attempt to usurp such popularity would be foolhardy especially as
the people had demonstrated their capacity to mobilize in huge
numbers to support Aquino during the February revolution. They
had also turned out in force for Aquino since then. In his analysis
of Brazil, Stepan (1971:79-84) found that the smaller a regime's
electoral victory, the more likely it was to be overthrown. Needier
(1977:115-116) followed this with the generalization that in Latin
America 'the narrowness of an electoral victory seems to impair a
government's legitimacy, thus making a military coup against it
more likely'. In the Philippines, Aquino's electoral victory was
overwhelming thus removing any doubts about her legitimacy or
that of the constitution she endorsed.
But the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) do remain a
threat to Aquino and to constitutional democracy. Sections of this
large military machine do not regard the current regime as
legitimate or simply do not approve of it. Their criteria for judging
legitimacy are obviously different from the masses who voted 'yes'
in the plebiscite. The AFP have ceased to be under civilian control
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as they were before martial law. They have become politicized in
the sense that they believe the military should participate in the
running of the country, that the AFP should make policy and
administrative inputs in areas which have previously been
regarded as under civilian control. This situation produces tension
between military and civilian authorities. Occasional but frequent
coup attempts during Aquino's first year of office emphasize the
volatility of the military and the willingness of sections of the AFP
to mount armed challenges to legitimate authority. For civilian
authorities it is fortunate that the AFP is so riven with factionalism
and unofficial command systems that nobody is really in control.
What is referred to as 'professionalism' is seen to be lacking.
However, if the AFP is made more professional and if factionalism
subsides as a result then the 300,000 personnel who make up the
coercive forces of the state could be a distinct threat to that state.
Even now they are a threat as they continue in their efforts to push
for greater involvement in civilian affairs. If one faction, hostile to
Aquino, can secure ascendancy in the AFP then the regime will face
a crisis.
The AFP or elements of it may not consider a concerted move
against the government until its legitimacy has been queried by
elites, other strategic groups and even the population at large. To
forestall such possibilities the Aquino government must succeed in
a non-Weberian mode of legitimation, that of socioeconomic
performance. This performance legitimation is generally seen as
the most important basis of legitimation in communist and other
authoritarian regimes (White 1986; Liddle 1985). It should also
become extremely important in the constitutional democratic
environment of the Philippines. A major factor contributing to
Marcos's downfall was the dreadful socioeconomic performance of
his regime in the 1980s. Rising unemployment and declining living
standards for the majority of Filipinos were particularly significant
as these are the items which directly affect people and help to
determine their attitudes and actions towards a regime. The people
now expect Aquino and her government to reverse this trend of
socioeconomic decline. They have to face a more politicized
population which has been granted the democratic space to press
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its demands and are doing just that. The people want material
rewards and improved welfare and the new government is
supposed to provide it.
The growing importance of performance legitimation does not
entail the eclipse of other modes of legitimation. Aquino's
popularity is still enormous as witnessed by the resounding victory
of 'her candidates' in the senatorial and congressional elections of
May 1987. If socioeconomic performance remains lacklustre then
this popularity will certainly decline. It will not make her
illegitimate. The Filipino attachment to constitutionality and
legality as vital legitimating mechanisms will guarantee that. Also,
the faith in democratic processes, even if some or all are typically
ritualized, will function as an important source of legitimacy. Even
if the democratic institutions are judged imperfect they may still be
deemed lawful and moral enough to be legitimate - perhaps
'tenable' is a more appropriate description. But poor socioeconomic
performance and unsatisfactory policy-making in Congress and
Senate could intensify political conflict and even boost communist
insurgency. The military might then seize power on the grounds of
national security and the need of strong central direction to
extricate the country from its current crisis. Paradoxically, poor
performance would also suit the NDF as it would demonstrate the
impossibility of socioeconomic development for the benefit of the
masses under a system of bourgeois democracy. Disillusionment
among the masses would then lead to growth in NDF support.
At present the Philippines has a legitimate president and set of
governmental institutions. There can be no doubt about that. An
overwhelming endorsement of the two came in the plebiscite of
February 1987. Although a rational-legal constitution provides the
centrepiece for legitimation, tradition, charisma and symbolism
have also played their part in the legitimation process. A further
type of legitimation, that of socioeconomic performance, will
become more important. If performance is poor then the regime
could expect a challenge for power from a politically ambitious
military. Current regime popularity and divisive factionalism have
prevented hostile elements in the military from making concerted
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moves for seizing power. But these conditions could change. And
as Marcos demonstrated in 1972 legitimate regimes can be
overthrown in the Philippines. Constitutional democracy is not
guaranteed simply because a regime is legitimate. But a popular
regime is difficult to displace. And Aquino's popularity will remain
high if she can preside over improvements in the welfare of the
majority of Filipinos. Performance legitimation could then be added
to the other modes of legitimation which support President Aquino
and her government.
CHAPTER 3
WOMEN, WOMEN'S ISSUES AND THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IN
THE PHILIPPINES
Marian Simms
Women, women's organizations and women's issues were
important in, and at times central to, the whole process of
constitution-making in the Philippines during 1986. Women were
six of the forty-eight members of the Constitutional Commission
(Con-Com), which was appointed by President Corazon Aquino in
May 1986 to draft the new constitution of the Philippines. It was a
woman, Cecilia Munoz-Palma, a former justice of the Supreme Court
of the Philippines, who was elected as Con-Com chairman by the
other commissioners. The actions, ideas and values of the key
women protagonists and organizations involved in the making of
the new constitution are illustrative of broader factors and
processes at work in the politics of the Aquino administration. In
this paper the role of women and women's issues in the evolution
and drafting of the 1987 constitution are considered as a chapter in
the history of women and politics in the Philippines.
Women and politics in the Philippines
Women were granted the suffrage in 1933 and they first voted
in 1937. Voting is theoretically voluntary in the Philippines and
women's turn-out rates have on average been about the same as
men (NCRFW 1985). Women have fared better in the judiciary and
in the upper echelons of the bureaucracy than they have in elective
office or in cabinet (Tapales 1984). Women have had poor
representation in both the latter areas.
Filipino women have long been active in a range of women's
organizations. The first feminist group was set up in 1905 and was
influenced by the American model. After the Second World War
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the Civic Assembly of the Women of the Philippines (CAWP) was
established. It was an umbrella organization, and its orientation
was never feminist. Women's politics, like Filipino politics more
generally, felt the impact of martial law and the increasing
centralization of political power. CAWP and its affiliates became
showpieces' for Imelda Marcos, the president's wife. Alternative
organizations also grew up. Concerned Women of the Philippines
(CWP) was formed in the mid-1970s as an expression of solidarity
against the Marcos regime. A number of its founders, such as
Cecilia Munoz-Palma, had previously been identified with the senior
levels of the Marcos administration. She had been appointed by
President Marcos as a justice of the Supreme Court but was forced
to resign in 1977 for attacking the excesses of the administration
(see Table 3.1). She did this during her commencement address at
the University of the Philippines an institution which maintained a
constant barrage of anti-regime criticism during the Marcos years.
From the late 1970s cause-oriented anti-Marcos groups began
to proliferate. Women's groups were prominent in this
development. They used a range of tactics including 'sporadic
protest marches, demonstrations, and prayer rallies' (Gabriela
1984). They expressed their opposition to the continued violation
of human rights, the presence of the nuclear power plants at Bataan
and Morong, the social and political consequences of the US military
bases and the exploitation of Filipinos by multinational corporations,
with reference to working conditions and the production of
dangerous baby foods and formulae.
The assassination of returning opposition leader, Benigno
Aquino, in August 1983 caused a huge outcry in the Philippines and
in the West. New opposition groups sprang up and others changed
their focus. Such developments characterized women's politics at
this time. According to one report of the National Commission on
the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW 1985:82), the many women's
groups active during this time were 'sometimes associated with the
opposition, considered as leftist or fronts of the rebel groups and on
some occasions, interest groups concerned with particular issues'.
104
Gabriela, an acronym for the General Assembly Binding Women
for Integrity, Equality, Leadership and Action, became the best
known women's organization outside the Philippines. It was an
umbrella organization consisting of a loose coalition of women's
organizations. Gabriela made a major impact at the 1985 United
Nations Conference for Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) held
in Nairobi. This was the companion to the official Conference to
Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations
Decade for Women (Hill 1987:348). Women's issues in the
Philippines, as in other countries, have been raised in the domestic
arena at least partly as the result of United Nations initiatives. The
Philippines participated in the various activities associated with the
United Nations Decade for Women and set up new bureaucracies for
women such as the NCRFW. Leticia Ramos Shahani, a career
diplomat and the sister of Aquino's military chief, General Fidel
Ramos, was appointed by the United Nations as Secretary General of
the World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of
the United Nations Decade for Women.
Feminist politics, of a local kind, have united women of
different political connections. Gabriela, the women's coalition
named after Gabriela Silang, the Philippines eighteenth century
equivalent of Joan of Arc, was an important source of criticism
during the last years of the Marcos regime. Several leading figures
in the Aquino government, including members of Con-Com, are, or
have been, active in Gabriela. Four key principles unite members:
the quest for 'democracy', 'a sovereign and truly independent
Philippines', 'economic well-being' and the end of 'feudal patriarchal
structures'. A leaflet circulated by Gabriela states:
The women of GABRIELA support the struggles of the
great majority of Filipino women - workers, peasants and
the urban poor - to attain economic well-being. GABRIELA
assumes the responsibility to enhance the development of
these grassroots women and to oppose any moves to
dehumanize and oppress them (Gabriela 1984).
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Gabriela has had to cope with two issues with the potential to
cause damaging disunity, namely, communism and pro-choice.
Resignations have occurred over the desirability or otherwise of
links with women's organizations associated with the communist
guerrilla movement, for example, the Makabayang Kilusan ng
Bagong Kababaihan (MAKIBAKA), a constituent organization of the
communist-dominated National Democratic Front (NDF). Mita Pardo
de Tavera, an original Gabriela activist and later a minister in
Aquino's cabinet, resigned in 1985 because of her opposition to the
accreditation of communist women (see Table 3.2). Gabriela has
been unable to campaign openly for the right of Filipino women to
reproductive freedom.
Women's policies, family policies, the constitution and the
state
The women members of the Con-Com exhibited several
common characteristics (see Table 3.1). They were all associated
with anti-Marcos or opposition politics in one form or another.
There was little evidence that any came from groups outside the
middle class, professional and/or upper middle class. Their homes,
jobs and political and social networks were in Metro Manila rather
than in the provinces. None could have been considered a
'housewife', the coy label sometimes accorded to the president
herself (Burton 1987).
Despite these similarities there were considerable ideological
differences among them over women's issues. One useful starting
point is to distinguish between the traditionalists and the non-
traditionalists. These differences were manifested over the so-
called 'right to life' issue which was discussed at some length by the
commissioners. As will be detailed below, two members, who could
be termed traditionalists, actively favoured the clause which
protected the life of the unborn from the moment of conception.
One other in particular, led the attempt to moderate the clause by
invoking the rights of the mother. The traditionalists were both
members of the Concerned Women of the Philippines (CWP). An
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anti-Marcos organization, the CWP consisted of well-to-do
professional women. The non-traditionalist, Minda Luz Quesada
who invoked the rights of the mother, was linked to a different
women's organization, Gabriela, as well as having a long history of
interest in women's health issues.
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that Gabriela
possessed a liberal platform on issues dealing with reproductive
freedom. Unlike the case in the West, feminism Filipina-style did
not automatically include a commitment to individual freedom as
reflected in 'the right to choose' idea. The position of church
activists was also different and complex. Commissioner Sister
Christine Tan, the sole nun on the Con-Com, was not an advocate of
the so called 'right to life' clause and in other contexts has spoken of
the need for family planning in conjunction with basic economic
reform.
It is thus necessary to avoid categorizing feminist debate in
the Philippines in Western terms. Mita Pardo de Tavera, the
minister responsible for social services and development, had
become a vocal critic of the use of artificial contraceptives in family
planning programmes. She had developed strong links with the
conservative wing of the Catholic Church yet had been prominent in
Gabriela's group at the Conference of NGOs held to mark the end of
the United Nations Decade for Women in Nairobi, Kenya. She left
Gabriela over the communist issue but had strongly identified with
Gabriela's radicalism and economic nationalism. In 1987 she argued
that the widespread use of artificial contraceptives under Marcos's
family planning programmes had alienated the people and also the
church. She believed that family planning should be pursued in the
context of 'family welfare' with a policy that would be approved by
the church, which, she claimed, spoke for the people. The Muslims,
too, Pardo de Tavera argued, were against artificial contraceptives.
The 'liberties' associated with artificial contraceptives were said to
be 'not in keeping with our [i.e. the Philippines] culture'. Family
planning did not become an issue during the Con-Com's
deliberations in 1986 and in its discussions with women's groups
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such as Gabriela. This was largely because of the impost of cultural
taboos which operated to delimit the contours of the debate.
Debates over women's issues in the Philippines do not fit neatly
into Western categories. It is also important to avoid assuming that
the relative prominence of women in Filipino politics can be
explained by reference to the South and Southeast Asian tradition
whereby elite women become powerful due to family and class
factors. Jahan (1987) has usefully surveyed the debates over this
tradition. It is true that Corazon Aquino corresponds to the model
of the strong family connection common to Mrs Gandhi, Miss Bhutto,
Mrs Wazed, Mrs Bandaranaike and Mrs Zia. There are, however, a
number of strengths which women and women's organizations have
held in the Philippines to a degree not common to other South and
Southeast Asian politics.
The 1987 constitution has been described in a semi-official
publication, written by the Con-Com secretary-general in
consultation with one other Con-Com member, as 'pro-people, pro-
Filipino, pro-life and pro-God' (Romero 1987:6). It is the latest of
several constitutions the Philippines has adopted this century.
Others included the 1935 constitution and the 1973 'martial law'
constitution of President Marcos. Interestingly, Cory Aquino's so-
called 'Freedom Constitution', which she used as the basis for
government until the 1987 constitution came into effect, was an
amended version of Marcos's 1973 constitution. The 1987
constitution was drafted as a reaction against the 1973 constitution
and as a formal legitimation measure for the Aquino government.
While the 1973 constitution was lacking in detail, the 1987 product
was replete with detailed information which managed to be vague
and woolly at the same time.
The sections of the constitution dealing with women and family
questions illustrate this tendency. More significantly, however, the
content of the debates surrounding their drafting can be used to
illuminate two questions of central importance to the position of
women, namely the values of the women members of the new
political elite and the likely impact of greater numbers of women in
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government. Four sentences of the constitution are of particular
importance, as follows:
Art II.
Sec 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution.
Art II.
Sec 12. It [The State] shall equally protect the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
Art II.
Sec 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-
building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before
the law of women and men.
Art XIII
Sec 14. The State shall protect working women by
providing safe and healthful working conditions, taking
into account their material functions, and such facilities
and opportunities that will enchance their welfare and
enable them to realize their full potential in the service of
the nation.
In addition, the published interpretation of the constitution by
the Con-Com secretary-general in consultation with one other Con-
Com member asserted that 'the separation between Church and
State is not absolute' (Romero 1987:10).
Art II, Section 12, on the protection of the mother and the
unborn illustrates something of the lack of clarity of the details.
Does it prohibit abortion in all cases? This is not clear. Part of the
explanation resides in the fact that this sentence, like many others
in the constitution, was the result of compromise. In its initial form
it referred only to the protection of the unborn. Con-Com chairman
Cecilia Munoz-Palma and commissioner Teresa Nieva were among
the leading promoters of the protection clause. Both have strong
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links with the conservative wing of the Catholic Church. Minda Luz
Quesada initiated the inclusion of the clause protecting the life of
the mother. It seems that the debates and consultations raised her
consciousness on women's issues. It must be realized that questions
relating to women's reproductive freedom are difficult to discuss
publicly in the Philippines. It was for this reason that Gabriela,
which took an active part in the constitutional consultations, was
unable to take a stand on the question. Gabriela's brief was to:
endeavour for the inclusion of constitutional provisions
that will promote equal rights for women and men, as well
as specific rights for women and children (Gabriela
1986:8).
It also called for a 'pro-women, pro-people Constitution' (ibid.).
Leading members of Gabriela express pro-choice views privately
but in order to preserve the integrity of Gabriela have been unable
to use it as a forum or a launching pad for such beliefs.
In a similar fashion divorce was viewed as a taboo issue.
Gabriela did not raise it. The constitution is relatively unambiguous
on the issue. The idea of 'the sanctity' of family life is not
something that comes only from the church. Left-wing groups also
espouse it. Gabriela, for example, does not list the family as a site
for women's oppression and has not called for legislation permitting
divorce. It should be pointed out, however, that legal separation is
available in the Philippines.
The importance of 'the family' was reflected in the fact that one
of the eighteen provisions was devoted solely to the topic. Cecilia
Munoz-Palma was one of the co-sponsors. To the 'sanctity' of family
life was added the statement that 'Marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by
the state' (Art XV, Sec 2).
Another of the four sections was less clear cut. It included the
following statement:
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Art XV
Sec 3. The state shall defend:
(1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance
with their religious convictions and the demands of
responsible parenthood.
This was interpreted in quite different ways by leading women
whom I interviewed. One minister saw this as guaranteeing that
the policy of the government must follow both pro-life and
contraception. She thought that the government's role was to
'inform' and to 'disseminate' information about the range of family
planning methods. The guiding principle was the centrality of
'individual human rights'. It followed, according to the minister
that if the right exists then 'there must be the tools'. This is quite
different from the view of Mita Pardo de Tavera, the minister for
social services and development.
Perhaps ironically, one of the few critics of the so-called 'family
section' of the constitution was a Catholic nun, Sister Christine Tan
(see Table 3.2). A worker with the urban poor, as well as a member
of the two women's organizations listed on the Table, she expressed
concern lest the constitution enshrine the traditional values of the
church and ignore the need to grapple with economic and social
realities. Sister Tan and other activists believed that the protective
clauses did not go far enough. Gabriela, for example, had hoped that
the constitution would provide for equal pay, equal opportunity,
maternity leave and such like. Instead, in Article XIII, Section 14
there is a broad allusion to the right of women to work in 'safe and
healthful conditions'.
Sister Tan voted in favour of the constitution but she had
consistently adopted the so-called 'critical yes' position and had
expressed particularly strong opposition to the US bases. None of
the women delegates voted against the draft constitution's approval
but nationalist bloc members, Minda Luz Quesada and Felicitas
Aquino, expressed reservations publicly about their final pro-
constitution votes. Tan, Quesada and Aquino had each been
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involved in nationalist boycotts of Con-Com proceedings during the
stormy debates on economic nationalism and patrimony.
For many Manila feminists there was one positive
constitutional achievement, namely, the equal rights clause fought
for by Felicitas Aquino (no relative of the president). Aquino was
an activist in Gabriela, and with Christine Tan and minister Pardo de
Tavera, one of the seven conveners of Gabriela's Second General
Assembly in March 1985. The Philippines is one of the few nations
with such a clause in its constitution.
What is striking then is the diversity contained within Gabriela
and the breadth of the feminist programme. Minister Pardo de
Tavera emphasized this in her speech to Gabriela's 1985 assembly:
We want peace to be restored but on our terms: nothing
less than sovereignty, justice and democracy. That is what
women want.
I invite women of all classes and persuasions to join hands
and strive for the common good and to set aside
differences that can be easily negotiated given the will to
unify (Gabriela 1985:28).
Mita Pardo de Tavera's departure from Gabriela reminds one of
the fragility of such coalitions and the persistence of ideological
differences. It seems highly unlikely that Gabriela will be able to
make significant inputs into policy under the Aquino
administration. There are just too many divisions within Gabriela
over questions of socioeconomic reform and over issues dealing
with reproductive freedom. It should be emphasized that in 1986
there was a push from the church and within the ministry to
remove public funding from the existing population programmes.
The state would promote only two forms of contraception, the
rhythm and 'Billings' methods, which are approved by the Catholic
Church. In contrast with the 1973 constitution, the 1987
constitution contained no reference to the state's responsibility 'to
achieve and maintain population levels most conducive to the
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national welfare' (Republic of the Philippines 1973:33, Art XV, Sec.
10).
Conclusion
In conclusion it is useful to look closely at the characteristics of
the leading women members of the Aquino government. Several
common features emerge, as follows: in the first instance few links
with the Marcos regime; secondly, high socioeconomic status, and;
thirdly, fairly widespread involvement in cause-oriented politics
(see Tables 3.1 and 3.2). A number of the women shared
involvement in these political networks, and the Alliance of Women
for Action Towards Reform (AWARE) and the National Citizens
Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel) both seemed fairly
important. With only a few exceptions the women were innocent of
so-called traditional politics. Traditional politics had come to mean
not only involvement in Marcos's administration and particularly
his political party the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL). It refers
more generally to the personality, as opposed to issue, politics
which characterized pre-martial law elite democracy in the
Philippines and has enjoyed a resurgence even in the current pro-
Aquino political parties.
In many ways, the new women members of the political elite
mirror the characteristics of President Aquino herself. Their
collective presence shows that women have been recruited to the
political elite in greater number than before. Their differences,
however, over women's issues and socioeconomic questions means
that they are unlikely to act in concert as a political bloc or lobby.
It also remains to be seen whether the links between the women's
movement and the nationalist movement will remain.
The information contained in the Tables is based on interviews I
conducted and questionnaires I distributed in the Philippines in
February 1987. Unidentified quotations are from these interviews.
I am grateful to the women for their participation. Luz Tancangco,
Raul de Guzman and Edith Colliver all provided invaluable help.
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The travel was undertaken with the assistance of the Faculty of
Arts, Australian National University. Unfortunately, I was unable to
speak with all the senior women. Leticia Ramos Shahani was
overseas and Karina David and Minda Quesada were difficult to pin
down. I was able, however, to speak with several activists who
knew them well.
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CHAPTER 4
THE 1987 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES:
CONTEXT, CONDUCT AND OUTCOME
Alan Robson
The Philippine congressional elections of May 1987 were the
second of President Aquino's three major state reconstruction
measures. The first was the constitutional plebiscite in February
1987 and the last will be the local government polls now scheduled
for early 1988. The measures so far undertaken have structurally
entrenched the new presidency and shown how popular Mrs Aquino
continues to be. To that extent they are also vicarious presidential
elections, although there is no doubt that Aquino won the snap
presidential election of 1986. This demonstration of popularity is as
least as important as the establishment of new constitutional
foundations. In spite of an undeniable preoccupation with
constitutionalism in Philippine political culture, the viability of
political authority in the Philippines has tended to be determined
by the ability of regimes to deliver patronage and bias policy to
favour strategic social groups and individuals. Aquino's
reconstruction measures, like those of her predecessor, have mainly
been limited to the formal political domain in spite of the evidence
of public opinion surveys which identify the 'people's power' basis
to her rule as a more significant source of her authority than her
formal political victory over Marcos in the snap election (Ateneo de
Manila 1986). Thus, the legitimacy of Aquino's regime has a strong
performative aspect to it in spite of the moves concerned with its
formal entrenchment. Yet Aquino's people's power victory did not
arise out of any alteration to the prevailing class structure of
Philippine society. Indeed, it was a counter-revolutionary
development on two fronts. First, by replacing the discredited and
desperate Marcos regime, a re-imposition of martial law with the
consequent risk of military dictatorship was avoided. The overthrow
of Marcos's brand of authoritarianism was also a retreat from the
structural radicalism which had focused political power in the hands
117
of the president at the expense of a more diffuse power system.
Secondly, the Aquino succession stalled the advance of the militant
Left which had made impressive gains during Marcos's rule. The
counter-revolutionary nature of the Aquino regime will be of
central concern in this description and analysis of the 1987
congressional elections.
Threats to the regime
Aquino's period of prerogative rule leading up to the
congressional elections was dominated by the need to contain
immediate threats to the regime from the Right and the military.
Aquino's enormous popular support was both a disincentive and an
impediment to any isolated military coup attempt, especially as this
support had been institutionalized at the local level by her dismissal
of undesirable local government officials and their replacement
with pro-administration people, the Officers in Charge (OICs).
Inevitably, many members of local elites transferred allegiance to
the new government. The few remaining Marcos warlords thus
found themselves fighting to preserve their threatened local power
bases and were in no position to foment serious trouble at the
centre. Factionalism in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
also diminished the threat to the government from the Right and
prevented Enrile, defence minister for both Marcos and Aquino,
from consolidating a monopoly of armed force around himself in the
new administration. This did not, however, stop several amateurish
coup attempts before the congressional elections and a very serious
one shortly afterwards.
The left-wing threat was less immediate. The communist
movement lost ground as a result of Aquino assuming power. It
was unable to exploit a negotiated cease-fire with the government
to bolster the position of the National Democratic Front (NDF) and
failed to win policy concessions from the government over the US
military bases in the Philippines and economic issues. Aquino
eventually placated the military opposition to the cease-fire and
strengthened her support in the US by promising to 'unleash the
sword of war' against the communists if negotiations failed. She
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tried to popularize this option with an appeal for the construction of
a people's power counter-insurgency programme at barrio (village)
level. Recent bases for militant counter-insurgency operations have
been the armed gangs of local political warlords, the local volunteers
of the Integrated Civil Home Defense Forces (ICHDF), the AFP itself
and fanatical quasi-religious groups such as the Tadtad. These anti-
communist organizations have provided the personnel and support
for the anti-communist vigilante groups which proliferated during
the past year. Support for them under the rubric of people's power
from the government and conservative elements in the church did
nothing to attenuate their anti-popular basis. There was a vigorous
counter-attack from cause-oriented groups associated with the Left.
They attempted to demonstrate that the communist New People's
Army (NPA) was not like the Khmer Rouge, as the Right alleged, but
that vigilante groups were violent and undemocratic. Publicity over
the atrocities committed by vigilante groups, their continuing
warlord connections and support from certain US interests
embarrassed the government but failed to halt the growth of these
groups which pose as much of a threat to the operation of
institutional democracy as they do to that of the NPA. In general,
people's power never transcended the street theatre of the EDSA
revolt. Aquino's vague call for the establishment of 'people's
councils' in the barrios seemed more like Marcos's early martial law
barangay democracy than a genuine attempt at democratization.
Her call was, anyway, mostly answered by affirmations of support
for her administration from elite-dominated local bodies.
Within government, regime stability was threatened by
factional disputes. These became less acute after Enrile's dismissal
and the subordination of vice-president Laurel, but they were never
completely resolved. Right up to the congressional elections there
was a major split between the 'economic nationalists' around
executive secretary Joker Arroyo, and the rising proponants of
deregulation and social conservatism, nicknamed the 'Council of
Trent' because of their Jesuit links and ostentatious moralism.
Aquino's equivocating stance between the two groups made it hard
for her to discipline the cabinet.
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In spite of these threats to the regime and to its stability the
economy showed signs of recovery through a combination of
deregulatory measures, renewed foreign aid and investment, and
credit adjustments. Marcos crony firms continued to be sequestered
by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) but
there were indications that a new crony capitalism had already
begun to orbit around Aquino's Malacanang (Veritas 19-25 March
1985; Far Eastern Economic Review (PEER) 26 March 1987). The
church also provided unstinting support and helped to promote
Aquino's platform in the constitutional plebiscite. Aquino's
overwhelming victory in this electoral exercise reaffirmed her
immense popularity and indicated the importance of her
endorsement for candidates. Despite factional disputes within
government Aquino had no difficulty in constructing a united
coalition for the Senate elections.
Coalitions and campaigns
Aquino's Senate coalition included representatives of Lakas ng
Bansa (LABAN), Philippine Democratic Party-Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-
Laban), Bansang Nagkaisa sa Diwa at Layunin (Bandila), National
Union of Christian Democrats (NUCD), Panaghiusa, the Laurel wing of
the Nacionalista Party, and the Salonga wing of the Liberal Party.
All, however, ran under the LABAN label. It had the overall
conservative ideological cast of the government but included such
moderate Leftists as Rene Saguisag, Wigberto Tanada and Augusto
Sanchez, while others like the veteran politician Jovito Salonga could
be expected to take a nationalist stance on issues like the US bases.
Sanchez had been dismissed as labour minister in January 1986
after pressure had been brought on the president by business
interests which considered him too sympathetic to the militant
Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) labour movement. Both Tanada and
Saguisag were street politicians and human rights lawyers. For the
most part though, the administration ticket was made up of long
standing oppositionist politicians like Raul Manglapus, Neptali
Gonzales, Ernesto Maceda, Mamintal Tamano, John Osmena, Victor
Ziga and Alberto Romulo. all of whom had previously held Senate or
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Batasang Pambansa seats. Other candidates on the Aquino slate
included the former University of the Philippines president, Edgardo
Angara, the president's brother-in-law, Agapito 'Butz' Aquino,
former deputy education minister Arturo Defensor, Trades Union
Congress of the Philippines (TUCP) general secretary Ernesto
Herrera, the vice president's brother Sotero Laurel, former Metro
Manila mayor Joey Lina, former public works minister Vicente
Paterno, the controversial former local government minister
Aquilino Pimentel, Santanina Rasul from Sulu, former United
Nations assistant secretary general Letitia Shahani, television
personality Orlando Mercado, human rights activist Teofisto
Guingona and Heherson Alvarez who, like Manglapus, had been
active in the US-based Movement for a Free Philippines (MFP).
The Right's opposition to the administration's Senate ticket
came from the Union for Peace and Progress-Kilusang Bagong
Lipunan (UPP-KBL) and the newly-constituted Grand Alliance for
Democracy (GAD) on the Right. The lacklustre UPP-KBL team which
included former Batasang Pambansa members like ex-speaker
Nicanor Yniguez was dominated by politicians unrepentently
associated with Marcos. It had initially hoped to mount a common
senatorial ticket with GAD but this hope evaporated when GAD
insisted that notorious Marcos stalwarts like Batasan members
Rafael Recto and Salvador Britanico and former Commission on
Elections (Comelec) commissioner Leonardo Perez be dropped from
any common ticket. As a result, the UPP-KBL went into the election
campaign with only seventeen candidates against a much stronger
and bigger contingent from GAD.
The GAD coalition included the Kalaw wing of the Liberal party
as well as elements claiming to represent the United Nationalist
Democratic Organization (UNIDO), the KBL and the Nacionalistas.
The banker Vicente Puyat was the nominal Senate ticket leader but
Juan Ponce Enrile was undoubtedly GAD's leading personality. The
others were mostly former 'young turks' of the Marcos
administration and ex-KBL politicians with an independent
provincial power base. Among the latter were former provincial
governors Rene Espina, Alejandro Almendras, Vicente Magsaysay,
Rafael Palmares, Isidro Rodriguez, Lorenzo Teves and Fernando
121
Veloso. Like Juan Ponce Enrile, Roilo Golez, Wilson Gamboa, Blas
Ople, Francisco Tatad, Arturo Tolentino and Zosimo Paredes had
been ministers or deputy ministers under Marcos. The veteran anti-
communist Liberal oppositionist Eva Kalaw who had contested the
vice-presidency during the snap election also ran as a GAD
candidate. So did the popular movie star Joseph Estrada and a
former Miss Philippines, Edith Rabat. GAD also claimed former
Batasan members Homobono Adaza, Jeremias Montemayor,
Wenceslao Lagumbay and Romeo Jalosjos, and Firdaussi Abbas and
Abdul Alonto who had been active in Muslim politics.
On the Left, the Partido ng Bayan (PnB), the Volunteers for
Popular Democracy (VPD) and the cause-oriented umbrella
organization Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN) came together
in the Alliance for New Politics (ANP). There had been some internal
debate as to whether the Left had the resources to mount a national
campaign for Senate and it was eventually decided to put forward
just seven candidates, although there were to be 103 Left-affiliated
lower house contenders. Supporters thus had the possibility of
voting for a ticket made up of the ANP group and the more
progressive administration candidates. Five of the seven ANP
candidates had been political detainees. The two most prominent in
this respect were Bernabe Buscayno, the founder of the NPA, and
Horatio Morales, former NDF leader and VPD founder. The other ex-
detainees were KMU chairman Crispin Beltran, women's group
activist and head of the radical women's group coalition, Gabriela,
Nelia Sancho, and former publisher of the newspaper Malaya, Jose
Burgos. Jaime Tadeo, chairman of the militant Kilusang Magbubukid
ng Pilipinas (KMP) peasant organization and head of BAYAN, and the
former Laban activist Romeo Capulong were also on the ticket.
Finally there was a scattering of independent candidates
including the movie star Jose Bautista and ex-mayor of Laoag,
national Jaycee president and Marcos stalwart, Rodolfo Farinas.
In the lower house contest over 1,800 candidates pursued 200
seats. Aquino declared that the contest for lower house seats would
be 'open' with no official administration coalition ticket. This led to a
proliferation of candidates claiming government affiliation. Aquino
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did proclaim her own LABAN choices in many districts, and
candidates fought to be the official 'Cory's choice'; even so, LABAN
affiliation was often claimed by more than one candidate in a
district. The most common pro-administration party endorsements
and designations were LABAN, PDP-Laban, UNIDO, various Liberal
Party groups and certain regional parties. For the Left, PnB was the
usual label. On the Right, KBL, GAD and the Nacionalista Party
dominated the field. But, candidates often claimed multiple
endorsement in an effort to strengthen their electoral credentials.
One candidate in Zambales province claimed to represent five major
parties (most of which were represented individually by other
candidates) while there were numerous constituencies with more
than one candidate per party. In one Quezon City district no fewer
than twenty-four candidates claimed allegiance to Aquino. Vote-
splitting would therefore be a feature of the lower house contests.
Mutually beneficial deals between lower house candidates, or their
sponsors, and senatorial support groups were reportedly common. It
was also in the lower house districts that political warlords of the
Marcos era would make their bids for a continued national political
presence. Usually, however, the local elites were less combative and
preferred to accommodate with the Aquino administration by
adopting pro-administration stances.
A problem all the major political parties faced was the expense
and organizational difficulty of running a nationwide political
campaign for the Senate election. One-constituency Senate elections
in a bicameral representation system had been a feature of the
1935 constitution. This applied through the period when political
contests were fought between provincial factions operating under
the banners of the ideologically indistinguishable Liberal and
Nacionalista parties. Under the 1972 martial law constitution,
however, the Senate had been abolished in favour of a single-
chamber assembly, the Batasang Pambansa, whose members were
elected from local constituencies. Only the president could claim to
represent a national constituency. But political centralization was
evident in the outcome of the heavily-controlled Batasan elections.
To secure power, local elites needed to deal with Marcos's Manila-
based KBL. The old Liberal and Nacionalista coalitions did not
survive the Marcos era in a form that allowed them to forge
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national political alliances. In 1987, the political scene was heavily
divided. In a continuation of the Marcos tradition, a crucial feature
of the Senate campaign was the electoral advantage accruing to
candidates who could prove direct association with the president.
The single nation-wide Senate constituency conferred particular
importance on this kind of endorsement. Candidates often failed to
look at the electoral arithmetic involved in the new system. Enrile,
for example, spent a lot of time rallying support in his northern
Luzon bailiwick of the Cagayan Valley and making peace with
voters in Marcos's Ilocos homeland. But whatever his success in
these endeavours, the election was being won or lost numerically
elsewhere. In the absence of the old Liberal/Nacionalista power-
broking system, highly focused regional bases could not prove
sufficient to put candidates into the Senate. The same observation
holds true of the focused sectoral support bases claimed by the Left.
The administration's campaign inevitably exploited Aquino's
popularity and emphasized the presidential support for particular
candidates. This approach was given impetus by PDP-Laban
surveys which showed a low voter awareness of specific issues
coupled with a disposition to vote for anyone Aquino nominated.
The president campaigned personally in many constituencies with
the message that her presidency was at issue. The administration's
Senate campaign was technically well-organized and there was little
'dumping' of candidates compared to the right-wing opposition.
Aquino's insistence on campaigning for the whole LABAN slate
reduced the impact of the uneven distribution of campaign funding
between individual candidates. The biggest spender on the
administration side was Angara, who allegedly laid out seven
million pesos; another eight candidates each spent between four
and five million pesos, and the remainder spent between one and
four million (Malaya 13 June 1987). Most of this money went on
sample ballots and radio and television advertising. Musical jingles
rather than policy statements were the order of the day
(characteristic of these was the personalized version of the pop song
Body-Rock with which Joey Lina campaigned) as was anything
which might indicate proximity to the president. Somewhere
amongst all this there was an official LABAN policy statement. This
was a thirteen page set of generalities promising such things as
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resistance against the return of oppression, a voice in government
for the poor and an independent judiciary. The president's
commitment to economic deregulation featured and there was a
promise to 'devolve' land to the tiller. The most specific social policy
proposal was one for free secondary education. On the US bases
issue, the platform favoured 'keeping options open' until after the
expiration of the present agreement. The nationalist bloc
occasionally attacked foreign control of the Philippine economy
while Left-leaning Sanchez identified a major problem as the
economic control exerted by the wealthiest eighty families.
The UPP-KBL campaign never really overcame the party's
failure to strike a coalition bargain with GAD. There were a few
newspaper advertisements highlighting the communist menace,
complaining about the neglect of the military and alleging
harassment of their candidates. But their poorly focused and
underfinanced campaign soon ran out of steam and was eclipsed by
the more sophisticated GAD effort which attracted the bulk of the
Right's funding. The two biggest campaign spenders of any party
were GAD's Enrile and Puyat, both of whom laid out more than nine
million pesos (the Puyat family's Manila Banking Corporation
collapsed shortly after the election). Like their counterparts in the
UPP-KBL, GAD candidates alleged a lax government approach to
counter-insurgency. They also appealed to military personnel for
their support. Regional autonomy proposals in the constitution were
attacked. On the US bases issue, GAD candidates called for a
renegotiation of terms to secure increased direct US payment. This
reflected many GAD candidates' feeling of betrayal over the US
abandonment of Marcos. For Enrile, this was a personal campaign
difficulty because of his own complicity in the events which led to
the overthrow of Marcos. In the Ilocos, Enrile blamed Marcos's
advisers for the president's downfall and apologized for the role he
had played. Such comments were a liability in the anti-Marcos
south where Enrile denied making them. This strengthened the
general perception of him as a rapidly oscillating balimbing
(somebody who changes political allegiance). The television and
press advertisements portraying him as a moderate national
statesman did little to alter this image. Enrile seemed to campaign
more as an individual than as a member of GAD. So did Puyat who
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also made an exculpatory appeal in the north where he promised to
work for Marcos's return if he was elected. These references
underscored GAD's main electoral problem - the powers and
resources of the state were not on their side.
The same was of course true for the candidates of the ANP.
They mounted a vigorous soapbox campaign on slender financial
resources and received some support from the Left-leaning press,
notably the newspaper Malaya. Their Senate candidates travelled
through the archipelago en bloc and received a good reception from
large numbers of youthful supporters, many of them associated
with BAYAN. The itinerary included all the main cities. ANP rallies
were well publicized by local newspapers and were usually well
attended. The main campaign emphasis was on the 'new politics' of
issues as opposed to what they described as the personality contests
of 'traditional politics'. Such politics was being practised by
candidates from the administration and the right-wing opposition.
All the ANP candidates proved fluent campaigners with a good
grasp of policy issues and a coherent platform. Nonetheless there
was still some spread of opinion between them, with Jose Burgos
supporting a free market economic system as against the socialism
of the other candidates. There were also differences of focus. For
example, Sancho spoke on womens' issues, Beltran dealt with the
problems of urban workers, while Tadeo concentrated on agrarian
reform. ANP economic policies proposed nationalist industrialization,
selective debt repudiation and rejection of the IMF-World Bank
recovery programme. On agrarian reform it was proposed to
eradicate landlordism through a free land redistribution programme
with only selective compensation to owners. In foreign policy they
called for abrogation of the existing bases treaty. US involvement in
Philippine domestic affairs was predictably excoriated, with the
issue of US support for vigilante groups a particular focus of
attention. Perhaps surprisingly, the ANP candidates were never
attacked directly by vigilante groups during the campaign although
twenty-nine of their supporters were killed and fifty others
detained by the police and military (Malaya 22 May 1987). Many
local offices of the ANP and their affiliate groups were raided by the
police. One raid in Metro Manila led to the arrest of seven activists
who were accused of possessing arms on what the ANP said were
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trumped up charges. For their part the police tended to view the
ANP as a wing of the communist movement able to campaign openly
at a time when the police were frustrated at their inability to react
effectively to a wave of NPA 'sparrow unit' killings of policemen in
Manila. Indeed, shortly after the election campaign the Manila-
based Alex Boncayno sparrow unit took out newspaper
advertisements to explain that they only killed a specified range of
abusive policemen (Malaya 15 June 1987). This could not have
helped matters much. The Metro Manila ambush of Bernabe
Buscayno after the elections was thought by the ANP to have been
an act of retaliation by off-duty policemen for sparrow unit
executions. In general, the ANP candidates were faced with the
problem of being radical-legal Left campaigners in the midst of a
civil war, where supporters of the insurgents could be expected to
vote for them. The government would obviously refuse to meet
them on their favoured ground of policy debate and they would just
as obviously be harassed by the forces of the state and local elites.
The government's anti-Left atitude was supported by the
church establishment. Cardinal Sin, in spite of frequent avowals that
he was withdrawing from partisan politics, urged voters to avoid
candidates of the 'extreme' Left or Right. He attacked the KBL as
self-interested but singled out candidates espousing a 'godless
ideology' and advocating the 'class struggle' for maximum vitriol
(Malaya 23 April 1987). At the same time, he launched an attack
on activist priests and nuns with NDF ties, taking the Aquino line
that the justification for such involvement had passed with the
departure of Marcos and the country's 'liberation from that regime
of oppression' (Malaya 15 April 1987). The NDF-supporting
Christians for National Liberation (CNL) and various other Left-
leaning religious groups responded with newspaper advertisements
publicizing continuing human rights abuses, although these
responses presumably had less impact than the exhortations, ex-
cathedra or otherwise, of the cardinal. The National Council of
Churches in the Philippines (NCCP) also took out advertisments
calling for genuine land reform, respect of human rights and honest
election practices. Some may have interpreted these as a plea for
the Left. Cardinal Sin eventually stepped directly into the campaign
through his promotion in the church magazine Veritas, of 'ten
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outstanding senatorial candidates' (TOSCA). This TOSCA list was
drawn completely from the administration ticket and it included
several of the more progressive candidates plus a couple who may
have looked in need of some providential assistance. A condition of
nomination, however, was support for the church's position on
issues like divorce and abortion, so the inclusion of the progressives
may have had more to do with getting likely winners on side than
with helping the Left of the Aquino ticket.
Cardinal Sin did not have the field of religious nominations to
himself. As a counter to the TOSCA endorsements, the progressive
Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines (AMRSP)
came up with its own list of candidates which included three
Leftists. The Iglesia ni Cristo, an indigenous church, also put out a
list of fourteen nominees from the administration ticket and sixteen
from the right-wing opposition. The Iglesia claims up to 3 million
adherents; its endorsements carry weight because its members are
expected to follow strictly the advice, electoral or otherwise, of the
leader as a matter of religious conviction. The Iglesia leader Manalo
had supported Marcos right up to the snap poll but this time he was
obviously hedging his bets. The Iglesia ni Cristo extracted a promise
from the candidates it endorsed to vote for the repeal of the
religious instruction in schools clause of the new constitution. Like
the growing number of fundamentalist protestant groups, the
Iglesia has a strong constituency in the military.
The various campaigns closed, as usual, with rallies in Manila.
The best attended was Aquino's meeting at the Liwasang Bonifacio
where she appeared alongside all her senatorial candidates and
made a final plea for a complete LABAN win in the upper house.
Few believed this possible.
The poll
On 11 May, 90 per cent of the country's 26 million registered
voters went to the polls in all but a few areas. The Comelec had
declared constituencies in Sulu and Lanao as emergency zones and
voting took place there at a later date. The electoral registers were
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in fairly good order, having been purged of many false names and
ghost (non-existent) barrios in the preparations for the February
plebiscite. By the standards of Philippine elections (Carbonell and
Nicolas 1986), the voting in May was fairly orderly and peaceful,
though there were still twenty-five election-related deaths around
polling day. There were few reports of ballot box snatchings, ballot
substitutions and deletions, and there was certainly nothing like the
mayhem of the snap presidential election. Nonetheless, ballot
counting was extremely slow. In part this was due to the awkward
and time-consuming task of allocating the twenty-four names on
each Senate ballot into the eighty-four spaces on the official tally
sheets. With an average of around 250 voters spread over 101,551
precincts, counting over many days could be expected especially as
the lower house tallies also had to be made. But the Comelec's
failure to demand prompt submission of canvass returns from its
election supervisors and boards of canvassers naturally fostered
suspicions of poll manipulation once it became evident that the
Aquino slate was going to score a sweeping win. At the national
tally room misrecorded results were relatively commonplace and
scrutineers had to keep a sharp eye on the tabulation of returns.
The incidence of such errors reportedly increased as the battle for
the last few Senate positions intensified.
Lack of good data makes it difficult to present a well-informed
account of how polling went in many provincial areas, particularly
those dominated by political warlords. The face-saving custom
adopted by many losers of claiming cheating by the winner does not
make forming an accurate idea of what went on any easier. There
were reports of violent incidents in a few areas, and in Negros
Occidental a Comelec registrar ordered ballot counting in twenty-
two districts in the municipality of Candon to be conducted in the
town proper because of intimidation in outlying barrios. Nowhere,
however, did these kinds of reports seem to indicate a complete
breakdown in Comelec control; losers would of course claim that
Comelec itself was manipulating an administration win, while there
is some question as to the reality of Comelec control in electorates
where particular elite families exercised strong domination.
Naturally, suspicion was aroused by the wins of lower house
candidates who were or who had the support of local warlords
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known for their standover tactics during the Marcos period.
However, even in these areas vote-buying rather than overt
coercion seems to have been the modus operandi.
Extensive vote-buying was alleged but the extent of this
traditional practice remains unknown (PEER 21 May 1987; Malaya
1 June 1987). It is an endemic feature of Philippine elections and
will persist in an unreconstructed social system where there are
poor electors and rich local elites who desire power and who are not
constrained by the appearance of fairness required by Western
democratic theory and practice. It is also obviously hard to
distinguish between vote-buying accompanied by the threat of
coercion and vote-buying in which there is an option not to sell. In
the post-Marcos Philippines the level of coercion in vote-buying is
down and it is no longer co-ordinated directly from the office of the
president. GAD made persistent claims of massive systematic fraud
once it became evident that their candidates were losing, but they
were not able to sustain their charges with sufficient detailed
evidence (Malaya 13 May 1987). They did itemize polling
irregularities in several regions where administration candidates
won in situations where the total number of votes cast exceeded the
number of electors. Some trimming of GAD results by local officials
seems certain. Naturally, accusations of electoral malfeasance by
GAD and the UPP-KBL were greeted cynically by people who
remembered the wholesale cheating of these same groups during
the Marcos period when they were on top. The ANP certainly had a
stronger case for its claims of systematic fraud, but no amount of
manipulation and trimming could have made any difference to a
Senate result in which the top ranking ANP candidate received only
one sixth as many votes as the lowest ranking winner. In fact the
most compelling complaint of effective electoral malfeasance was to
come not from the opposition, but from defeated administration
candidate Augusto Sanchez.
Sanchez was widely regarded by employers and business
groups and the formerly KBL-aligned TUCP as sympathetic to the
left-wing KMU and therefore the least attractive administration
Senate candidate in a team which also included the TUCP general
secretary Ernesto Herrera. There were, therefore, early fears on the
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Left that Sanchez was a courtesy candidate who would be dumped
by the administration. This did not eventuate in the campaign but
problems arose during counting when many Comelec officials
rejected ballots marked 'Sanchez' on the grounds that there was
more than one candidate with that name. In fact there had been a
Gil Sanchez registered as a candidate but he was struck off more
than a month before polling for failure to comply with the
requirement to lodge 200,000 copies of his certificate of candidacy
with the Comelec. The Comelec failed to strike his name off the list
of official candidates sent out to the polling stations shortly before
the elections. To make matters worse, the disqualified candidate
himself appeared on television with Enrile and Ople just three days
before the election to appeal for votes. A Comelec member
sympathetic to Augusto Sanchez, Haydee Yorac, made a television
broadcast shortly before the election advising officials about the
problem, but to no avail. Many local Comelec officials continued to
ignore advice from the national counting office to count all votes
marked 'Sanchez' for the official candidate (Augusto Sanchez)
because this advice frequently failed to arrive in the form of an
official notification. During the national tally room scrutiny of the
certificates of canvass, Yorac also discovered that the Comelec
recording of the Cavite certificate showed only 40,000 votes for
Sanchez while the actual figure was 167,000. Similarly a certificate
from Marinduque was tallied as showing only 12,000 votes for
Sanchez, instead of the 121,000 actually canvassed (National
Midweek 10 June 1987). These errors were blamed on 'calculator
problems' when they were brought to the attention of
commissioners. Sanchez was not the only candidate to suffer from
misrecorded results but this happened very frequently with him. It
is impossible to accurately determine how many votes Sanchez was
finally deprived of, but it seems likely that he received more than
the bottom polling winners in the Senate race. When the evidence of
unfairness became impossible to ignore, Comelec finally agreed to a
partial recount of votes in the 6,000 or so most disputed precincts.
This was overruled by the Supreme Court which instructed Comelec
to declare Enrile the final Senate winner. A recount for Sanchez
would have created a precedent for similar demands from other
losing candidates, particularly if it had been executed on a selective
131
precinct basis. This would have made it difficult to ever arrive at a
definitive resolution of election results. As it was, it took Comelec
three months from the date of the election to declare the last Senate
place.
Two other factors emphasize the potential for government
control of the election result, although it is hard to assess the overall
impact they had on the electoral outcome. First, the National
Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel), which had been such an
effective protector of opposition results during the snap election
because of its antagonism to the Marcos-controlled Comelec, was
this time monitoring an election being fought by a government of
which most Namfrel members approved. The administration
senatorial candidate Aquilino Pimentel believed that the
independence of the poll watch body had been compromised by
rewarding Namfrel officials with public office and by petty dealing
between the government and Namfrel (Malaya 8 June 1987).
Pimentel suggested the revival of partisan party scrutineers as a
more realistic way of monitoring the counting. Secondly, the local
government minister, Jaime Ferrer, made it plain that the
administration-appointed OICs were expected to support the
government ticket on pain of dismissal. After the election he
warned that OICs in areas which had failed to deliver an
administration win would be dismissed. Ferrer, who was
assassinated shortly after the election, was an enthusiastic anti-
communist crusader and a supporter of right-wing vigilante groups.
His principal animosity was directed against OICs believed to
support the ANP. In a post-election tour of the Bicol region of
Southern Luzon he took turns with senator-elect Victor Ziga to
denounce OICs in areas where ANP candidates had made it into the
top twenty-four; many of these officers were later dismissed.
Failure to organize anti-communist vigilante groups was another
ground for dismissal. Thus, there was a strong incentive, born of
self-preservation, for OICs to minimize the Leftist vote during the
elections.
The vote tallying dragged on for months, with a number of
lower house appeals still pending at the time of writing (August
1987). However, all of the senators and most of the lower house
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representatives are now in place and the general recorded voting
pattern is clear. In the Senate there was a clear clustering of
candidates by party affiliation, with twenty-two of the twenty-four
winning positions going to the LABAN slate. Salonga and Butz
Aquino were the top scorers with over 12 million votes each. GAD's
Joseph Estrada won fourteenth place, presumably on the basis of his
popularity as a movie star. The fight for the last winning slot was
intense with Enrile on 7,964,966 just making it past the LABAN
candidates Sanchez and Defensor. The unsuccessful GAD candidates
occupied the next cluster with a wide spread of support. The top
scorers for GAD were its big names like Kalaw, Puyat, Almendras,
Tolentino, Ople, Tatad, Golez, Espina and Adaza, each of whom
received over 4.5 million votes. Bautista also made it into this group,
and the KBL's Recto was not far behind with 3,277,088 votes. The
other GAD candidates straggled out behind with 1.5-3 million votes.
The three top KBL scorers after Recto were next, each with around
1.5 million votes. Following on was the tight ANP cluster with all
their candidates getting 1-1.5 million votes. In amongst them was
the KBL's Millora on 1,242,115 and then came the remainder of the
UPP-KBL team with between 400,000 and 1 million votes. Most of
the independents were scattered at the bottom of the tally sheet. It
is possible, on this result, that if the right-wing oposition had
mounted a common Senate ticket, more of their candidates might
have won, but this is far from certain. After all, the UPP-KBL put up
only seventeen candidates, far from a full slate, yet only two GAD
candidates made it to the Senate.
There was some regional and sectoral variation in the voting
pattern. GAD candidates did as well as the administration in
Regions 1 and 2. This reaffirmed the anti-Aquino, Right vote
recorded there in the plebiscite. Region 1, the Ilocos, was the home
of Marcos. Region 2, the Cagayan Valley, was Enrile's political
bailiwick. He was the highest polling candidate in Region 2. Apart
from this, there were candidate-specific vote fluctuations in the
remaining ten regions, mostly reflecting candidates' place of origin.
The ANP did better than the lower ranked GAD candidates in
Regions 5, 6 and 8. Region 5 includes parts of Southern Luzon where
the NDF is reputedly strong. Region 6, the Western Visayas,
contains the cities of Iloilo and Bacolod. Region 8 covers the
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Visayan islands of Leyte and Samar, the latter being a hotbed of
NPA activity. Nonetheless, in many areas of strong NDF support, the
ANP did not do all that well. In part this occurred through the
inability of the ANP to monitor the conduct of the polls. The
numerically small absentee vote is significant because it is mostly
composed of returns from the military. The top-ranking GAD
candidates were the clear winners here, with the administration and
bottom-ranking GAD candidates equal next.
In the lower house contests pro-administration winners greatly
outnumbered those of other persuasions (see Table 3.1). Aquino
had again triumphed. However, some nominally 'pro-
administration' candidates won against 'Cory's choices' while pro-
administration vote-splitting sometimes opened up opportunities
for opposition wins, though it was not always easy to distinguish
candidates' attitudes towards the administration from their declared
party affiliation. There was some continuation of anti-Aquino
provincial elite control in a number of areas, particularly in Regions
1 and 2. Former Marcos tourism minister, Jose Aspiras, won a seat
in La Union province while under indictment for complicity in the
murder of Ninoy Aquino. Further up the coast in Ilocos Sur
province, the Singsons, who were similarly implicated, won the two
seats. KBL candidates romped home as expected in Ilocos Norte and
Isabela provinces while the Estrella family returned two members
in Pangasinan. Other right-wing opposition successes included
Ramon Durano in Cebu, and Abdullah Dimakuta Dimaporo in Lanao
del Norte. But while the success of candidates endorsed by the more
notorious warlords of the Marcos period strike the eye, in fact the
general pattern was for continued local elite representation, with
many families once identified strongly with the former regime only
too happy to make a functional peace with the new central
government. Other elite families who had been politically dormant
during the Marcos era also took the opportunity to reassert their
control. Candidates of the ANP won only three seats. Although
Aquino's broad coalition of candidates won 136 of the 190 seats
now declared (August 1987), the level of control her administration
will be able to exert on the lower house is far from certain. Some of
'Cory's choices' may prove unwilling to concur with the policy
preferences of the president as they have no ideological bond with
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her and party discipline could be lacking. She will be helped,
however, by being able to nominate a further fifty sectoral
representatives to Congress in addition to the 200 elected members.
Table 4.1
Distribution of Members of Congress by Party Affiliation and
Region as of August 14
Region Pro-
Aquino
GAD, NP
UPP, KBL
ANP INDEP
ENDENT
TOTAL
NCR National Capital Region 15 1 0 4 20
1 Ilocos 7 5 0 4 16
2 Cagayan Valley 5 5 0 1 11
3 Central Luzon 16 1 1 1 19
S Bicol 8 1 0 5 14
6 Western Visayas 14 0 0 3 17
7 Central Visayas 13 2 0 0 IS
8 Eastern Visayas 7 3 1 0 11
9 Western Mindanao 8 1 0 1 10
10 Northern Mindanao 10 1 0 0 11
11 Southern Mindanao 9 3 0 3 IS
12 Central Mindanao 5 l 1 0 7
TOTAL 136 28 3 23 190
Source: Commission on Elections
Notes: (a) The 'Pro-Aquino' parties would include LABAN, PDP-Laban,
UNIDO, Liberal Party groups, Bandila, NUCD and some regional
parties.
(b) The final total of elected members is 200.
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The overwhelming government win in the elections is not
difficult to understand, just as the ANP's declaration that the
outcome was a victory for traditional politics was obviously true.
Provincial political elites have always courted the central
government and the fluid political situation after the collapse of the
Marcos regime increased the importance of establishing connections
with Malacanang, particularly as the next presidential elections are
more than five years away. The OIC system provided, in many
cases, a direct point of contact between local elites (from whom
many OICs were in any case drawn) and the administration.
Discussion
At the level of public opinion the 'Cory' factor has remained
extremely important, with a majority of voters prepared to defer to
her choices of representative. The Left claim that this represented
voter confusion about self-interest is not clearly established. In the
fifteen months between the triumph of people's power and the
elections there were five coup attempts which traded on
uncertainty about the president's legitimacy and there was a
widespread feeling that the elections were ultimately about a choice
between an Aquino-led civilian government and a right-wing
regime with military support, if not an outright military
dictatorship. Tactical voting may also have played a role. A large
non-vote for the weaker administration candidates in favour of the
Left, for example, would have increased the representation of GAD.
The president's campaign style with its frequent references to
peoples' power appeals to many voters who feel that she is close to
them and not a remote figure in Malacanang. The electoral
arithmetic of the new constitution also favoured the administration.
Senators are elected on a first past the post single nation-wide
constituency. This voting system makes it very difficult for
candidates without general support to be elected; highly focused
regional or sectoral support, no matter how strong, will never be
enough on their own to secure an election win. A strong vote would
always be required in the vote-rich Metro Manila and Tagalog
regions and in the Visayas. Aquino's candidates scored well in these
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areas as against the opposition candidates with their narrower
regional and sectoral support bases.
The GAD and UPP-KBL candidates were handicapped in the
most populous areas by their past association with the Marcos
regime. Large amounts of money and famous names could not
compensate for this. Kalaw was an exception, but she had run as a
vice-presidential candidate against the Aquino-Laurel ticket in the
snap election and this, quite apart from her new association with
GAD, probably cost her votes. As noted earlier, the main problem
for GAD candidates was their distance from a government which
was obviously well established in office and about to receive further
support through a strong victory in the congressional elections.
From a pragmatic point of view it made little sense for anyone not
anticipating a military take-over to support the Right. Local elites
sympathetic to the Right thus had to weigh political principles
against the practical risk of estrangement from the regime. The
absence of an alternative power structure at the centre, outside the
military, was another factor in this choice. Apart from Estrada, and
possibly Enrile, none of the GAD candidates had the fresh non-
Marcos electoral image required for victory. At least Enrile had the
credential of having participated in Marcos's overthrow even if he
was to apologise for his role in it during the campaign. However, his
solo style did not spread his support onto the rest of the GAD team.
When the extent of GAD's loss became apparent Estrada and Enrile
claimed that they would not sit in the new Senate even if they were
elected; but when their election began to look likely, both quickly
drew back from this posture, with Enrile switching back and forth
with the ebb and flow of his fortunes in the count. Estrada's early
confirmed win saw him heading rapidly in the direction of
Malacanang, white flag in hand. The outrage being expressed by the
losing GAD candidates was thus overshadowed by the musical chair
antics of their leading candidates. GAD made a wildly optimistic
attempt to revive the people's power EDSA demonstrations outside
the military camps, but failed abysmally on both sides of the fence.
Now that Enrile has made it to Senate an attempt has finally been
made to consolidate the Right by forming a GAD-UPP-KBL coalition
under his leadership.
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As recent events have shown, the threat of political action from
the military has persisted into the post-election period, as have
suspicions about Enrile's loyalty to the new constitution. The
strength of the late-August coup attempt led by Colonel Gregorio
Honasan was a reminder of how dangerous military opposition to
the civilian regime is and how sections of the military refuse to
acknowledge the repeated and massive popular endorsements of
the Aquino regime's legitimacy. Had Honasan managed to take
control of the government television station and broadcast this
success to sympathetic commanders in the provinces around Manila,
there could have been a snowballing effect and Aquino might have
been struggling to survive. But it is difficult to imagine how the
coup leaders supposed they could form a government which would
control the country if the coup had succeeded. The coup-makers
have put their activities down to dissatisfaction with government
handling of the communist insurgency and the growth of the NPA.
Aquino has, however, been taking a hard line on the insurgency,
while the NPA has abandoned its urban support centres to the
vigilante groups. It may even have contracted in size. In fact the
political rather than 'professional' aspirations of the Reform the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (RAM) group to which Honasan
belonged are well known. The line RAM officers took before and
during the overthrow of Marcos was that they were concerned
about the politicization of the military. Evidence now suggests that
they may have been more concerned about promotion blockages
which were frustrating the ambitions of middle-ranking officers like
Honasan. These ambitions had their financial side, since the higher-
ranking officers had better access to perks, though even officers of
Honasan's rank could turn their field commands to advantage - in
his case lucrative textile smuggling operations have been alleged
(Starner 1986:104). Since the change in goverment, there has been
a sharp reduction in the scope for such perks, while at the same
time sections of the civilian elite disadvantaged by Marcos have
made something of a comeback. The restoration of civilian control
over local government via the system of OICs further reduced the
role of the military in civil administration. Thus, precisely those
members of the armed forces concerned about their personal
prospects under Marcos, have seen these even further eroded under
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the Aquino government, and many of them now oppose the new
regime. Other problems include the semi-permanent state of high
alert the military has been on since February 1986; this has eroded
the day-to-day working conditions of almost every soldier and
focused attention on the fact that they are there to repel threats to
the civilan government by other soldiers as much as to resist the
NPA. Controlling the military will continue to be a major problem
for Aquino and the potential for collaboration between the civilian
Right and disgruntled officers should not be taken lightly.
The Left opposition coalition is likely to prove more durable
than its right-wing counterpart in the absence of military action - a
reflection of the less opportunistic character of its members and
their ideological commitment. A number of factors contributing to
the failure of the ANP campaign have already been noted:
harassment by OICs and obstruction by other members of local
elites, violence used against its campaigners in some areas and lack
of money. Around election time there was a suspiciously high level
of military activity in many of the ANP's rural support bases. This
led to civilian evacuations and disrupted voting in some precincts
thus reducing the ANP's vote. It is difficult to gauge the extent to
which this harassment was systematically pursued by state
organizations, but it certainly manifested itself at many levels.
Initially, the Comelec refused to register the PnB as an official party
because of what it asserted were its links to the armed communist
movement. Aquino herself is also personally antagonistic to the Left
opposition because of its refusal to work on her behalf in the anti-
Marcos struggle whereas she frequently makes reference, in the
manner of utang na loob (debt of gratitude), to the 'nice gestures' of
those who did support her. For a group with congressional
aspirations, the Left has never really recovered from its boycott of
the snap election and its opposition, shared with the Right, to
ratification of the constitution. This alignment with the Right
opposition to Aquino's legitimation measures has been very
unpopular. Many people also feel that it is the Right, rather than the
Left, which will exploit continuing Leftist confrontation with the
Aquino government.
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Most of the ANP's leadership blamed the coalition's poor
performance on harassment and cheating, but it is clear that the
ANP would not have come much closer to winning even in a fairer
election. This was recognized by Buscayno who blamed the Left's
loss on inexperience and lack of money. The latter was certainly a
problem. At 1.2 million pesos, the total ANP campaign budget was a
fraction of what any one GAD or administration candidate spent.
Lack of funds meant that the ANP was unable to print sufficient
leaflets and posters, let alone buy television or radio time. While
there was no correlation between election spending and results, the
meagre funds available to the ANP will not have aided their cause.
The enthusiastic turnouts of mainly youthful supporters at ANP
rallies in many provincial urban centres probably generated the
impression of much wider ANP support than there really was. Also
contributing to this view was some sympathetic print media
coverage for the coalition. Among the dailies, Malaya and MidDay
were the strongest supporters, but even Malaya, which has a
relatively large circulation by Philippine standards, sells only
91,000 copies per day. Of the ANP line-up, only Buscayno and
Morales were well-known nationally, but their NPA membership
was a dubious electoral asset. The ANP suffered a major loss in
mid- 1986 with the murder of Rolando Olalia, the KMU leader. Olalia
was reputedly a good organizer with a positive public image and
there was speculation in the ANP that he was murdered to reduce
the legal Left's electoral attraction. Finally, the ANP seems to have
been seduced by a fixation with sectoral support bases which led
many of its members to overestimate their strength. There were
frequent campaign references to the party's urban mass-base in the
KMU and to its rural mass-base in the KMP. At one point Beltran
suggested that this base could number over 8 million people. If
even half this number had supported the ANP, the suppression of
their will by the government would necessarily have been on the
scale of that employed by Marcos in 1986, and just as obvious to
observers. This does not, however, mean that support for the Left is
as low as their recorded vote. What is evident is that if the ANP is to
improve its performance there will have to be an improvement in
the popular acceptance of the Left as a legitimate contender in the
election process and alongside this, a change among many more
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Filipinos in the way political activities are viewed. Even then, it is
unlikely that the Left will be permitted to prosper in the legal arena
if it preserves its ideological stance since as things stand this stance
threatens the existing power structure. Working inside this
structure for its radical change may prove impossible. Many from
both the administration and the Left realize this and, for opposite
reasons, question the participation of the Left in the legal political
programme. The expulsion of moderate members of cabinet in
September indicates a shift further to the Right by Aquino.
Conclusion
What kind of national political administration has the
Philippines ended up with after the congressional elections? The
Philippines now has a reconstructed formal political system very
similar to the one which existed prior to martial law. The
constitution has allocated strong legislative and appropriation
powers to Congress coupled with a US-style presidential veto which
Congress can overrule with a two-thirds majority in each house.
Aquino must now find sponsors for her legislation before it can be
introduced. Although this will not be a problem in itself, capable
sponsors will naturally want to play a role in shaping presidential
measures before they bring them before the house. It therefore
seems likely that the focus of national political activity will move to
Congress. Pro and anti administration sides can be expected to
develop across the existing party affiliations. It is unclear as to how
far Aquino can rely on the congressional support of those who were
elected as 'Cory' followers since parties are fluid entities and strong
party discipline is unlikely. However, both the Senate president,
Jovito Salonga, and the lower house speaker, Ramon Mitra, are close
Aquino supporters. Indeed, Aquino persauded Mitra to run for the
lower house rather than the Senate so that he could act for her
there. Already, however, both men have had to fight hard to get
their choices into the leadership of the important house committees.
Policy outcome can be expected to be slow, with duplicated general
hearings and committee investigations needed for all legislation.
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Policy measures are also likely to be conservative in areas
demanding rapid and radical action. Land reform can be expected to
have a particularly difficult passage given Aquino's refusal to move
much beyond declaring the whole of the Philippines a land reform
area before leaving the issue to Congress for substantiation. In her
maiden speech to Congress Aquino painted a depressing picture of
the problems facing the Philippines. But if Congress shares her view
that these problems have been exclusively caused by Marcos's
abuses and by external factors, then the structural reforms
necessary to redress them are not going to be forthcoming. One of
Aquino's final independent executive orders extended the penalty
for subversion from six years to life imprisonment and may be an
ominous indicator of what lies ahead.
Despite some impressive growth figures, the economic situation
is still poor for most people. The population has grown beyond
anything that could ever be contained within the old semi-feudal
patron-client system described by observers like Landd (1965) and
Grossholtz (1964), but already in a state of dissolution at the time
they were writing (Machado 1971; Scott and Kerkvliet 1973).
Indeed, it was the degradation of this system, economic malaise and
rising expectations which provoked the martial law experiment in
preserving old structures of privilege via new political forms.
Expectations are still high, social distress is more intense, and the
old strucures of inequality are still there. Now that Aquino is no
longer alone on centre stage, people will be looking more critically
at the operation of the post-Marcos national political system. If
their hopes for a better future continue to be frustrated there is
more than one historical tradition to which they can turn in search
of a better life.
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time of Marcos's downfall and during the first eighteen months of
Aquino's presidency. Anne Mackenzie describes the events leading up
to Marcos's flight from the Philippines. But her main concern is to
examine the background to the events and to assess the competing
interpretations and explanations of them. Mark Turner traces
Aquino's quest for political legitimacy through the drafting and
popular approval of a new constitution. Discussion of the nature of
political legitimacy in the Philippines provides the setting for the
account of the latest constitutional developments. Marian Slmms is
concerned with the role of women and women's issues in the
drafting of the 1987 constitution. These matters are dealt with in the
general context of women and politics in the Philippines. Alan Robson
examines the second of Aquino's major legitimating measures, the
congressional elections of May 1987. He sorts out the protagonists,
looks at the characteristics of their campaigns and of the polling, and
analyses the results. He also outlines some of the major features of
contemporary Philippine politics.
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